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The apparent anomaly that initial public offerings (IPOs) are mispriced across time 
and markets has been a focus of academic research for over four decades. Previous 
studies on the subject have focused on the underpricing of IPOs. Using a sample of 
6171 IPOs that were issued from 1995 to 2013 in four markets – the United States 
(US - 2458 IPOs), Australia (1095 IPOs), China (2199 IPOs) and Malaysia (419 
IPOs) – we also find that IPOs are on average underpriced but that a concentration 
on the average overstates the extent of this underpricing with a significant 
proportion of IPOs actually being overpriced. In the US, the mean mispricing is 
34.90%, and the median is 2.40%, with 35.50% of IPOs being overpriced. In 
Australia, the mean mispricing is 25.51%, the median is 10%, and 37.70% of IPOs 
are overpriced. In China, the mean mispricing is 112.10%, the median is 71.40%, 
and 6.30% of IPOs are overpriced. In Malaysia, the mean mispricing is 1.80%, the 
median is -17.53%, and 59.42% of the sample IPOs are overpriced. 
A wide dispersion in mispricing exists across the four markets. The IPOs range 
from highly overpriced to extremely underpriced IPOs. We assemble a large 
number of firm-level and country-level variables to explain the mispricing, and we 
show how their impacts vary across the range of mispricing and across the four 
markets. The firm-level factors examined include company characteristics, offer 
characteristics, issue certification, prospectus disclosure, market sentiment, and 
institutional characteristics. These factors are found to have a varying impacts 
across different levels of mispricing.  
Country-level variables include institutional quality and economic strength. Our 
findings suggest that poor institutional quality adds to the uncertainty about the 
value of the firm and leads to more mispricing. 
Our cross-country examination of mispricing is one of the first studies to examine 
the relationship between a country’s economic strength and IPO mispricing. We 
find that the largest mispricing occurs in developing countries experiencing high 
economic growth, and that larger economic size reduces mispricing.  We further 
find that, while the country-level characteristics are differentiating factors across 





of mispricing, and that extreme levels of mispricing are better explained by firm-
level factors. 
We use the traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) and the more appropriate 
quantile regression (QR) methods as our methods of examination. The OLS 
approach focuses on the average impact that the independent variables have on 
mispricing. In this approach, the latent characteristics of the mispricing distribution, 
given that it does not follow a normal distribution, remain unexamined. On the other 
hand, the QR approach allows us to examine the varying effects that the 
independent variables have at different levels of mispricing due to the asymmetric 
distribution of returns. The QR approach enables us to identify the impacts of each 
variable on IPOs at particular levels of mispricing. The QR approach is a robust 
method which is able to deal with potential heterogeneity in the distribution, as was 
the case with our sample. We are able to compare the results derived from the 
median QR with those derived from the traditional OLS to enrich the literature in 
terms of the analysis of a skewed distribution. The QR method also enables us to 
examine different segments of the distribution of mispricing, including the tail 
regions. By doing this we are able to compare the impacts of the explanatory factors 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Introduction 
An initial public offering (IPO) occurs when a business entity first approaches the 
market to raise equity capital. This event is of significance to several important 
participants: the issuer, the investors and a number of institutions that play an 
important role (such as the underwriter), and eventually the market. An IPO offers 
the opportunity to raise capital to finance the expansion of an entity and/or for the 
current owners to realise on their investment. An IPO typically involves a financial 
institution that assists in bringing the entity to the market. The financial institution 
assists in reducing the cost of acquiring information, and in transacting and 
facilitating the issuing of equity. In particular, with respect to IPOs, they provide 
services such as assisting in setting the price, providing information to potential 
purchasers and ensuring that all regulatory requirements are met. The financial 
institution also underwrites and markets the shares. The investors seek to profit 
from the purchase and (re)sale of the shares. The market in which the IPOs are 
offered and traded facilitates the process of raising equity by providing a regulatory 
and institutional framework under which the three parties operate. Importantly, the 
sale of the shares involves the use of scarce capital resources and their deployment 
to contribute to the development of the economy. 
When IPOs are sold to investors, they are often found to be traded on a different 
price in the secondary market than the price at which they are first offered. This is 
referred to as mispricing. The mispricing is the difference between the price at 
which issuers offer their IPO shares for sale and the price at which those shares are 
traded in the secondary market. Since mispricing is usually calculated on the first 
trading day, it is also called first day returns. The phenomenon of mispricing has 
been observed across time and markets. Previous studies (e.g. Loughran, Ritter & 
Rydqvist, 1994; Autore, Boulton, Smart & Zutter, 2014) report the average 
mispricing to be positive, which is referred to as underpricing. Empirical studies 
spanning more than four decades report that the IPOs are persistently mispriced 
across markets, and that the average mispricing ranges from 11.90% to 29.6% in 
Australia, 6.2% to 78.5% in Brazil, 50.17% to 948.59% in China, 1.82% to 99.25% 





(US). These sizable first day returns made by the IPO investors have been an 
intriguing phenomenon for academics, and they have been consistently investigated 
in the literature. 
 Background 
The early evidence that the IPO stocks are offered below the price at which they are 
subsequently sold in the secondary market dates back to a Securities and Exchange 
Commission (1971) study that reports positive mean initial returns on newly issued 
common stocks. Since then, studies have continued to find IPO mispricing. Figure 
1.1 shows the frequency of studies that have examined the mispricing of IPOs 
across time.1  
Figure 1.1: Frequency of publications by years 
 
 
The first academic publication on the topic of IPO mispricing occurred in 1973. 
This was a paper by Dennis Logue titled “On the Pricing of Unseasoned Equity 
Issues: 1965-1969”, in which he studied 250 IPOs issued from 1965 to 1969. A 
simple text search of the article reveals that the words “underpricing” and 
“overpricing” appear six times and one time respectively in the article, and instead 
of using the term “initial public offering” he uses the term, “first public offering of 
common stock”. The second article found in the search was Ibbotson’s (1975) study 
titled “Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues” in which the author 
                                                 





























examines a sample of 120 IPOs issued from 1960 to 1969. Ibbotson finds mean 
initial positive returns of 11.4%. He refers to mispricing as “underpricing”, a term 
which appears seven times in the article. The graph of the publications on IPO 
mispricing shown in Figure 1.1 suggests that interest in IPO mispricing grew during 
the mid-90s, followed by a surge in the number of publications on the topic from 
2001 onwards. The highest number of articles published was 59 in 2016. 
A summary of the mispricing evidence is provided in Table 1.1 that shows that IPO 
mispricing occurs across time and markets. Overall, average mispricing is found to 
be positive, and the highest mispricing has been observed in China (157% to 
378.4%) and Malaysia (99.25%). The lowest mispricing has been observed in the 
UK (11.41%) and Germany (9.2%). The other descriptive statistics such as median, 
minimum, maximum and skewness measures are not widely reported in the 
literature. 
The levels of IPO mispricing reported in previous studies show a huge difference 
between the mean and median levels of mispricing. For example, Lee, Taylor and 
Walter (1996) report a 16.41% mean and a 10% median for mispricing in Australia, 
Wang (2005) reports a 271.90% mean and a 123.90% median in China, Kooli and 
Suret (2001) report a 20.57% mean and a 5% median in Canada, Ahmad-Zaluki, 
Campbell and Goodacre (2007) report a 95.20% mean and a 76.50% median in 
Malaysia, Lin, Pukthuanthong and Walker (2013) report a 55.83% mean and a 
36.19% median in South Korea, and  Lee and Kuo (2010) report a 28.42% mean 
and a 17.89 % median in Taiwan. For the US, Miller and Reilly (1987) report a 
9.87% mean and a 2.78% median whereas Chang et al. (2014) report a 13.36% 
mean and a 6.27% median. Given the skewness observed in the distribution of first 
day returns, it is somewhat surprising that this issue has received little attention in 
the literature. In addition, wherever the minimum level of mispricing is reported, it 
has been found to be negative. A comparison between the minimum level of 
mispricing and the median level of mispricing indicates that a proportion of the 
IPOs are overpriced, which is also a subject which has received little attention in 
the literature. 
Research that attempts to explain why IPOs are mispriced and yield positive first 
day returns on average refer to this phenomenon as an anomaly. The fact that IPO 





Table 1.1: Mispricing across time and markets 
Country Study Period Mean (%) Median (%) Min (%) Max (%) Skewness 
US Miller & Reilly (1987) 1982 – 1983  9.87 2.78 -21.07 124.94 2.54 
Hong Kong McGuinness (1992) 1980 – 1990 17.60     
US Michaely & Shaw (1994) 1984 – 1988 7.27  -29.87 136.81  
Australia Lee et al. (1996) 1976 – 1989 16.41 10.00 -50.00 240.00  
Germany Ljungqvist (1997) 1970 – 1993   9.20         
Japan Hamao, Packer & Ritter (2000) 1989 – 1995   15.70         
Malaysia Jelic, Saadouni & Briston (2001) 1980 – 1995  99.25 79.04 -65.80 396.96   
Canada Kooli & Suret (2001) 1991 – 1998  20.57 5.00     2.15 
Belgium Engelen (2003) 1996 – 1999  14.32         
China Wang (2005) 1994 – 1999  271.9 123.90 -50.40 4,900.00   
UK Hill & Wilson (2006) 1991 – 1998  11.41   -21.59 153.55   
Malaysia Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) 1990 – 2000  95.20 76.50 -53.80 400.00   
China Guo & Brooks (2008) 1984 – 2005  378.4 119.37 -82.40 38,300.00   
France Chahine (2008) 1997 – 2000  22.70 9.80       
Taiwan Lee & Kuo (2010) 1997 – 2007  28.42 17.98 -57.92 503.85 20.35 
China Lee, Hsieh & Yen (2010) 1993 – 2005  144.42 108.16 -86.90 3,283.33 786.36 
Brazil Boulton, Smart & Zutter (2010) 2000 – 2004  13.70 13.90       
China Gao (2010) 2006 – 2008  157.00   0.00 538.00   
India Hopp & Dreher (2013) 1988 – 2005  96.74   26.68 534.82   
Singapore Hopp & Dreher (2013) 1988 – 2005 22.43   -2.22 55.71   
South Korea Lin et al. (2013) 1991 – 2011  55.83 36.19       
New Zealand Lin et al. (2013) 1991 – 2011  17.95 31.51       
Indonesia Husnan, Hanafi & Munandar (2014) 1995 – 2012  23.06 15.42 -71.78 175.79   
Greece Autore et al. (2014) 1998 – 2008  58.30         
Taiwan Chang, Chen, Kao & Wu (2014) 2006 – 2010 50.60 34.00 -10.00 233.33   
US Chang et al. (2014) 2006 – 2010 13.36 6.27 -29.55 161.25   
Australia Bird & Ajmal (2016) 1995 – 2013 25.51 8.62     4.70 





number of studies which have proposed a number of explanations. This is evident 
from the word-cloud2, shown in Figure 1.2, which is based on the keywords of the 
articles that examine the mispricing phenomenon. The word-cloud shows that most 
of the research relates to: IPO, underpricing, initial, public, and offerings. Less 
prominent terms include information, corporate, performance, governance, and 
venture. 
Figure 1.2: Map of words that appear most frequently in the articles’ keywords 
 
 
Figure 1.3 shows the word-cloud of the words that appear most frequently in the 
abstracts of the articles. The most frequent words are not much different to those 
appearing in Figure 1.2. The most commonly used words are IPOs, firms, market, 
underpricing, public, performance and results. Words that appear less frequently in 
the abstracts include: information, investors, returns, price, equity, venture and 
capital. 
The word-clouds in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 depict the overall focus of the literature 
regarding IPOs. The focus revolves mainly around the following contexts: the 
underpricing of IPOs, capital, commitment, ex-ante uncertainty, information 
asymmetries surrounding IPOs, the relationship between IPO mispricing and 
underwriters, the role of venture capitalists in IPO mispricing, corporate 
governance and IPO performance, institutional settings and IPO mispricing, 
signalling theory, prospectus disclosure and market performance. The leading 
                                                 





topics are the underpricing of IPOs, and many theories that attempt to explain this 
phenomenon. Particular theories may be more applicable to some contexts than 
others, but they are not mutually exclusive. These theories are discussed in Chapter 
2. 
Figure 1.3: Map of words that appear most frequently in the articles’ abstracts 
 
 
 Motivation and research questions 
The above discussion highlights some gaps in the mispricing literature which led to 
the formation of our research questions. First, the fact that the mean of the IPO 
mispricing which has always been found to be positive has led to a focus on 
underpricing. This is evident from the fact that underpricing is frequently used to 
refer to IPO mispricing. However, a number of IPOs are also overpriced, which can 
be observed from the minimum first day returns reported in Table 1.1. This 
indicates that a significant proportion of IPOs are overpriced. At the same time, 
there is a huge difference between the mean and the median first day returns. These 
observations suggest that the distribution of the first day returns might not be 
normal and this leads us to our first research question. 
Research question 1: What is the distribution of mispricing across the four 
markets? 
Second, the focus of the literature has been on explaining why IPOs are 
underpriced. Whereas, we find that a proportion of IPOs are overpriced. To address 





the mispricing. IPOs with negative first day returns are referred to as overpriced 
IPOs; IPOs with positive returns are referred to as underpriced IPOs and IPOs that 
have close to zero returns are called fairly priced IPOs.3 In order to examine the 
factors that impact the levels of mispricing we put forward our second research 
question. 
Research question 2: What are the factors that contribute to mispricing at different 
levels of mispricing? 
Third, most studies in this area have focused on explaining the mispricing 
phenomenon through firm-level characteristics such as the characteristics of the 
firm going public, offer characteristics, the characteristics of the financial 
institutions associated with the firm and the characteristics of the market where the 
firm is going public. This is, again, evident from the keywords associated with the 
articles and from other words frequently used in the articles. It is only recently that 
researchers have started to examine the effects of country characteristics on 
mispricing (e.g. Autore et al., 2014; Boulton, Smart & Zutter, 2017; Engelen & van 
Essen, 2010; Hopp & Dreher, 2013). This leads to our third research question. 
Research question 3: How do a country’s characteristics impact IPO mispricing? 
This thesis addresses these questions by examining the mispricing of IPOs in four 
markets: the US, Australia, China and Malaysia. The reason for selecting these 
markets is that they are at different stages of development, they have different 
regulatory and institutional frameworks, and different levels of economic strength 
and institutional quality. The US market also serves as a benchmark case and 
studies on the other three countries are compared with US studies. Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) Market classification classifies the US and Australia 
as developed markets. China and Malaysia are classified as secondary emerging 
(under-developed) and advanced emerging (developing) markets, respectively. The 
classification is primarily based on the regulatory environment and the market-
oriented practices prevalent in each country. 
                                                 





The dominant method of pricing IPOs in the US is the book building method.4 In 
Australia and Malaysia the dominant method of pricing IPOs is the fixed price 
method. The Chinese IPO market has experienced a transition from the fixed price 
method to the book building method. The phases of this transition are discussed in 
Section 6.1. Firms going public in the US hire financial institution(s) to underwrite 
their IPOs, whereas in Australia, firms going public are found not to underwrite 
their issues, and may only use a financial institution to manage the issue. On the 
other hand, Chinese firms were required to hire government-owned financial 
institutions as underwriters. This practice changed to the hiring of private financial 
institutions as underwriters when the book building method of pricing was adopted 
in 2005. In Malaysia, firms listing in the ACE (Access, Certainty and Efficiency) 
market are required to hire a Bursa Malaysia-nominated financial institution as an 
underwriter. The institution also assumes a role as an adviser for a period of three 
years after the company is listed in the ACE Market. 
The four countries also differ in terms of their institutional quality, a characteristic 
which is measured using a set of six indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2015) (i.e. control of corruption, government effectiveness, political 
stability, regulation quality, voice and accountability and rule of law). These 
measures show that Australia has the highest level of institutional quality across all 
six measures, followed by the US, Malaysia and China. In terms of economic 
strength (measured as GDP per capita), Australia and the US rank highest. On the 
other hand, China has the highest level of economic growth (measured as the 
percentage growth in GDP) followed by Malaysia, Australia and the US. 
This thesis examines the mispricing of IPOs at both the intra-country and inter-
country levels to identify the factors that cause variations in the mispricing of the 
IPOs. The factors that we include in the examination are the characteristics of the 
                                                 
4 In the book building method the underwriter sets the offer price after assessing the non-binding 
offers submitted by the investors and demand for the shares. Under the fixed price mechanism the 
IPO shares are sold at a price predetermined by the issuer and the underwriter. The other methods 
of going public are auction and hybrid offers. In the auction method, investors submit binding orders 
stating a specific number of shares at a certain offer price. After the submission of the orders, an 
auction pricing mechanism is used to assign the shares. The hybrid offer method is a combination 





firm that is going public and the characteristics of the country where the firm is 
going public. 
In addition to using the traditional approach used for examining the mispricing of 
IPOs (i.e. the ordinary least squares (OLS) method), we use the quantile regression 
(QR) approach, developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), to conduct our analysis. 
The QR approach has several advantages over the OLS method. The key difference 
between the two approaches is that they use different distributional reference points 
to examine the impacts of firm- and country-level factors on mispricing. The OLS 
method explores the effects of explanatory factors on mean mispricing values. The 
estimates that are obtained from the OLS approach are assumed to be fixed across 
the distribution of IPO returns. In addition, the OLS method has to meet the 
condition of normal distribution for its estimates to be reliable. In contrast, the QR 
approach can examine the effects of factors on multiple quantiles of mispricing 
distributions. Therefore, the QR allows us to examine various levels of mispriced 
IPOs, including those that lie within extreme value ranges. Hence, we are able to 
differentiate between the impacts that the explanatory factors have on the 
overpriced and the underpriced IPOs. 
 Contribution of the thesis 
By addressing the research questions that emerged from the literature on 
mispricing, this thesis makes the following contributions to the literature. Firstly, 
we show that IPOs are mispriced by varying magnitudes across markets. The 
magnitudes of mispricing are not only different across the markets but also within 
markets. While IPOs are on average underpriced, the levels of magnitude vary 
within the markets (i.e. there are overpriced IPOs, fairly priced IPOs and 
underpriced IPOs). Secondly, we examine the various levels of IPO mispricing 
using both the OLS and the QR approaches. The use of the QR approach allows us 
to examine the different levels of mispricing, that is, overpriced IPOs, fairly priced 
IPOs and underpriced IPOs, and to differentiate between the impacts that the 
independent variables have on mispricing in these categories. We show that the 
relationship between mispricing and the explanatory factors are not monotonic, 
which is not captured by the OLS method. Instead, the relationship differs across 
different levels of mispricing. Third, we show that the different levels of mispricing 





economic strength. Our cross-country study is the first to examine the relationship 
between a country’s economic strength and mispricing.  Lastly, the book building 
method of pricing IPOs is found to reduce the level of mispricing. This is 
particularly apparent when one examines the connection between mispricing and 
changes to the type of pricing regime used in China. 
 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 (Literature review) provides a summary of the mispricing evidence 
across the world and the explanations that are put forward to explain the mispricing 
phenomenon at both the firm level and the country level. 
Chapter 3 (Variables, data and method) discusses the variables used to examine IPO 
mispricing and the sources used to obtain data for those variables. This is followed 
by a discussion of the method used to examine mispricing across the four sample 
countries. 
Chapter 4 (the United States) discusses the mispricing of IPOs issued in the US. 
Chapter 5 (Australia) discusses the mispricing of IPOs issued in Australia. 
Chapter 6 (China) discusses the mispricing of the IPOs in China. This chapter also 
provides insights into the impact of the book building method of IPO pricing on the 
mispricing of IPOs in China.  
Chapter 7 (Malaysia) discusses the mispricing of IPOs issued in Malaysia. 
Chapter 8 (Mispricing and country-level institutional framework) examines the 
impacts of country-level institutional frameworks on IPO mispricing across the four 
markets. Country-level institutional framework variables are institutional quality 
and the economic strength of the country.  
Chapter 9 (Conclusion) concludes the thesis by highlighting the major contributions 
made by this study to the broader IPO literature and identifies directions future 





2 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 Introduction 
The difference between the price at which issuers offer an IPO and the price at 
which the shares close on the first day of trading is taken as a measure of mispricing. 
The common finding, across markets and over time, is that IPOs are on average 
underpriced. The fact that issuers are willing to underprice IPOs and hence 
seemingly leave large amounts of funds on the table has intrigued researchers for 
over four decades. The existing literature includes several attempts at explaining 
the mispricing of IPOs, but little attention has been paid to the fact that a significant 
proportion of the IPOs are overpriced. This chapter aims to review the existing 
literature that provides explanations of the phenomenon of IPO mispricing. 
However, since we examine mispricing in four individual markets, the studies that 
examine those markets are reviewed in their respective chapters. 
 Theories that explain IPO mispricing 
The process of going public involves the participation of four parties: the issuer, 
investors, financial institutions (such as those acting as underwriter/s) and the 
market. Issuers approach markets to raise capital and investors seek investment 
opportunities to yield returns. Financial institutions help ensure the IPO is fully 
subscribed by underwriting, marketing and managing the offer. The market is an 
institution that provides regulations and a framework to facilitate the process of 
going public. When shares are mispriced, a question arises: Which of the IPO 
parties gain and which of the participants lose? The literature contains various 
theories which attempt to answer this question. Ibbotson (1975) was the first to 
provide plausible reasons for why money is left on the table. Ibbotson provides the 
following arguments to possibly explain the mispricing phenomenon: 
 The US securities regulations encourage underwriters to offer the IPO 
shares below their expected value. 
 Issues are mispriced to ‘leave a good taste in investors’ mouths’ so that 
subsequent offerings from the same issuers will sell at higher prices. 






 Underwriters misprice IPOs in case their underwriting spread does not 
sufficiently cover the risk they are taking. 
 There may be a mechanism under which investors compensate issuers for 
selling the issue at a discount.  
 Issuers and underwriters misprice IPOs as insurance against litigation risk.  
Ibbotson states that these are inadequate explanations for the observed mispricing, 
as each of them involves either unknown legal constraints, unnecessarily 
complicated indirect compensation schemes, or irrational behaviour by the parties 
involved in the IPO process. The sections that follow discuss the various theoretical 
explanations that have been put forward to explain the phenomenon of mispricing. 
One explanation that receives significant empirical support is based on asymmetric 
information theory. Ljungqvist (2007) concludes that information asymmetry has a 
first order effect on mispricing. Other explanations of the mispricing phenomenon 
are based on: insurance against litigation (Tinic, 1988), wealth redistribution 
(Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995), regulatory constraints (Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995), 
ownership dispersion (Booth & Chua, 1996) and ‘hot issues’ market (Ritter, 1984). 
It should be noted that most of these explanations were developed based on the US 
IPO market, and may not be applicable in other markets as the features of the US 
IPO market may be different from others. The rest of this section discusses the 
explanations listed above.  
2.2.1 Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is said to be the key underlying reason for the average 
positive difference between IPOs’ offer prices and market prices. Information 
asymmetry refers to different levels of information possessed by three parties: the 
issuer, the investors and the underwriter(s). 
2.2.1.1 The winner’s curse model 
The winner’s curse model developed by Rock (1986) suggests that underpricing 
IPOs is a rational move by the issuer in an environment which is informationally 
asymmetric for different types of investors. Investors are categorised based on their 
levels of information about true value of the firm. Informed investors will have 
superior information about the value of the firm while uninformed investors’ 





they assess firm’s value. As a result of this difference in the level of information, 
the informed investors will compete with the uninformed investors for good issues. 
Informed investors will only subscribe to issues which are attractively priced, 
whereas uninformed investors will not be able to discriminate between good and 
bad issues. This causes the winner’s curse for the uninformed investors as they will 
face competition from the informed investors for good issues and this will decrease 
the probability of their being allocated good issues. On the other hand, when bad 
issues are available, uninformed investors will face no competition and will end up 
purchasing disproportionate levels of overpriced stocks. This implies that the fact 
that the IPOs are on average underpriced is of no significance to uninformed 
investors as there is a high probability that they will not get the subscribed number 
of underpriced IPOs and will get 100 per cent of the overpriced IPOs. For such 
uninformed investors, the average returns they yield from investing in IPO shares 
will be negative. If uninformed investors expect to lose money they will withdraw 
from the IPO market and the only investors left to participate in IPO activity will 
be informed investors. Rock (1986) argues that informed demand is not sufficient 
to subscribe to all the shares, even when the shares are attractively priced. 
Therefore, the IPO market is dependent on the continuous participation of 
uninformed investors. Thus, to encourage uninformed investors to participate in the 
market, issuers leave some money on the table to ensure their continuous 
participation. 
The empirical examination of winner’s curse by Beatty and Ritter (1986) finds 
average mispricing of 18.80%. They suggest two explanations for the positive mean 
return. First, they demonstrate that the positive returns are caused by the 
information asymmetry that exists between the investors. Second, they argue that 
the issuers hire financial institutions to underwrite the IPOs to ensure subscription, 
as the financial institutions are known to the investors whereas the issuers are new 
to the market. Therefore, there is an equilibrium relation between ex-ante 
uncertainty and mispricing which according to Beatty and Ritter (1986) is enforced 
by underwriters. Michaely and Shaw (1994) find evidence supporting the existence 
of winner’s curse attributing higher mispricing to greater information asymmetry. 
They show that when investors know they do not have to compete with informed 





good reputation, this reduces mispricing as the IPOs underwritten by reputable 
financial institutions experience less mispricing. 
In summary, the winner’s curse model suggests that issuers deliberately misprice 
IPOs to mitigate information asymmetry among investors and attract uninformed 
investors to participate in the IPO process. Therefore, if issuers do not want to 
attract uninformed investors, they do not have an incentive to misprice. 
2.2.1.2 The Signalling Model 
Signalling model of mispricing states that mispricing is a deliberate action 
performed by issuers to provide a signal of the true value of firms. This model 
assumes that information asymmetry is present between the issuers and investors. 
Issuers, who are better informed about the value of the firm, future cash flows and 
the associated risks, reveal information about the firm to reduce the information 
asymmetry. The model was first proposed by Spence (1973) in the context of labour 
market behaviour. Later, works by Leland and Pyle (1977), Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989), Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) examine the impact of the 
information revealed by issuers on IPO mispricing. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that the information asymmetry between the issuers 
and investors leads to poor market performance. Therefore, the issuers reduce this 
information asymmetry by revealing information about their value. One such piece 
of information is the proportion of ownership stake that the issuers retain in the firm 
at the time of IPO. Bradley and Jordan (2002) argue that issuers who retain higher 
proportion of shares at IPO misprice more. For instance, the issuers who retain 
higher proportions of shares signal the market of their superior knowledge about 
future cash flows. Welch (1989) argues that mispricing is a result of a signal that 
an issuing firm sends to the market about the likelihood of profitable returns from 
investing in the IPO. By intentionally offering shares at lower prices at the IPO, the 
firms seek higher prices for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) which compensates 
for mispricing the initial offering. This implies that in cases when issuers do not 
intend to go for a seasoned offering, they are likely to underprice less, or may even 






Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Allen and Faulhaber (1989) argue that it is the 
issuer who has the best information about the value of the firm and the issuer wants 
investors to know about their superior quality. To achieve this, issuers use the low 
price and size of IPOs as a signal for investors. Their assumptions back Ibbotson’s 
(1975) proposition that IPOs are underpriced to ‘leave a good taste in investors’ 
mouth’. When the same issuer sells more shares in subsequent offerings, investors 
are more willing to subscribe to their offers. Therefore, mispricing becomes a 
credible signal for investors that the firm is worthy of their investment. This implies 
that positive mispricing (underpricing) should favour high value firms, as investors 
will make favourable inferences regarding the subsequent performance of the firms. 
Similarly, low-value firms that know that the aftermarket performance of their 
shares will be poor and that they will not be able to recover the money left on the 
table in the form of underpricing will not be able to afford to price their shares low 
as a form of signal; on the contrary, they will be inclined towards overpricing their 
shares.  
Like Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Allen and Faulhaber (1989) Brennan and 
Hughes (1991) show that issuers use the offer price as a signal of quality. Their 
argument is that, by setting a lower offer price, issuers attempt to attract the 
attention of analysts so that they produce more research reports about their stocks, 
which acts as an incentive to gain higher brokerage commissions. Thus, by setting 
the offer price low, issuers signal their high quality, leading to less ex ante 
uncertainty and lower first day returns. In doing so, high risk firms can attract 
analysts’ attention by setting low offer prices. However, if a lower price 
disproportionately benefits riskier firms, investors might revise their perceptions of 
the firm's intrinsic riskiness, resulting in an opposite impact: IPOs priced lower (by 
riskier firms, who wish to signal quality by increasing investor transaction costs to 
attract more analyst’s coverage) are associated with higher mispricing. It is mostly 
the underwriter himself / herself who later provides analysts with coverage. Lower 
pricing translates directly into a wealth transfer from investors/owners to the 
underwriter (in subsequent commissions). 
Consistent with the above mispricing theories, different variables like offer price, 
offer size, earnings per share forecast and retained ownership are identified as 





mispricing. For example, Beatty and Ritter (1986) show that firms that retain higher 
proportions of shares at the time of IPO are more mispriced; Dimovski and Brooks 
(2004) show that firms that predict higher future cash flows are more mispriced; 
Gygax and Ong (2011) find a positive correlation between offer price and 
mispricing; and lastly Autore et al. (2014) show that smaller offer size leads to more 
mispricing. 
2.2.1.3 The underwriter’s power theory and issue certification 
Firms that are going public need underwriting services, such as advice, pricing and 
distribution. These services are offered by financial institutions, which possess 
better information about the capital markets and have the expertise needed to sell 
the issue to the investors. Issuers can obtain value from this role by delegating the 
underwriter to make the decision about the offer price. Baron (1982) model 
hypothesises that the underwriters possess superior information about the market, 
and about pricing IPO shares, and therefore they will choose the second-best price 
level. They do so to expend less in marketing the offer and ingratiate themselves 
with their buy-side clients. As a result the IPO is mispriced compared to the first 
price. 
On the other hand, Campbell and Kracaw (1980) argue that the underwriters 
performing the information production role can reduce information asymmetry and 
increase the price investors are willing to pay. This implies that underwriters can 
play a part in achieving more accurate pricing. This notion is supported by the 
‘certification hypothesis’ which suggests that the underwriters certify the offer price 
with their reputation capital (Booth & Smith, 1986). Based on this rationale, it can 
be argued that involving a reputable underwriter reduces mispricing by making the 
firm more credible. Further, the involvement of a reputable underwriter also implies 
that the underwriter is risking its reputation and would not associate itself with a 
poor quality firm (Fernando, Gatchev & Spindt, 2005). 
 
Various studies have been conducted to examine the impact of issue certification 
on mispricing. Carter and Manaster (1990) see underwriter reputation as a measure 
of issue certification because reputable underwriters provide better certification and 





and Loughran and Ritter (2002), find that reputable underwriters are associated with 
more mispricing. They suggest that this is driven by the changing characteristics of 
the firms going public. Later studies support the finding that if the underwriter has 
a good reputation, this increases mispricing (e.g. Dolvin & Jordan, 2008; Gygax & 
Ong, 2011). 
Issue certification is not only provided by underwriters but also by other players in 
the IPO process. Megginson and Weiss (1991) show that the involvement of a 
venture capitalist (VC) can also reduce investors’ uncertainty about the value of a 
firm. The involvement of a venture capitalist provides investors a degree of comfort 
as they know that the VCs would have used their knowledge and resources to assess 
the firm, and would have performed extensive due diligence before becoming 
involved. Later studies by Chang, Gygax, Oon and Zhang (2008) and Engelen and 
van Essen (2010) confirm this finding. 
2.2.1.4 The cascade theory 
Welch (1992) argues that the IPO market is subject to information cascades. The 
term ‘information cascade’ refers to investor behaviour when investors rely on the 
buying behaviour of earlier investors and tend to overlook the information they 
themselves possess. When a potential investor observes that no one else is 
subscribing to the stock they may also not purchase it, despite having favourable 
information. To avoid this happening, an issuer may misprice the new issue to 
generate the interest of the first few buyers to subscribe. This behaviour creates a 
cascade effect and all subsequent investors are induced to purchase the stock, 
irrespective of the information they possess. This theory has different implications 
for the fixed price and book building methods of pricing IPOs. Under the fixed price 
method, because the price is pre-set by the issuer (and underwriter), issuers tend to 
misprice more, as initial investor behaviour triggers sequential demand and later 
investors will follow them. In the book building method the issuer (and underwriter) 
are less uncertain and have a better idea of what investors will be willing to pay for 
the IPO and so can price more correctly that leads to less mispricing. Therefore in 






2.2.1.5 The costly information acquisition theory 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that underwriters tend to induce informed 
investors to reveal information about the firm valuation during the pre-selling 
process. The book building method is a mechanism used by underwriters to induce 
informed investors to reveal accurate information. This information is then used in 
the issue pricing. In order to encourage informed investors to reveal accurate and 
positive information, underwrites misprice the offer as a compensation. 
Furthermore, the issues where more favourable information is revealed have higher 
mispricing levels than the ones where less favourable information is revealed. 
Sherman (2000) shows that IPOs are mispriced as compensations for investors to 
evaluate issues. This rationale is more applicable in an environment where the book 
building method of pricing is prevalent. On the other hand, if the investors provide 
incorrect information, the issue may be priced higher than what market is willing 
to pay and this will lead to negative returns. 
2.2.2 Institutional reasons 
There are three institutional theories that explain IPO mispricing: litigation against 
risk, price stabilisation by underwriters and political interference. A relatively 
recent body of literature has emerged which uses macro-environment variables to 
capture the institutional factors affecting IPO mispricing (see Section 2.3). 
However, at the firm level, there is little empirical evidence available, primarily 
because of the lack of availability of the data that is required to empirically test 
these reasons, especially for examining price stabilisation activities carried out by 
underwriters and for studying political interference in the IPO process. Price 
stabilisation involves the underwriters carrying out trades to prevent the price from 
falling below a certain level. Price stabilisation activity can only be examined if the 
information on identity of the entity (or investors) carrying out the trade and the 
volume of trade are available. The price stabilisation activity is not widely 
researched, in some cases because laws in several countries do not allow price 
stabilisation activities, and in others because the data is not made available due to 
privacy protection. Likewise, it is generally difficult to know whether politicians 






2.2.2.1 Insurance against litigation 
The idea that IPO mispricing provides a cover against litigation risk from investors 
who are disappointed with the performance of IPO shares goes back to Ibbotson 
(1975). This idea does not have a lot of empirical support (e.g. Drake & Vetsuypens, 
1993; Hughes & Thakor, 1992; Keloharju, 1993), but it does have some economic 
relevance. Regulatory bodies impose strict policies regarding disclosure of new 
issues, which makes all signatories liable for any material omission in the 
prospectus. This exposes issuers and underwriters to the risk of litigation by 
shareholders on grounds of excluded or misstated information in the prospectus 
(Tinic, 1988). 
Another important legal requirement under which issuing firms are bound is to 
disclose in the IPO prospectus any potential risk factors5 that the issuers deem may 
affect the firm’s operations. This motivates riskier firms to include more risk factors 
in the prospectus to avoid misrepresentation and reduce the litigation risk. 
However, the higher number of risk factors reported in the prospectus increases the 
issuer’s risk profile and results in higher mispricing. Beatty and Welch (1996) and 
Gygax and Ong (2011) find that IPOs that report more risk factors in their 
prospectuses are mispriced by larger amounts. 
2.2.2.2 Price stabilisation 
Price stabilisation refers to artificially manipulating the demand and supply of IPO 
shares to manage share prices in the secondary market.6 The function of price 
stabilisation is primarily performed by the financial institution acting as an 
underwriter, and/or in some cases, by their analysts who provide buy and sell 
recommendations. The practice of price stabilisation is legal in many countries such 
as the US, the UK, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. However, the empirical 
evidence on actual price support activities is limited to the US market and that 
information is also restricted by limitations on data availability (Ritter, 2003; Ruud, 
1993). 
                                                 
5 This is mandated by Item 503 of Regulation S-K under the US Securities Act of 1933 which 
provides reporting guidelines for public companies in the US. Similar disclosure is mandated in 
Australia by Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. 
6 Our discussion on price stabilisation is limited to discussing the empirical evidence because price 
stabilisation is restricted in three out of the four sample markets (Australia, China and Malaysia) 





The evidence shows that underwriters follow new issues in the aftermarket by 
performing stabilisation and price support activities, which Ritter (2003) considers 
as legally permissible manipulation of stock prices in the aftermarket. In the US, 
most underwriters get an overallotment option of 15 per cent of the total shares 
offered. This overallotment option is fully exercised in about 66 per cent of the 
issues. The purpose of using the overallotment option is to cover short position in 
case of price decline in the initial period of the stock issue. Moreover, underwriters 
also make penalty bids 7  to penalise investors involved in stock flipping. This 
practice encourages underwriters to allocate issue to buy-and-hold investors and 
discourages investors who sell instantly after listing. It is commonly observed that 
underwriters sell up to 115 per cent of the IPO shares if low IPO demand in the 
aftermarket is predicted. Since a maximum 115 per cent of the number of shares 
outstanding can be issued, the underwriters use the overallotment option to cover 
the short position for the extra 15 per cent of the offer size (Aggarwal, 2000). 
According to Hanley, Kumar and Seguin (1993) engaging in price support activity 
decreases underwriters’ holding risk in the aftermarket. Schultz and Zaman (1994) 
examine IPO aftermarkets and find that underwriters make inside bids for cold 
IPOs8, and that they repurchase around 20 per cent of the stock available at the time 
of the IPO during the first three days of trading. They also report that for cold IPOs, 
the volume of sell bids is higher than the volume of buy bids for the first three 
trading days. 
2.2.2.3 Political interference 
The area that receives the least attention in empirical examinations of mispricing is 
political interference in the IPO process at the firm level. The proposition that IPO 
mispricing is caused by interference from political elites in the IPO process is 
mostly argumentative, indirect and observation-based. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
(2001) mention that regulatory constraints imposed on IPO pricing, such as the 
requirement that IPO pricing should follow prescribed procedure and must be 
between limits determined by a pre-set price-to-earnings ratio. 
                                                 
7 “Penalty bids” refers to the practice in which underwriters penalise investors who quickly sell their stock 
(flip) in the aftermarket by taking their selling concessions (see Aggarwal, 2000). 





Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) highlight some cases where IPO were allocated to gain 
favour with politicians. One of the highlighted cases involved the large and 
intentional underpricing of The Recruit Cosmos IPO in Japan, which then led the 
prime minister to resign. Most of the shares were allocated to politicians. When 
details were released many of the politicians involved had to resign. The scandal 
later led to crucial amendments to IPO regulations. During denationalising of 
British government services in 1979, the government, in order to appease voters, 
intentionally underpriced and allocated shares to a wide range of voters across the 
country. As a result the government raised $57 billion and budget surpluses 
emerged during the period 1979–1990. British denationalised IPOs had average 
initial returns of 41 per cent, which is higher than the average underpricing of 
normal issues (see Levis, 1993). This and other historical evidence suggests that 
most of the denationalised IPOs are usually more mispriced than new issues of other 
companies. Moreover, studies of the Chinese market also suggest IPO mispricing 
is a result of political interference and political favours. Tian (2011) sheds some 
light on this issue in an examination of IPO mispricing in China.  The study states:  
 
First, the government frequently intervenes in the market. For instance, a 
policy commentary explicitly commented on the high price-earnings ratios 
of the stock market in People's Daily, the official newspaper of China's 
Communist Party, in 1996. This official commentary brought down the stock 
index 32% in only two weeks. The government also uses other methods to 
influence this market for its policy targets, including the IPO quota system 
to be illustrated in this paper. Second, rent-seeking activities appear rampant 
with corruptions in the primary market and insider trading is commonplace 
in the secondary market. Third, the market was somehow closed to most 
international investors. Without licenses, foreign investors are not allowed 
to invest in the major Chinese stock market, which is called the A-share 
market. In fact, the qualified financial institutional investors program was 
not implemented until the end of 2002, and allows only very large investors, 
like Morgan Stanley, to invest in China's A-share market with limited capital 
under the authorization of the CSRC (p. 81). 
 
2.2.3 Regulatory constraints and ownership dispersion 
Mispricing of IPOs may be caused by constraints put on IPO pricing by regulators. 





IPOs are priced without regulatory restrictions. In countries (such as China at one 
time) where regulations require that IPOs be priced based on book value, dividend 
yield, price-to-earning or market-to-book ratios, mispricing is found to be high (e.g. 
Guo & Brooks, 2008; Jelic et al., 2001; Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001).  
Similarly, in countries where shareholders’ rights are strong, issuers prefer 
dispersed ownership to reduce outside control. To achieve this, issuing firms 
deliberately misprice the issue to generate excess demand for their shares among a 
large body of small investors. This dispersed ownership increases the market 
liquidity of the issue and keeps management safe from outside influence (Booth & 
Chua, 1996). Brennan and Franks (1997) suggest that firms intentionally misprice 
issues to dilute ownership concentrations. Some managers, at disadvantage of 
shareholders, may misprice an issue for control reasons. Some managers, to benefit 
the shareholders, may overprice the issue. 
2.2.4 ‘Hot issues’ market 
Ljungqvist (2007) reports that cycles exist in the initial returns of US IPOs. There 
are periods when IPOs are on average underpriced; then there are periods when 
IPOs are on average overpriced and periods when the IPOs are significantly 
discounted. The period of significantly high levels of mispricing is referred to as 
‘hot issues’ market, was initially identified by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and later 
by Ritter (1984). They show that the mispricing of IPOs is greater in buoyant 
markets.9 The evidence for the existence of hot issues markets is not restricted to 
the US and is also observed in other markets. For example, Davis and Yeomans 
(1976) in their study of the UK market find that high market returns cause 
significant rises in the valuation of the new issued shares. McGuinness (1992) 
reports similar findings for the Hong Kong market. According to McGuinness IPOs 
are more mispriced during bull markets than bear markets. Similar findings are 
reported by Ljungqvist (1997) for Germany where IPO mispricing is positively 
correlated with stock market returns preceding the IPO date, and with favourable 
macroeconomic conditions measured by Business Climate Index.10 This suggests 
                                                 
9 A buoyant market is referred to as a period when the market index indicates high returns. 
10 Developed by Ifo Institutive for Economic Research, the Business Climate Index is a leading 
indicator for macroeconomic activity in Germany. This index is aggregation of surveyed data, 





that IPOs will be more mispriced when firms go public during periods of market 
exuberance when investors are more likely to overvalue IPOs. 
 Mispricing and country-level characteristics 
A relatively recent body of literature has emerged that suggests that IPO mispricing 
is also caused by country-level characteristics, such as institutional quality and 
economic condition. Institutional quality is determined by the formation, 
enforcement and compliance of laws within an economic structure (van Essen, Van 
Oosterhout & Heugens, 2013). Studies by La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
suggest that differences in the institutional frameworks of countries explain the 
differences between the financial markets and decision-making processes of 
companies and investors. Similarly, the economy has a huge impact on how 
financial institutions perform. Robinson (1952) argues that economic growth results 
in higher demand for financial services, which leads to financial development. As 
an economy grows, its gives rise to economic activities which tend to become more 
specialised. Specialised economic activity requires the formation of markets that 
provide a trading structure which facilitates easy access to capital for companies 
and provides investment opportunities for investors. In the following subsection, 
we examine the impacts of institutional quality and economic conditions on 
secondary markets and IPO mispricing.  
2.3.1 Institutional quality 
La Porta et al. (1997) demonstrate that the legal framework of a country impacts on 
the size and operations of its capital markets. Having a developed institutional 
environment that has better regulations and implementation of laws makes it easier 
for firms raise capital through IPOs (Boulton et al., 2010). At the same time a strong 
institutional environment also protects outside investors against any risk of 
expropriation by majority shareholders or management, and puts control of the 
initial owners at risk. However, in an environment where the risk of the 
expropriation is less, there is less risk associated with subscribing to those IPOs, 
which in turn leads to lower levels of mispricing and vice versa. On the other hand, 
if the initial owners have cheap and effective strategies which enable them to retain 





selling IPO at a lower price, the incentive to misprice will be minimal.11 In such 
cases, the issuing firms are more incentivised to overprice. Peng and Jiang (2010) 
also show that, in countries with stronger institutions, the benefits of having 
concentrated ownership may outweigh the costs, and the owners would not misprice 
to maintain control over the firm.  
As discussed in the previous sections, IPO mispricing is largely impacted by firm-
level uncertainties about firm value. A growing body of literature indicates that not 
only firm-level uncertainties, but also uncertainties that are present in the 
institutional frameworks of countries, have a significant impact on IPO mispricing 
(Autore et al., 2014; Engelen & van Essen, 2010). A country with poor rule of law 
and inadequate legal protection for investors has greater uncertainty about its post-
issue operations and strategic decisions. In such an environment, investors who 
subscribe to IPO shares will require more money left on the table to compensate for 
the risk they take by investing in those IPOs. Thus, the higher the level of 
uncertainty about the firm, the higher the mispricing of the IPOs is likely to be. The 
uncertainty caused by country-level factors adds to the uncertainty caused by firm-
level factors. Firms with lower quality underwriters, for instance, are mispriced to 
a greater extent due to higher firm-level ex-ante uncertainty about firm value. 
However, a firm that has a lower quality underwriter and goes public in an 
environment with poor regulations and rule of law is likely to be more mispriced 
than one with a lower quality underwriter that goes public in an environment with 
better regulations and rule of law. 
Another way a country’s institutional quality affects ex-ante uncertainty is the 
future distribution of firm value among its corporate stakeholders. In a country that 
has poor regulations and low government effectiveness, controlling shareholders 
will have more opportunities to transfer assets or firm profits at the expense of the 
minority shareholders. Thus, a higher probability of expropriation of profits by 
controlling shareholders is likely to increase ex-ante uncertainty, resulting in higher 
IPO mispricing. Cheung, Ouyang and Weiqiang (2009) show that this expropriation 
                                                 
11 This is based on the findings of Brennan and Franks (1997) that IPO firms misprice to create 
excess demand causing oversubscription of the IPO shares, then by rationing they create dispersed 
ownership base so that the initial owners retain control on the firm. Brau and Fawcett (2006) and 





of wealth takes place in the form of investor dilution, asset stripping and transfer 
pricing. Therefore, investors in a country with a poor institutional framework will 
have more uncertainty about their returns on investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Therefore, issuers in these countries are likely to have to leave money on the table 
to attract investors to subscribe to the IPO. 
Corruption is also argued to be a key factor in IPO mispricing (Jenkinson & 
Ljungqvist, 2001; Tian, 2011). Corruption is found to be associated with reductions 
in investment by a firm which as a result ceases to grow (Ades & Tella, 1997). 
Firms in this position also suffer from reduced productivity and less effective 
management (Athanasouli & Goujard, 2015). They also tend to be less efficient 
(Dal Bó & Rossi, 2007), and cause significant harm to growth of private firms 
(Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012). Corruption can also divert a company away from its 
regular efficient operations (Gounopoulos & Huang, 2017). All of these factors may 
contribute to increased uncertainty about the firm, resulting in higher mispricing. 
This suggests that higher levels of corruption (indicating lower levels of 
institutional quality) would result in greater mispricing of IPOs. 
Being located in a country with high-quality institutions has both positive and 
negative impacts on mispricing. On one hand, strong institutions make it easy for 
firms to raise capital; on the other hand, strong institutions also strengthen positions 
of minority investors and reduce the entrepreneurs’ control over their firms 
(Djankov et al., 2008; Boulton et al., 2010). Similarly, strong regulations and good 
law enforcement make corporate disclosure more transparent, and also expose firms 
to the risk of losing value in the event of loss making. Therefore, issuers in countries 
with strong institutions who want to retain control over their firms have an incentive 
to price their IPOs lower, as setting a lower price will result in dispersed ownership 
and less monitoring by minority shareholders (Boulton et al., 2010). On the other 
hand, Engelen and van Essen (2010) argue that strong institutions reduce 
uncertainty, as investors are more confident that they are protected by law against 
any expropriation by the controlling shareholders, and thus firms in these situations 









A growing economy gives rise to demand by firms for raising capital. Thangavelu, 
Jiunn, and others (2004) use change in GDP per capita as a measure of economic 
growth, and find that a growing economy improves the efficiency of financial 
markets and increases investment opportunities in stock markets. Levine and 
Zervos (1998) find a positive correlation between stock market trading and GDP 
growth. This suggests that a growing economy increases demand for new capital 
and is likely to give rise to IPO activity. Similarly, Ritter (1984) finds that IPOs are 
more mispriced at times when there are more firms going public. This is further 
supported by Hopp and Dreher (2013) who find a positive correlation between IPO 
mispricing and GDP growth. On the other hand, the size of the economy, measured 
as GDP per capita, is meant to reduce ex-ante uncertainty and subsequent 
mispricing about the firms, since large economies are associated with a less risky 
business environment (Engelen & van Essen, 2010). Boulton et al. (2017) report an 
indirect relationship between the size of the economy (measured as the log of GDP 
per capita) and IPO mispricing. Their study focuses on examining the impact of 
country-level accounting conservatism12 on IPO mispricing. They show that larger 
economies have higher levels of conservatism and that higher levels of 
conservatism lead to less mispricing. This supports the view that IPOs in larger 
economies are likely to be less mispriced. 
 Summary 
The literature, which spans over four decades, suggests that IPOs are consistently 
found to be mispriced across time and markets. While IPOs are on average 
underpriced, a significant number of them are overpriced. Theories that explain the 
mispricing of IPOs by looking at firm-level factors suggest that the mispricing is 
caused by: (a) information asymmetry between IPO participants, (b) information 
signalled by the issuers to mitigate the information asymmetry, (c) the role and 
impact that a financial institution acting as an underwriter has on mispricing, (d) 
ownership dispersion and (e) hot issues markets. In addition, a recent body of 
                                                 
12 Boulton et al. (2017) define conservatism as accounting practices through net book value of assets 





literature suggests that in addition, the strength of a country’s institutional quality 
and economy also affects the mispricing of IPOs. 
Our review of the literature identifies that studies examining IPO mispricing show 
that (a) the literature on IPO mispricing has focused mainly on explaining the 
underpricing phenomenon, and that little attention has been paid to explaining the 
overpricing of IPOs; (b) country-level studies are not very common in the domain 
of IPO mispricing; and (c) the literature on the relationship between IPO mispricing 
and the state of a country’s economy is extremely scarce. 
The next chapter discusses the research design by putting forward (a) the variables 
that are used in the subsequent empirical chapters, (b) the sources from where the 





3 Chapter 3: Variables, Data and Method 
 
 Introduction 
Building on the previous chapter, in Section 3.2 we discuss the variables used to 
examine the mispricing in the four sample countries – the United States (US), 
Australia, China and Malaysia. Section 3.3 outlines the data sources for each 
country, which is followed by a discussion of the methods that are used to examine 




3.2.1 Measuring first day returns 
IPO mispricing is measured as the first day IPO returns expressed as the percentage 
difference between the first day closing price of the IPO and the IPO offer price as 
shown in Equation (3.1).  
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑡 - 𝑃0
𝑃0
                                                                             (3.1) 
where 
RRi,t = first day raw return of stock ‘i’  
Pt = first day closing price of stock ‘i’  
P0 = offer price of stock ‘i’. 
 
3.2.2 Firm-level independent variables 
The discussion in the previous chapter has highlighted several firm-specific 
variables that have been found to explain mispricing in markets. We use a 
combination of these factors to examine their impacts on mispricing of IPOs across 
the four markets. Appendix B describes all the variables used in the thesis, describes 
the symbols to represent them, and identifies the data sources used to assess their 
impacts. 
3.2.2.1 Company characteristics  
The extant information about the company going public has an effect on mispricing. 





information is available, the issuers have to provide incentives (by lowering the 
share price) to the investors to encourage them to purchase the IPO shares. The size 
of the firm, measured by the value of pre-listing assets (logAssetsi, measured as 
natural log of one plus the total assets stated in the balance sheet), is a good 
indication of issuer quality. Larger firms are usually associated with less 
information asymmetry as more is known about them and thus require less 
mispricing (Beatty & Welch, 1996). Similarly, the age (logAgei, measured as natural 
log of one plus the age of the firm in years at the time of going public) of the issuer 
is used as a measure of the issuer’s quality. The older the issuer, the greater the 
availability of historical information on pre-listing performance to help investors 
arrive at a more accurate valuation of the equity, and thus reduce the ex-ante 
uncertainty and mispricing (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). 
Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik (1992) argue that issuers tend to signal 
private information to the market by providing earnings forecast (EPSi) in the 
prospectus. Issuers seek to distinguish themselves by providing earnings forecasts 
as good news to investors (Lev & Penman, 1990), which reduces information 
asymmetry and requires less mispricing. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that the owners of firms going public have superior 
information about the quality of the firm’s operations, and thus the proportion of 
their own funds invested in the firm are likely to signal their long-term commitment 
to the firm as well as the issuer’s expectations about the future profitability of the 
firm. Therefore, a higher proportion of shares retained (RetOwni, calculated as one 
minus the number of shares issued divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding) by the owners is likely to induce higher first day returns. Welch (1989) 
shows that the issuers who highly underprice their IPOs are likely to retain a larger 
portion of the equity and will sell it in later offerings to garner higher proceeds. On 
the other hand, since the issuers know more about the prospects of their firms they 
may increase the issue price to profit from the expectations of a profitable future, 
which is likely to result in lower levels of mispricing. 
3.2.2.2 Offer characteristics 
The capital to be raised in the IPO (logOSi),, measured by natural logarithm of the 





the issue and the magnitude of the issuer’s intentions regarding future expansion. 
The total value of money to be raised from the IPO is a proxy for future expansion 
and firm quality. Plans for significant future expansion reduce ex-ante uncertainty 
and the resultant mispricing (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Gygax & Ong, 2011). This 
finding is confirmed by Corhay, Teo and Tourani-Rad (2002), Dolvin (2005), 
Chang et al. (2008) and Tian (2011). 
The two most commonly used methods used by firms to go public (IMi) are fixed 
price offers and book building. Under fixed price offers, the issuers offer the IPO 
at a pre-determined fixed price for investors to submit their subscription offers. In 
this case, the issuers have less information about the demand for the IPO which 
leads to higher mispricing. On the other hand, the book building method involves 
the underwriters engaging with potential investors to assess their interest as an 
indication of the demand and the value that the investors place on the IPO. In the 
context of Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse model, Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) 
argue that the book building method of going public, as it is based on better 
information, reduces information asymmetry, leading to lower levels of mispricing. 
The price of the issue, offer price (InvOPi,, one divided by the final offer price per 
share), has been found to be a major determinant of magnitude and direction of the 
mispricing. Gygax and Ong (2011) find that a lower offer price leads to less 
mispricing. This is because firms that set a lower offer price experience an increase 
in relative transaction costs for investors and higher post-IPO trading commissions 
which attract more scrutiny by analysts who are likely to closely follow such stocks. 
Brennan and Hughes (1991) suggest that issuers use a lower offer price as a signal 
of quality and thus reduce uncertainty by attracting analysts’ coverage. On the other 
hand, Chang et al. (2008) find that a lower offer price increases mispricing. Beatty 
and Welch (1996) argue that if a disproportionate percentage of riskier firms set 
lower offer prices, then investors are likely to revise their risk perceptions about the 
firm, leading to a greater mispricing of IPO shares. 
3.2.2.3 Issue certification 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) find that issuers attempt to signal the quality of their 
offering by appointing a reputable financial institution as the underwriter (UMSi). 





underwriter will carry out thorough due diligence or otherwise put their own 
reputation at risk (Booth & Smith, 1986; Carter, Dark & Singh, 1998).  Therefore, 
firms that are underwritten by reputable underwriters are likely to experience lower 
levels of mispricing (Dimovski & Brooks, 2004; Guo & Brooks, 2008). 
Similarly, the involvement of a venture capitalist (VCi) also reduces investors’ 
uncertainty about the value of the firm. The rationale is that this involvement 
provides investors with a degree of comfort, since the investors know the VCs will 
have used their knowledge and resources to assess the firm by performing extensive 
due diligence before getting involved. Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that IPOs 
that involve venture capitalists as early investors are less likely to be mispriced. 
Later studies by Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Cao, Tang, and Yuan (2013) 
confirm these findings.  
3.2.2.4 Prospectus risk disclosure 
Issuers are required to disclose in the prospectus the risk factors (RFi) associated 
with the new issue and the steps undertaken to minimise these risks. While riskier 
firms are expected to yield higher returns, the provision of the steps taken to 
minimise those risks that may potentially affect the IPOs would reduce the ex-ante 
uncertainty associated with the IPOs and thus the resulting mispricing. Hence, the 
inclusion of the risk factors in the prospectus shifts the risk to investors, reducing 
the marketability of the issue and increasing the uncertainty and the resulting 
mispricing (Beatty & Welch, 1996). 
3.2.2.5 Market sentiment 
Ritter (1984) suggests that more firms go public during periods of euphoric market 
sentiment (MP30i), and that IPO mispricing is higher in periods when markets are 
performing well. Autore et al. (2014) suggests that market index returns are a good 
measure of market sentiment and high returns will increase the initial IPO returns. 
Further, studies show that the level of mispricing is influenced by the timing of the 






Similarly, Paudyal et al. (1998) show that market volatility also increases 
mispricing of IPOs. For this we use RelVol as a measure for realised volatility, 
calculated in Equation (3.2). 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙 =  






                                                     (3.2) 
 
where: 
PXi = price return index level of the market index on day t. 
N = Number of trading days in lookback period 
 
3.2.2.6 Institutional characteristics 
The time lag between the IPO date and the listing date is found to be positively 
associated with mispricing (Mok & Hui, 1998; Yu & Tse, 2006). Different 
explanations have been offered for this behaviour. For example, in instances where 
the offer price is set many days before the IPO sale closes, information about the 
demand for the IPO may be leaked. This information is an important factor in 
determining the price at which the IPO will be traded in the aftermarket. Such a 
leak of information would drive oversubscription of the IPO shares and increase the 
initial IPO returns. On the other hand, if the investors consider the issue is priced 
too high and the IPO is likely to fail, the issuers are led to misprice the IPOs and 
leave money on the table to avoid IPO failure (Chowdhry & Sherman, 1996). In 
contrast, How, Izan, and Monroe (1995) argue that the length of the time lag 
between the IPO days and the listing date is a good indication of informed demand 
for the IPO. They suggest that issues that are sold quickly have more informed 
demand and are more mispriced, whereas issues that take time to sell are less 
mispriced. The incidence of long delays between the IPO date and the listing date 
are more prevalent in China where time lag is found to be significantly and 
positively related to the mispricing (Chen, Firth & Kim, 2004; Tian, 2011). 
The stock exchange where the IPO is listed is also an important driver of IPO 
mispricing. Loderer, Sheehan and Kadlec (1991) and Corwin (2003) report 
significant differences in the first day IPO returns of issues made on different stock 





Australia, China and Malaysia. China and the US, each country has two stock 
exchanges. Malaysia has two boards that operate within Bursa Malaysia (formerly 
known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange). Hence, we control for the exchange 
of listing (Exchangei) or the listing board (Boardi) using an appropriate dummy 
variable in each study. There are two stock exchanges in mainland China (i.e. the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE)), where 
domestic A-shares are traded. Chen et al. (2004) show that the IPOs listed in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange are more mispriced than those in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. Similarly, there are two main stock exchanges in the US (i.e. the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association 
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)). The companies that are 
listed in the NASDAQ are mostly technology and growth companies which are 
likely to be more mispriced. The literature has found the NYSE is less mispriced 
than the NASDAQ (Lowry, Officer & Schwert, 2010). In Malaysia, issuers can 
choose between boards (i.e. the Main Market and the ACE Market for listing). 
However, the issuers need to meet the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
(BMLR) in order to get a listing. The former has stricter scrutiny than the latter. 
3.2.3 Country-level independent variables 
 
3.2.3.1 Institutional quality 
The first day IPO returns vary across countries (Loughran et al., 1994), which a 
relatively recent body of literature attributes to the quality of the country’s 
institutions and the state of the economy in which an IPO is listed. Therefore, to 
examine the impact of country-level factors on IPO mispricing, we use the proxies 
of institutional quality developed Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) and 
updated by Kaufmann et al. (2015). These proxies capture the institutions and 
traditions within a country that drive the exercise of authority. This includes policy 
formulation and implementation, institutions governing economic and social 
interactions, and selection of government. The proxies are measured by a set of six 
variables: control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and 
the absence of violence, regulation quality, voice and accountability, and rule of 
law. According to Engelen and van Essen (2010), the higher the institutional 





3.2.3.2 Economic growth and size 
La Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. (2008) suggest that the rate of growth and 
size of an economy affect a firm’s ability to raise capital, as firms in smaller or 
weaker economies are likely to find it hard to raise funds through IPOs, and thus 
fewer companies will go public. We choose two economic variables to measure 
economic strength: economic growth (GDP growth) and economic size (GDP per 
capita). La Porta et al. (1997) argue that economic growth rate affects valuations 
and IPO activity. A growing economy increases the demand for domestic equity 
and thus more firms approach equity markets to raise capital.  Meanwhile, investors 
are willing to pay higher prices for the shares. Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan 
(2001) find a positive correlation between GDP growth rate and first day IPO 
returns. Engelen and van Essen (2010) argue that a country with a large economy 
(measured as GDP per capita) will have lower ex-ante uncertainty and thus will 
require lower mispricing. 
 Data 
This thesis examines IPO mispricing in four countries over a sample period of 
1995–2013. Multiple sources are used to collect the data for each market. Details 
of sampling are listed below. 
The United States: The names, listing dates and data on independent variables of 
4014 US IPOs were identified using the SDC Platinum New Issues Database. The 
data on missing observations was filled using prospectuses sourced from Thomson 
One Banker, stock exchange websites and Jay Ritter database.13 The daily trading 
prices of stocks, the NYSE Composite Index and the NASDAQ Composite Index, 
which are used as benchmarks for market performance and for the calculation of 
realised volatility, are collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The 
construction of the final sample for analysis involved certain adjustments. The firms 
with missing data, missing identifiers, unavailable historical prices, unit trusts, 
stapled securities 14 , issues without a public offer component and ADRs were 
                                                 
13 Prof. Ritter’s IPO data is publicly available at https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/  
14 A stapled security is a type of financial instrument. It consists of two or more securities that are 






excluded.15  We ended up with 2458 IPOs for the final sample. The data is used in 
Chapters 4 and 8. 
Australia: The data were obtained from multiple sources. The names and the listing 
dates of 1361 Australian IPOs were identified using the Morningstar Global 
Database. The offer prices of the IPOs and all the independent variables except for 
market performance and realised volatility were obtained from the IPOs’ 
prospectuses, available on the Thomson One Banker and Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) websites. The daily trading prices of the stocks and the ASX All 
Ordinaries Index, which was used as a benchmark for market performance and for 
the calculation of realised volatility, were collected from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. The construction of the final sample for analysis involved certain 
adjustments. Firms with unavailable prospectuses, unavailable historical prices, 
unit trusts, stapled securities, issues without a public offer component and CHESS 
Depository Interests (CDIs) were excluded. The final sample consisted of 1095 
IPOs. The data is used in Chapters 5 and 8. 
China: The names and listing dates of 2235 Chinese A-share IPOs, listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), were 
identified using the Morningstar Global Database. The data for all the independent 
variables except for market performance and realised volatility were collected from 
in the IPO prospectuses available on the Thomson One Banker and the SSE and the 
SZSE websites. The daily trading prices of stocks and the composite indices of the 
market where the stocks are listed, which are used as benchmarks for market 
performance and for the calculation of realised volatility, were collected from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. The construction of the final sample excluded firms 
with unavailable prospectuses, unavailable historical prices, close-end funds and 
issues without a public offer component. We ended up with a final sample of 2199 
IPOs. The data is used in Chapters 6 and 8. 
 
                                                 
15 Exclusions of unit trusts, stapled securities, issues without public offer component and CDIs from 
the US data as well from the other countries data are carried out following Krigman et al. (1999) 
and Ritter and Welch (2002). These types of offerings are not considered as an IPO and would not 





Malaysia: The names and listing dates of 459 Malaysian IPOs issued during our 
sample period were obtained from Bursa Malaysia. The offer prices of the IPOs and 
all the independent variables except for market performance and realised volatility 
were obtained from the IPOs’ prospectuses, available via the Thomson One Banker 
and Bursa Malaysia websites. The daily adjusted trading prices of the stocks and 
the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index, which was used as a benchmark for market 
performance and for the calculation of realised volatility, were collected from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. The construction of the final sample excluded firms 
with unavailable prospectuses and unavailable historical prices, unit trusts, stapled 
securities and issues without a public offer component. We ended up with a final 
sample of 419 IPOs. The data is used in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Country-level data: For the country-level variables, Worldwide Governance 
Indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2015) were obtained from World Bank’s 
governance indicators. The data on GDP growth and GDP per capita were sourced 
from World Development Indicators available from the World Bank’s data 
catalogue. The time series exchange rates, which were used to convert offer price, 
total assets, offer size and EPS values from home currency to US dollars, were 
obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The data was used in Chapter 8. 
 Method 
This section describes the empirical methods used to analyse the effects that the 
independent variables have on the IPO mispricing. First, we describe the empirical 
model used to investigate the relationship between the first day IPOs returns, 
followed by the estimation techniques. 
3.4.1 Empirical model 
Based on the above discussion, our base model is given in Equation (3.3). 
 















+  𝜀𝑖    (3.3) 
 
where the dependent variable is the natural log of one plus the first day returns 
calculated in Equation (3.1); 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗






𝑘  refers to a set of country-level variables; 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑙  is a set of country dummies to 
control for country effects and 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑚 is a set of year dummies introduced to control 
for time effects. Equation (3.7) provides a base model to examine the determinants 
of the IPO mispricing. The selected countries differ in their institutional and 
regulatory characteristics, and thus we have to slightly modify the individual 
models for each country in order to reflect the institutional characteristics in that 
country. To capture these changes, we present separate empirical models to 
examine the determinants of mispricing in each country study by dropping or 
adding independent variable(s) where necessary. 
3.4.2 Estimation techniques 
In order to examine IPO mispricing in the four countries, we use the regression 
model in Equation (3.3). Regression analysis studies changes in the dependent 
variable as one or more independent variable changes. If we have a dependent 
variable y and a set of independent variables x, we seek to understand changes in y 
– that is, E(y | x), conditioned on changes of x. 
A common way of examining the impact a set of independent variables has on an 
independent variable is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The functional 
form of which is given in Equation (3.4). 
 
yi = xi.βi + ui          (3.4) 
where yi is the dependent variable. xi represent a set of independent variables to be 
regressed against yi, i is the unknown coefficient of the independent variable to be 
estimated, and ui is the error term. The subscript i (i = 1, 2 … N) denotes the ith IPO 
firm.  The OLS regression estimates are obtained by minimising the sum of squared 
errors where the focus is on the mean of the response variable given the changes in 
the explanatory variables. This minimising technique is obtained by Equation (3.5). 
min ∑(𝑢𝑖)
2
=  ∑ (𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 −  𝑥𝑖𝑖)
2                      (3.5) 
The coefficient, i, of Equation (3.4) would only provide an interpretation as to the 
extent and direction of the effect xi would have on the mispricing. Similarly, 





gives the conditional mean. This shows that the estimates obtained from the OLS 
method only gauge the accurate mean effect that the independent variables have on 
the dependent variable when the latter follows a normal distribution. Therefore, the 
OLS estimates may not capture the true relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables when the former’s distribution is not normal. And focusing 
on the central region of the sample distribution would not differentiate between the 
effects of the independent variables on the IPOs that have negative, zero and 
positive first day returns. Since first day IPO return distributions are found to be not 
normal in the literature (e.g. Michaely & Shaw, 1994; Dimovski & Brooks, 2004; 
Wang, 2005; Dolvin & Jordan, 2008), and this is also the case with our sample IPOs 
(see Chapters 4–8), using the OLS method might provide poor estimates. 
In cases when distribution of first day returns are found to be right skewed, the 
quantile regression (QR) approach developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) is a 
more suitable method for examining first day returns (Buchinsky, 1998; Autore & 
Peterson, 2009; Lee et al., 2010; Lee & Kuo, 2010). The QR approach is an 
estimation method which allows us to examine the relationship between yi and xi 
for all the areas of the distribution yi. These areas of the distribution are referred to 
as quantiles. The QR approach provides a good alternative which mitigates the 
effect of the non-normality of the data and to capture the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables at varying levels of the sample distribution, 
including the tail regions. The QR approach allows us to examine the latent 
characteristics of the distribution of the IPO mispricing which ranges from negative 
to positive. By doing so the QR addresses the issue of distributional asymmetry in 
the estimation process. 
The functional form of the quantile regression model is expressed in Equation (3.6) 
for the qth quantile. The value of q ranges from zero to one. 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖
 (𝑞) +  𝑢𝑖
(𝑞)
                                     (3.6) 
 
where yi is dependent variable. xi represents a set of independent variables to be 
regressed against yi, (q) is an unknown coefficient of the independent variables to 
be estimated associated with the qth quantile, and 𝑢𝑖
(𝑞)





with qth quantile. The regression estimates of (q) associated with the qth quantile 
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By changing the value of q from 0 to 1, Equation (3.7) produces (q) for the 
independent variables corresponding to the chosen quantile of the dependent 
variable. In this way, the quantile regression examines the whole distribution of the 
first day returns conditional on the independent variables. The comparison between 
Equations (3.5) and (3.7) reveals that in Equation (3.5) the sum of errors is 
minimised using equal weight which comes from a symmetric distribution, whereas 
Equation (3.7) minimises the absolute value of all the errors with unequal weights. 
The sum of the absolute values of all the errors is divided into two parts, the first 
part is assigned the weight q and the second part (1 – q). The comparison between 
the (q) of different qs could reveal potential differences in the behaviour of the first 
day returns across the sample distribution. This allows us to compare the impacts 
that the independent variables have on the different categories of the first day 
returns (e.g. overpriced vs. underpriced IPOs), which is not possible if we use OLS 
to explain the relationship between the dependent and independent variables across 
the sample. 
The above discussion highlights the benefits of using the QR method over the OLS 
method. First, the use of QR allows us to overcome the issue of non-normality 
which is a key assumption for the OLS method. Second, the OLS, which focuses 
on the mean of the sample distribution, only provides a unique set of coefficients 
to ascertain the magnitude and direction of the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables. The QR, on the other hand, produces multiple sets of 
coefficients corresponding to the selected quantiles across the whole distribution of 
the first day returns. By doing so, the QR method allows us to examine the whole 





dependent and independent variables.  That is, we can examine the impact of the 
independent variables on the overpriced, fairly priced and the underpriced IPOs. 
 Summary 
Building on the literature review provided in Chapter 2, this chapter provides a 
discussion of the variables that are used in the examination of IPO mispricing across 
the four markets. Several variables are proposed to capture multiple factors that 
affect IPO pricing behaviour: company characteristics, offering characteristics, 
issue certification, risk disclosure, market sentiment, institutional factors, country-
level institutional quality and economic size and growth. 
Multiple sources are used to collect data such as the Morning Star Global Database, 
Thomson Reuters Datastream, Thomson One Banker, SDC Platinum, the ASX 
website, the Bursa Malaysia website, Jay Ritter’s IPO database and the World 
Bank’s data catalogue. 
The thesis uses two types of regression models to examine IPO mispricing – the 
OLS and QR approaches. The OLS approach focuses on the average impact that 
the independent variables have on mispricing (which is usually positive). In this 
approach, the latent characteristics of the mispricing distribution, given that it does 
not follow a normal distribution, remains unexamined. Therefore, to examine the 
non-unique effects that the independent variables have on the various levels of 
mispricing due to asymmetric returns distribution, we employ the quantile 
regression (QR) approach. The QR approach enables us to identify the impacts of 
the factors on IPOs that fall within a particular level of mispricing. The QR method 
provides us with the following advantages over the OLS method. First, the QR 
approach is a robust method which deals with potential heterogeneity in the 
distribution, as is the case with our sample. Second, we are able to compare the 
results derived from the median QR with those derived from the traditional OLS to 
enrich the literature in terms of the situation of skewed distribution. Third, the QR 
method also enables us to examine different segments of the distribution of first day 
returns, including tail regions. By doing this we are able to compare the impacts of 
the explanatory factors on different levels of misprcing – that is, overpriced, fairly 






4 Chapter 4: Mispricing in the United States 
 
 Introduction 
This is the first of the five empirical chapters that examine the mispricing of IPOs 
in several markets – in this chapter, the United States (US) market. The US IPO 
market is considered to be the most thoroughly researched markets. This is reflected 
by the amount of literature that is produced on theoretical and empirical 
examinations of US IPOs. It is one of the most developed markets according to the 
MSCI Market classification and is usually referred to as a benchmark market for 
comparison with the other IPO markets around the world (e.g.  Hamao et al., 2000; 
Ljungqvist et al., 2003; Gygax & Ong, 2011). The reasons the US IPOs market is 
used as a benchmark are: the US being the largest economy in the world having the 
most IPOs, its regulatory and institutional framework in which book building is the 
dominant method of pricing the IPOs (79.7% of the sample), its less stringent listing 
regulations, its shorter lock-up periods, its pre-issue marketing and the fact that 
underwriters have permission to carry out after-market activities.16 Therefore, we 
take the US as our starting point for examining IPO mispricing.  
Using a sample of 2458 IPOs listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) 
during the period from 1995 to 2013, we find mean mispricing of 34.90% and 
median mispricing of 2.4%, with 35.5% of IPOs having less than zero per cent 
returns (i.e. they are overpriced) and only 18.63% of the IPOs having returns above 
the average returns. The distribution of these returns is skewed to the right, with a 
skewness measure of 5.31, indicating that the return distribution is not normal.17  
Previous studies concentrated on explaining the average mispricing (i.e. 
underpricing). Whereas, we show that underpricing is driven by a relatively small 
number of IPOs and that the distribution of the first day returns consists of a whole 
spectrum of mispricing ranging from significantly overpriced to significantly 
                                                 
16 Aftermarket activities are briefly discussed in Section 2.2.2.2. The impact of these activities is 
examined by Ruud (1993), Hanley et al. (1993), Schultz and Zaman (1994) and Aggarwal (2000). 
Due to a lack of the sensitive data required to study these activities, we exclude them from the scope 
of our study. 
17 We conducted the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and Breusch-Pagan-Cook-Weisberg tests for 





underpriced IPOs. To explain this wide divergence of mispricing we divided the 
mispricing distribution into various levels based on the magnitude and direction of 
the mispricing. The levels of mispricing for the US IPOs are: highly overpriced, 
overpriced, fairly priced, underpriced, highly underpriced and extremely 
underpriced. 18  The characteristics of the IPOs within each level of mispricing 
suggest that the IPOs of the firms that are young in age, large in size, have a venture 
capitalist and/or underwriter backing and are listed in the NASDAQ tend to be 
underpriced. These IPOs also tend to go public during periods of positive market 
performance and high market volatility. On the other hand, overpriced IPOs tend to 
be older, and have higher earnings forecasts, higher offer prices and less reputable 
underwriters. 
 Studies in the US 
In the US, the empirical evidence of mispricing dates back to the early study by 
Ibbotson (1975) who examined a randomly selected sample of 120 IPOs over a 
period of 1960–1969 and finds them to have been mispriced by an average of 
11.40%. Subsequent studies have continued to find that US IPOs are being 
mispriced: 26.30% (Ritter, 1984), 7.27% (Michaely & Shaw, 1994), 8.08% (Carter 
et al., 1998), 22.60% (Bradley & Jordan, 2002). 50.40% (Aggarwal, Krigman & 
Womack, 2002) and 34.80% (Loughran & McDonald, 2013). A list of key studies 
examining the US market and IPOs’ reported mean and median levels of mispricing 
are provided in Table 4.1. A key feature of IPO mispricing largely overlooked by 
these studies is the skewness of the distribution, which is clearly observable from 
the differences between mean and median mispricings. For example, Aggarwal and 
Rivoli (1990) reported a 10.67% mean and a 1.92% median mispricing in a sample 
of 1598 IPOs, Krigman et al. (1999) reported a 12.30% mean and a 6.20% median 
mispricing in a sample of 1232 IPOs, and Loughran and McDonald (2013) reported 
a 34.80% mean and a 13.30% median mispricing in a sample of 1887 IPOs. 
The studies that examine IPO mispricing in the US market have identified various 
factors that have an effect on the direction of mispricing. The factors that are found 
to increase mispricing are: higher proportion of ownership retained by issuer 
                                                 
18 The overpriced IPOs are those that have negative returns, the fairly priced IPOs are those with 
close to zero returns (between -0.0001% to +0.0001%) and underpriced IPOs are those that have 





(Beatty & Welch, 1996; Bradley & Jordan, 2002), higher number of risk factors 
reported in the prospectus (Beatty & Welch, 1996), provision of earnings per share 
forecast (Loughran & McDonald, 2013), large offer size (Beatty & Welch, 1996; 
Meigginson & Weiss, 1991), euphoric markets (Ritter, 1984) and listing in the 
NASDAQ (Bradley & Jordan, 2002). The factors that are found to reduce 
mispricing are: large firm size (Loughran & Ritter, 2004), greater age of firm 
(Carter et al., 1998; Dolvin & Jordan, 2008) and smaller offer prices (Beatty & 
Welch, 1996). 
Table 4.1: Mispricing of the US IPOs 
Study Period N Mean (%) Median (%) 
Ibbotson (1975) 1960 – 1969  120 11.40 -  
Ritter (1984) 1977 – 1982  1,028 26.30 - 
Aggarwal & Rivoli (1990) 1977 – 1987  1,598 10.67 1.92 
Michaely & Shaw (1994) 1984 – 1988  947 7.27 -  
Welch (1996) 1970 – 1989  574 29.60 - 
Carter et al. (1998) 1979 – 1991  2,292 8.08 2.38 
Krigman et al. (1999) 1988 – 1995  1,232 12.30 6.20 
Aggarwal & Conroy (2000) Mar - Oct, 1997 188 19.47 14.17 
Habib & Ljungqvist (2001) 1991 – 1995  1,409 13.80 7.100 
Bradley & Jordan (2002) 1990 – 1999 3,325 22.60 10.00 
Ritter & Welch (2002) 1980 – 2001 6,249 18.80 -  
Aggarwal et al. (2002) 1994 – 1999 618 50.40 23.30 
Loughran & Ritter (2004) 1980 – 2003  6391 18.70 6.30 
Loughran & McDonald (2013) 1997 - 2010 1,887 34.80 13.30 
1. The table summarises evidence of IPO mispricing in the US. 
In addition to these factors, entities other than the issuer that are involved in the 
IPO process (i.e. underwriters and VCs) are also found to impact the level of 
mispricing. However, the evidence on the direction of this impact is mixed. Earlier 
studies like Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter et al. (1998) find that the 
involvement of a reputable underwriter in the IPO process reduces mispricing. 
More recent studies find that reputable underwriters are found to increase the level 
of mispricing (Bradley & Jordan, 2002; Loughran & Ritter, 2002; Dolvin & Jordan, 
2008). Similarly, Meigginson and Weiss (1991) find that the involvement of VCs 
in the IPO process reduces mispricing whereas Dolvin (2005) and Loughran and 
McDonald (2013) find that IPOs that are backed by VCs exhibit higher mispricing.  
 Method 
Based on the empirical model given in Equation (3.3) in Chapter 3, we present the 





consists of a set of firm-level variables (𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗
) and year dummies (𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑚). The one 
variable that is new to the model is the dummy variable Exchangei to control for 
the listing exchange. Exchangei takes a value of 0 for IPOs listed in the NYSE and 
1 for the IPOs listed in the NASDAQ. The definitions of the variables used in 
Equation (4.1) are given in Table 4.2. Equation (4.1) is set out below:  
log RRi,t = α  + β1logAssetsi + β2logAgei + β3EP Si + β4RetOwni   
+β5logOSi+  β6IMi  +  β7InvOPi  +  β8VCi  +  β9UMSi    +β10RF i   
+ β11MP30 i  +β12Exchange i  +β13RelVol i + ΣYeari + εi                                       
                                                                                                          (4.1) 
Table 4.2: Definition of independent variables 
Variable Definitions Expected 
Sign 
logAssetsi Logarithm of one plus pre-IPO total assets  - 
logAgei Logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated from the 
difference of the foundation year and the time of the IPO. 
- 
EPSi EPS is the forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. + 
RetOwni Calculated as one minus the number of shares issued / total 
number of shares outstanding. 
+ 
logOSi Logarithm of offer size measured from the final offer price 
multiplied by the number of shares offered.  
- 
IMi A dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is fixed price 
offer and 0 for book building offer. 
+ 
InvOPi One divided by final offer price per share. - 
UMSi  
 
Underwriter Market Share is calculated as the sum of total 
capital raised in IPOs by the underwriter in a year ‘t’, divided 
by the total capital raised by all the IPOs in the year ‘t’. 
+/- 
VCi A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture 
capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 
otherwise. 
+/- 
RFi Number of Risk Factors. Measures the risks reported in the 
IPO prospectus. 
+ 
MP30i Pre-IPO 30-day performance of FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index. + 
Exchangei Exchange is a dummy variable with value of 0 for the IPOs 
listed in the NYSE and 1 for those listed in the NASDAQ. 
+ 
RelVoli Pre-IPO 30-day realised volatility of the market index where 
the stock is listed calculated as square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-
i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). 
+ 
1. The table summarises the expected signs of the relationship between the independent variables and the first day 
IPO returns. 
 
 Sample characteristics 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the variables for the whole sample are reported in Table 
4.3.  The average level of mispricing of the US IPOs over the sample period is 





as, 34.80% reported by Loughran and McDonald (2013). As expected, the median 
level of mispricing is found to be 2.40% which is much less than the mean 
mispricing. Out of the sample IPOs, 35.50% of IPOs having less than zero per cent 
returns (i.e. they are overpriced) and only 18.63% of the IPOs having returns above 
the average returns. The skewness measure of the distribution is 5.31, suggesting a 
right-skewed distribution. This finding is consistent with the previous studies both 
in the US (Table 4.1) and other countries (Table 1.1) which found evidence of 
skewness in the mispricing distribution but did not examine it. 
The average size of the firm at the time of the IPO was US$ 841.25 million, with a 
median of only US$37.05 million. The average age of the companies in our sample 
was approximately 15.28 years (7.92 years median) which is slightly higher than 
13.60 years previously recorded in the US (e.g. Dolvin & Jordan, 2008) and less 
than the 14.70 years reported for international IPOs by Engelen and van Essen 
(2010). The average earnings per share forecast provided by the firms was 27 cents 
(0 cents median) and the issuing companies retained 11.57% of the ownership on 
average (0% median) with the companies that retained the highest proportion of 
ownership being in the manufacturing sector. The companies with the lowest 
proportions of retained ownership were from the gas distribution sector. The 
proportion of retained ownership is lower in the US than in the other markets that 
we studied (see subsequent chapters) but higher than the 3.01% and 3.49% reported 
by Dolvin (2005) and Loughran and McDonald (2013) respectively. The total 
money raised by the IPOs over our sample period was USD 284.06 billion with an 
average offer size of USD 115.50 million (USD 54 million median).  
These features show that the characteristics of the firms going public differ widely, 
as reflected by the difference between the mean and the median. The dominant way 
of pricing the IPOs is the book building method, with only 20.3% of IPOs using a 
fixed price. Venture capitalists back 39% of the sample IPOs, slightly lower than 
the 44.13% reported by Dolvin (2005). The proportion on the IPOs backed by 
venture capitalists is the highest in the US compared to the other markets that we 
study. The average number of risk factors reported in the prospectus is 14.18. 







Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for full sample 
Variables Mean St. Dev Median Skewness 
First day returns (%) 34.90% 179.00% 2.40% 5.31 
Offer Price (US$) 14.44 9.90 14.00 20.74 
Assets (US$ M.) 841.25 9,786.34 37.05 23.07 
Age (years) 15.28 22.16 7.92 3.05 
EPS (US$) 0.27 2.22 0.00 34.39 
Retained Ownership (%) 11.57% 22.10% 0.00% 2.37 
Offer Size (US$ M.) 115.56 277.08 54.00 16.22 
Issue Method 0.20 0.40 1.00 -1.48 
Inverse offer price 0.08 0.03 0.07 1.61 
Underwriter Market Share 0.07 0.09 0.04 2.77 
Venture Capitalist 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.45 
No. of Risk Factors 14.18 4.34 14.10 -0.09 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) 2.14% 4.10% 2.64% -0.52 
Exchange 0.73 0.44 1.00 -1.01 
Realised volatility t-30 (%) 17.49% 9.61% 14.61% 2.04 
No. of IPOs 2,458    
1. The data for the study are from multiple sources. The names, listing dates and data on independent 
variables of 4014 US IPOs issued during the period from 1995 to 2013 were identified using the SDC 
Platinum New Issues Database. The data on missing observations is from prospectuses sourced from 
Thomson One Banker, stock exchange websites and the Jay Ritter database. The daily adjusted trading 
prices of the stocks included in our sample, the NYSE Composite Index and the NASDAQ Composite 
Index, which are used as benchmarks for market performance, were collected from DataStream. The 
construction of the final sample for the analysis involved certain adjustments. The firms with missing data, 
missing identifiers, unavailable historical prices, unit trusts, stapled securities, issues without a public offer 
component and ADRs were excluded, leaving a final sample size of 2458 IPOs. 
2. The table summarises descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables used in the study.  
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-
IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPS 
earnings forecasts are from IPO prospectuses. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of shares issued 
over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is calculated as the final offer price multiplied by the 
number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is fixed price 
offer and 0 for book building offer. Inverse offer price is one divided by final offer price per share. UMS is 
the underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by the underwriter in a year divided by 
capital raised by all the IPOs in that year. Venture Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors 
measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is pre-IPO 30 days performance 
of the market index where the stock is listed. Exchange is a dummy variable with value of 0 for IPOs listed 
on the NYSE and 1 for the IPOs listed on the NASDAQ. Realised Volatilityt-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO 
volatility of market index calculated as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). 
 
4.4.2 Levels of mispricing 
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 4.3 show the differences between the 
means and medians and the skewness of the first day returns. This implies a 
significantly skewed distribution.19 The right-skewed distribution of the first day 
IPO returns is clearly observable from the distribution plot in Figure 4.1.  
 
 
                                                 
19 We conducted the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and Breusch-Pagan-Cook-Weisberg tests for 





Figure 4.1: Distribution plot of the US IPO mispricing 
 
Further, Table 4.3 also indicates differences in the characteristics of the IPOs across 
our sample. In order to get further insights into the characteristics of the IPOs 
associated with different levels of mispricing, we broke down the mispricing 
distribution into three segments on the basis of the direction of mispricing – that is,  
IPOs with negative returns (873 IPOs), IPOs with close to zero returns (187 IPOs) 
and IPOs with positive returns (1398 IPOs). The IPOs with negative returns were 
further divided into two categories: highly overpriced IPOs (the top 17.7% of the 
sample where the IPOs were ranked from the most overpriced to the most 
underpriced) and overpriced IPOs (ranked observations from 17.7% to 35.5%). The 
IPOs with close to zero returns, called fairly priced IPOs numbered only 187 and 
were not further divided (ranked observations from 35.5% to 43%). The IPOs with 
positive returns were divided into three categories: underpriced IPOs (ranked 
observations from 43% to 62%), highly underpriced IPOs (ranked observations 
from 62% to 81%) and extremely underpriced IPOs (probability of ranked 
observations from 81% to 100%).20 The means of these mispricing sub-ranges and 
the corresponding means of the independent variables are reported in Table 4.4. 
                                                 
20 The distribution of the US IPOs’ returns was divided into three categories: IPOs with negative returns, IPOs 
with zero returns and IPOs with positive returns. There were 873 IPOs with negative returns which were divided 
into a further two sub-categories: highly overpriced IPOs and overpriced IPOs. There were 1398 IPOs with 
positive returns which were further divided into three subcategories; underpriced IPOs, highly underpriced 
IPOs and extremely underpriced IPOs. Finally, there were 187 IPOs with close to zero returns which we refer 
to as fairly priced IPOs. The quantile points were selected as the mid-points of these sub-categories. The mid-
points for the highly overpriced and overpriced IPOs were 0.09 and 0.266 respectively. The mid-point for 
underpriced IPOs was 0.52, for highly underpriced IPOs it was 0.716 and for extremely underpriced IPOs it 





Table 4.4 shows that the characteristics of the IPOs vary across the distribution of 
the mispricing. The highly overpriced IPOs tended to be the largest firms, and they 
tended to be old, provide lower earnings forecasts, retain higher proportions of 
ownership, have the largest offer sizes, be sold at higher offer prices and have less 
venture capitalist involvement. Compared to the other levels of mispricing, a higher 
proportion of the highly overpriced IPOs were listed in the NYSE and went public 
when market volatility was less than average. On the other hand, extremely 
underpriced IPOs tended to be smaller firms that were younger, provided higher 
earnings forecasts and had below-average offer sizes. The extremely underpriced 
IPOs were the firms associated with the highest levels of VC involvement that went 
public during periods of high market performance and volatility, and were listed in 
the NASDAQ. 
Overall, the patterns show that higher levels of underpricing are associated with the 
firms that exhibited higher levels of ex-ante uncertainty (Beatty & Ritter, 1986). 
The underpriced IPOs were relatively fixed in price, which is in line with 
Ljungqvist et al.’s (2003) suggestion that the fixed price method increases 
mispricing. We further see an inverse relationship between the level of the first day 
returns and the offer price. Venture capitalist backing is also more pronounced 
among underpriced IPOs, which Aggarwal et al. (2002) suggest is beneficial for the 
issuers and VCs. In line with Loughran and Ritter (2002) we find that reputable 
underwriters are associated with higher levels of mispricing, whereas IPOs that are 
underwritten by underwriters with below average market share are associated with 
mid-ranges of the mispricing. 
4.4.3 Mispricing in the NYSE and the NASDAQ 
Table 4.5 reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables of the IPOs listed in 
the NYSE and NASDAQ stock markets. There are some observable differences 
between the IPO characteristics of the two stock exchanges. The firms listed in the 
NYSE are 22.7% less mispriced than those listed in the NASDAQ. The NYSE firms 
exhibit the characteristics of firms that have less ex-ante uncertainty and are 
expected to be less mispriced. For example, the firms listed in the NYSE are larger 
in size, are more mature, retain higher proportions of ownership, have larger issue 
sizes, more frequently use the fixed price method to go public, offer shares at higher 





Table 4.4: Variable means by the extent of mispricing 
Variables Highly 
Overpriced 




(0 – 0.177) (0.177 – 0.355) (0.355 – 0.43) (0.43 – 0.62) (0.62 – 0.81) (0.81 – 1) 
First day returns (%) -75.00% -12.50% 0.00% 4.50% 20.60% 240.30% 
Assets (US$ M.) 1,891.66 387.01 674.93 718.52 897.83 420.82 
Age (years) 16.67 15.19 13.29 18.29 14.78 12.34 
EPS (US$) 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.28 0.23 0.41 
Retained Ownership (%) 13.40% 11.10% 7.5% 11.70% 14.00% 9.40% 
Offer Size (US$ M.) 171.00 102.42 128.88 112.96 86.98 102.08 
Issue Method 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.17 
Inverse offer price 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Underwriter Market Share 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 
Venture Capitalist 0.31 0.36 0.29 0.32 0.45 0.53 
No. of Risk Factors 14.21 14.62 13.60 14.11 14.03 14.31 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) 2.80% 2.40% 1.30% 2.40% 2.50% 4.30% 
Exchange 0.57 0.71 0.66 0.74 0.80 0.81 
Realised volatility t-30 (%) 16.52% 16.36% 16.56% 16.51% 17.35% 19.92% 
No. of IPOs 436 437 187 466 466 466 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 4.3. 
2. The table breaks down the levels of first day returns based on the magnitude of mispricing, where 0 to 0.177 refers to highly overpriced IPOs, 0.177 to 0.355 refers to overpriced IPOs, 0.355 to 0.43 
refers to fairly priced IPOs, whereas 0.43 to 0.62, 0.62 to 0.81 and 0.81 to 1 refer to underpriced, highly underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs respectively. 
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of 
incorporation. EPS Earnings forecasts are from IPO prospectuses. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is the final offer 
price multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 for IPO fixed price offers and 0 for book building offers. Inverse offer price is one divided by 
final offer price per share. UMS is the underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by the underwriter in a year divided by capital raised by all the IPOs in that year. Venture Capitalist 
is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. 
MarketPerformancet-30 is pre-IPO 30 days performance of the market index where the stock is listed. Exchange is a dummy variable with value of 0 for IPOs listed on the NYSE and 1 for the IPOs 






Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics with respect to the NYSE and the NASDAQ 
 Variables 
 
NYSE  NASDAQ  NYSE – NASDAQ  
Mean SD Median Skewness  Mean SD Median Skewness  Mean diff. t-stats 
First day returns (%)  18.40% 169.20% 0.00% 5.06  41.10% 181.70% 5.20% 5.41  -22.70% -2.90*** 
Assets (US$ M.) 2,646.08 18,568.03 151.20 12.13  163.56 856.30 30.6 23.59  2,482.52 3.46*** 
Age (years) 21.83 32.02 8.51 2.01  12.81 16.39 7.86 3.45  9.02 6.95*** 
EPS 0.33 1.01 0.00 6.70  0.25 2.53 0.00 31.87  0.08 1.15 
Retained Ownership (%) 15.30% 28.60% 0.00% 1.90  10.20% 19.00% 0.00% 2.46  5.10% 4.25*** 
Offer Size (US$ M.) 261.93 476.04 140.00 10.52  60.60 97.65 42.00 14.44  201.33 10.8*** 
Issue Method 0.25 0.44 1.00 -1.12  0.18 0.38 1.00 -1.65  0.07 3.85*** 
Inverse offer price 0.06 0.02 0.06 4.43  0.09 0.03 0.08 1.33  -0.03 -22.23*** 
Underwriter Market Share 0.11 0.10 0.08 1.84  0.05 0.08 0.02 3.59  0.06 12.59*** 
Venture Capitalist 0.11 0.31 0.00 2.52  0.49 0.50 0.00 0.02  -0.38 -22.94*** 
No. of Risk Factors 14.14 4.21 14.32 -0.01  14.22 4.50 14.40 -0.11  -0.08 -0.42 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) 1.90% 4.20% 2.40% -0.59  3.10% 7.30% 3.60% -0.38  -1.20% -5.36*** 
Realised volatility t-30 (%) 13.66% 6.22% 12.39% 1.78  18.93% 10.24% 15.43% 1.93  -5.27% -12.48*** 
No. of IPOs 671     1,787       
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 4.3. 
2. The table summarises descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables of the IPOs listed in the NYSE and the NASDAQ.  
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of 
incorporation. EPS Earnings forecasts are from IPO prospectuses. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is measured as the 
final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. Inverse offer price is 
one divided by final offer price per share. UMS is underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by the underwriter in a year divided by capital raised by all the IPOs in that year. 
Venture Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors measures the risks reported in 
the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the stock is listed. Realised Volatility t-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of market index calculated 
as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). 





On the other hand, the IPOs listed in the NASDAQ are smaller companies with 
short operational histories, smaller offer sizes and smaller offer prices. These 
characteristics are of the firms that tend to have higher ex-ante uncertainty and thus 
they require higher mispricing. In addition, we find higher performance and more 
volatility in the NASDAQ prior to the firms going public, which is another factor 
that contributes to the mispricing of the IPOs listed in the NASDAQ. The 
differences in the characteristics of the IPOs listed in the two exchanges are 
significant at the 1% level. However, there are no significant differences in the 
earnings forecasts and the risk factors provided by the firms listing in the NYSE 
and NASDAQ stock markets. 
 Results and discussion 
4.5.1 OLS and median regression estimates 
The first column of Table 4.6 reports the OLS regression results of Equation (4.1). 
The significant estimates are earnings forecast in the prospectus (+), offer price (+), 
stock exchange (+) and realised volatility (+). Consistent with previous studies, the 
results suggest that greater mispricing is caused by higher earnings forecasts 
(Loughran & McDonald, 2013), lower offer prices (Beatty & Welch, 1996; Brennan 
& Hughes, 1991), listing on the NASDAQ stock market and go public during 
volatile market periods (Carter et al., 1998). 
Comparing the OLS results with the median regression estimates (column 2 of 
Table 4.6), we can identify a few more variables that have significant effects on the 
first day returns: pre-IPO total assets (+), retained ownership (+), venture capitalist 
backing (+), market performance (+), exchange (+) and realised volatility (+). The 
positive sign for the involvement of venture capitalists and stock exchanges 
indicates that involvement of a venture capitalist and listing on the NASDAQ stock 
market increase mispricing. Our finding is consistent with earlier studies as 
Aggarwal et al. (2002) and Dolvin (2005) argue that mispricing IPOs is beneficial 
for venture capitalists. This is because, earlier, we observed that the NASDAQ 
firms have riskier characteristics, and that NASDAQ firms are mostly technology 
firms and these are the IPOs that require the backing of VCs, which results in higher 
mispricing of those IPOs (Bradley & Jordan, 2002). This implies that VCs misprice 





they take by investing in their IPOs.  Finally, the positive and significant 
coefficients of market performance and realised volatility suggest that the firms that 
go public during periods of market exuberance exhibit higher mispricing. 
We see differences between the OLS and median regression coefficients in terms 
of magnitude and significance, with some isolated instances of a change in sign. To 
some extent the findings of median QR provide more detail and are closer to the 
expected relationships between the independent variables and mispricing. These 
differences are influenced by non-uniformity in the sample due to the observed 
skewness in the distribution of IPO returns as well as the strong effect the inflated 
mean has on the OLS fit. However, since both OLS and median regressions focus 
on the central tendency of the first day returns distribution, the estimates obtained 
from these regressions do not allow us to identify the effects of independent 
variables on different levels of the first day returns of IPOs. In order to overcome 
these issues and to explore more latent patterns in the relationships between 
mispricing and independent variables, we employ the QR approach to examine the 
relationships between the various levels of mispricing (defined in Table 4.4) and 
explanatory variables. 
4.5.2 QR estimates 
The QR estimates across the levels of mispricing are reported in columns 3 to 8 in 
Table 4.6.  The QR results confirm our earlier finding that the independent variables 
have varying impacts across the levels of mispricing. These varying impacts can be 
observed in the varying sizes, signs and significance of the coefficients as the 
mispricing levels change across the various ranges examined. 
We will first review the findings for each of the independent variables and then 
discuss the overall perspective as to how the impacts of the independent variables 
on the underpriced IPOs differ from those on the overpriced IPOs. When looking 
at OLS estimates for the whole sample, we find no relationship between firm size 
and IPO mispricing.  But now we see that this is not true for all segments of the 
sample because firm size is found to increase the mispricing of the underpriced and 
the highly underpriced IPOs. The age of the company undertaking the IPO only has 





Table 4.6: OLS and QR estimates 
Variables  Full Sample Median  Highly  
overpriced 




OLS 0.5 0.09 0.266 0.39 0.52 0.716 0.905 
(Intercept) -0.3910*** -0.0625***  -1.5877*** -0.4274*** -0.0858** -0.0650*** -0.0408* -0.0429 
logAssetsi 0.0029 0.0012**  0.0019 0.0011 0.0011 0.0014** 0.0016** -0.0002 
logAgei 0.0231 -0.0034  0.2146*** 0.0124 -0.0004 -0.0037 -0.0041 -0.0447** 
EPSi 0.0083* 0.0059***  0.0107** 0.0016 0.0047 0.0058 0.0043*** 0.0148 
RetOwni -0.0643 0.0197*  -0.3007 -0.0041 0.0074 0.0220* 0.0221* 0.0669 
logOSi -0.0046 0.0029  -0.0018 0.0096 0.0027 0.0035** 0.0039* 0.0126 
IMi 0.0187 0.0009  0.0517 0.0062 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0072 -0.0070 
InvOPi 0.9602*** -0.0549  1.8278*** 0.3709** 0.0794 -0.0507 -0.0873 0.6413 
UMSi -0.0099 0.0351  -0.5345* -0.0595 0.0344 0.0364 0.1272*** 0.3058* 
VCi 0.0324 0.0185***  -0.0145 0.0073 0.0088* 0.0192*** 0.0331*** 0.0540** 
RFi 0.0013 0.0005  0.0065 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0001 0.0032* 
MP30i 0.1685 0.1286***  0.0390 0.1630 0.1005** 0.1477*** 0.2911*** 0.1728 
Exchangei 0.1516*** 0.0219***  0.6703*** 0.1273*** 0.0245** 0.0217*** 0.0378*** 0.0063 
RelVoli 0.0045** 0.0008***  0.0037 0.0034*** 0.0012** 0.0009*** 0.0009** 0.0009 
YearDummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 / R1 0.0609 0.0129  0.1539 0.0358 0.0600 0.0150 0.0387 0.0875 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 4.3.  
2. Estimated results are from Equation 4.1. The dependent variable is the logarithm of (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. LogAssets is the logarithm of one plus pre-IPO total assets. LogAgei is 
the logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPSi is forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. RetOwni is calculated as one minus the number of 
shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. logOSi is the logarithm of offer size measured from the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered.  IMi is a dummy variable with the 
value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. InvOPi is one divided by final offer price per share. UMSi is calculated as the sum of total capital raised in IPOs by the underwriter in 
the year t, divided by the total capital raised by all the IPOs in the year t. VCi is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. 
RFi is the number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus. MP30i is pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the stock is listed. Exchangei is a dummy variable with value of 0 for IPOs 
listed on the NYSE and 1 for the IPOs listed on the NASDAQ.  Realised Volatility t-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of market index calculated as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). 
3. The first column provides the OLS estimates from Equation 4.1 
4. Column 2 provides median quantile estimates. Columns 3–6 provide QR estimates for the quantile points selected as mid-points of the sub-ranges defined in Table 4.4. 
5. Coefficients significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are marked by ***, ** and * respectively. 




extremely underpriced IPOs. In the case of highly overpriced IPOs, the age of the 
firm has a significantly positive impact on mispricing. However, the effect becomes 
significantly negative for the extremely underpriced IPOs. Hence, we do see that 
company age increases the size of the mispricing of the IPOs in both directions. 
This finding has two implications. First, a plausible reason behind older firms 
increasing overpricing is that the investors put a lower value on firms with longer 
operational histories, leading to overpricing (Lin, Cai & Li, 1998). In contrast, 
younger firms are underpriced to compensate investors for the risk they take in 
investing in a firm with a shorter operating history (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
The results of the OLS and median regression show that the size of the earnings per 
share forecast is positively correlated with the first day returns. When we undertake 
a finer analysis we see that this really only applies in the case of the highly 
overpriced and highly underpriced IPOs that are positively affected by the size of 
the earnings forecast. Similarly, the ownership retained by the issuers has a 
significantly positive impact only on two levels of mispricing – that is, the 
underpriced and highly underpriced IPOs. This is consistent with Leland and Pyle 
(1977) and Beatty and Welch (1996) who find that higher levels of retained 
ownership increase mispricing. The rationale behind this is that issues tend to sell 
their IPOs at lower price so that when IPO shares gain higher prices in the 
aftermarket, this also increases the value of the shares retained by the issuers 
(Bradley & Jordan, 2002; Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
Consistent with Michaely and Shaw (1994), the size of the offer also has a 
significantly positive relationship with underpriced and highly underpriced IPOs, 
suggesting that the extremes of underpricing being more associated with the larger 
issues. The firms with larger offer size may face subscription uncertainty, for which 
they underprice their IPOs to ensure that the IPO is subscribed. The method of going 
public has no significant impact across the various levels of mispricing. The offer 
price has a significantly positive impact on the highly overpriced and the overpriced 
IPOs, suggesting that lower offer prices increase overpricing. As suggested by 
Beatty and Welch (1996), lower offer prices cause an increase in transaction costs 




The reputation of the underwriter is found to contribute to higher mispricing in the 
case of highly underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs. Consistent with 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Dolvin and Jordan (2008), underwriter reputation 
increased the mispricing of highly underpriced IPOs. However, underwriter 
reputation had a significantly negative impact on the highly overpriced IPOs. There 
was a positive and significant impact of VCi on all levels of the underpriced IPOs, 
but it had no impact on the overpriced and the highly overpriced IPOs, confirming 
our earlier finding that the involvement of VC increases mispricing. Although this 
contradicts Megginson and Weiss (1991), it is consistent with Hamao et al. (2000) 
and Brav and Gompers (2003) who find that VC-backed IPOs are more mispriced. 
The number of risk factors reported in prospectuses does not seem to impact IPO 
mispricing except for the extremely underpriced IPOs where the risk factors have a 
significantly positive relationship with overpricing. This suggests that the IPOs that 
are deemed risky by the issuers (and underwriters and VC) require higher 
mispricing as compensation for the risk investors take by investing in those IPOs. 
At the same time, issuers tend to leave money on the table to avoid litigation from 
unhappy investors (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Beatty & Welch, 1996). We further find 
that the IPOs that go public during periods of high market performance are more 
mispriced. This confirms that IPO mispricing can be driven by euphoric markets, 
as argued by Ritter (1984). In addition, higher market volatility is also found to 
increase the level of mispricing. This relationship is present at all the levels of 
mispricing except for the tail regions – that is, highly overpriced and extremely 
underpriced IPOs. Lastly, consistent with Bradley and Jordan (2002) and our 
discussion for Table 4.5, the level of mispricing is higher for the IPOs listed on the 
NASDAQ than for those listed on the NYSE. 
The QR results show that the relationships between the independent variables and 
mispricing vary across the levels of mispricing. The results are consistent with 
expectations and the prior literature, and they provide new insights into the 
mispricing behaviour of IPOs. The effects of the factors that explain the mispricing 
of IPOs on the left-hand side of the distribution (i.e. overpriced IPOs) are different 
from the factors that explain the mispricing of the IPOs on the right-hand side of 
the distribution (i.e. underpriced IPOs). The mispricing of the overpriced IPOs is 
significantly impacted by age of the firm going public, provision of higher earnings 




other hand, the underpriced and highly underpriced IPOs are driven by firm size, 
retained ownership, offer sizes, reputable underwriters, venture capitalist 
involvement, high market returns, high market volatility and listing on NASDAQ. 
The two categories of mispricing that exhibit distinct characteristics are the fairly 
priced and the extremely underpriced IPOs. The fairly priced IPOs are those that 
are impacted by positive market performance, VC backing and NASDAQ listing 
but fail to trigger a reaction from the market. Lastly, the extremely underpriced 
IPOs are explained by firm age, underwriter reputation, VC backing and high 
number of risk factors. Although these companies also go public during periods of 
high market performance and high volatility, the relationships with these variables 
are statistically insignificant. This suggests that the extremely underpriced IPOs 
experience high mispricing because of their risk characteristics which require their 
issuers to leave money on the table. 
Overall, our results show that independent variables impact differently across the 
levels of mispricing. Table 4.7 presents the F-statistics of the equality of slope 
parameters across the levels of mispricing that we examine. The test identifies the 
differences between the slope estimates for the various levels of the mispricing 
distribution. These differences are significant at the 1% level. These tests show 
differences between the IPOs in two extreme regions, the highly overpriced and the 
extremely underpriced IPOs. This confirms that the impact that the independent 
variables have on various levels of mispricing are significantly different across the 
mispricing distribution and this supports our use of the QR to explore those 
differences. 
Table 4.7: Tests of the equality of slope estimates across quantiles 
Levels of mispricing Quantiles Estimate p-value 
Highly overpriced vs. extremely 
underpriced 
0.09 vs. 0.905 17.78 0.000*** 
Overpriced vs. highly underpriced 0.266 vs. 0.716 7.78 0.000*** 
Fairly priced vs. underpriced 0.39 vs. 0.52 1.80 0.004*** 
All levels of mispricing 0.09 vs. 0.266 vs 
0.39 vs. 0.52 vs 
0.716 vs. 0.905 
27.88 0.000*** 
1. The table shows the F-statistics of the equality of slope estimates across the selected quantiles 
representing the levels of the first day returns. 







This chapter examines the mispricing of US IPOs across various levels. Using a 
sample of 2458 IPOs issued from 1995 to 2013, we find a mean mispricing of 
34.90% and a median of 2.40%. We find that the distribution of the returns is 
skewed to the right. This led us to separately examine various levels of highly 
overpriced, overpriced, fairly priced and underpriced, highly underpriced and 
extremely underpriced IPOs. 
We find that there is a non-uniform relationship between the level of mispricing 
and factors that explain the mispricing. We examine these relationships using the 
QR approaches with the OLS being reported for comparison purposes. The OLS 
estimates only explain the relationships in the central region of the distribution, 
highlighting earnings per share forecast, offer price, listed exchange and realised 
volatility as factors that significantly increase mispricing. In contrast, the median 
QR results provide more insights into the effects that the independent variables have 
on the mispricing. The median QR results show that, in addition to the OLS 
estimates, firm size, firm age, retained ownership, underwriter reputation, 
involvement of venture capitalist and high market performance also significantly 
explain the mispricing. The QR estimates highlight the relationship between the 
mispricing and the independent variables that were not otherwise captured by the 
OLS regression. For example, the OLS results indicate that firm age and 
underwriter reputation had no significant impact on mispricing, but the QR results 
show that this is not entirely true as firm age has a significant impact on the highly 
overpriced and the extremely underpriced IPOs, and underwriter reputation has a 
significant impact on the highly overpriced, highly underpriced and extremely 
underpriced IPOs. 
We provide new insights into the relationship between IPO mispricing and the 
factors that are found to explain the mispricing. By applying the QR approach we 
show that the independent variables have varying relationships with different levels 
of mispricing. This variation is more pronounced at the tails of the distribution. For 
example, the IPOs that are highly overpriced are significantly impacted by 
operational history, earnings per share forecast, offer price, underwriter reputation 
and listing exchange, suggesting that investors put lower prices on these firms 




more wealth at the expense of the investors. On the other hand, the extremely 
underpriced IPOs are significantly impacted by VC backing, underwriter 
reputation, operational history and report higher number of risk factors in the 
prospectus. These factors suggest that the VCs make risky IPOs more attractive by 
underpricing them. Lastly, the fairly priced IPOs tend to be the firms that are driven 
by VC backing, market performance and exchange listings which fail to trigger a 




5 Chapter 5: Mispricing in Australia 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter examines the mispricing of 1095 IPOs issued in Australia between 
1995 and 2013. We find that the average level of mispricing is 25.51% which is 
consistent with the findings in many previous studies. However, the distribution of 
first day returns is heavily skewed to the right with 37.30% IPOs being overpriced 
and only 16% of IPOs realising a first day return greater than the average first day 
return. Therefore, it is not surprising that the median first day return of 10% is much 
less than the average first day return (25.51%). We suggest that in this instance, the 
mean gives an inflated view of the extent of this mispricing and that the median 
mispricing of 10% provides a better measure of central tendency for the first day 
IPO returns. 
Like the US IPOs, we find divergence in mispricing of the Australian IPOs. To 
examine this divergence, we divide the mispricing distribution into various levels 
based on the magnitude and direction of the mispricing. The levels of mispricing 
for the Australian IPOs are highly overpriced, overpriced, fairly priced, 
underpriced, highly underpriced and extremely underpriced.21 The characteristics 
of IPOs are different for each level of mispricing. For example, the highly 
overpriced IPOs are larger and older companies that provide earnings forecasts. 
Further, older companies with larger offer sizes that sell shares at lower offer prices 
and involve a financial institution in the role of an underwriter are less mispriced. 
However, the highly underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs tend to be 
associated with the risky firms that involve an underwriter, report higher numbers 
of risk factors and seldom provide earnings forecasts. Lastly, we also find that most 
of the firms time their IPOs during periods of higher market performance. 
The Australian market differs from the US market in various respects. For instance, 
unlike the US, the fixed price method is the commonly used pricing method in 
Australia and only a nominal number of the issuers use the book building method. 
A number of the issuers do not include earnings forecasts in their IPO prospectuses 
                                                 
21 Overpriced IPOs are those that have negative returns, fairly priced IPOs are those with close to 





as they are allowed under Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) Regulatory Guide 170 to choose not to include less reliable earnings 
forecasts. Another key difference is that financial institutions in Australia perform 
roles in the IPO process ranging from the typical functions performed by 
underwriters to acting as advisers for the issues. Thus, it is quite common for those 
undertaking an Australian IPO to not engage a financial institution as an 
underwriter.  
 Studies on Australia 
In Australia, the evidence of mispricing dates back to Finn and Higham (1988) who 
find that IPOs are on average mispriced by 29.20%.  Finn and Higham examined 
93 IPOs over the period from 1966 to 1978. Table 5.1 provides a summary of 
evidence of the mispricing of Australian IPOs from Australian studies over different 
time periods. The mispricings range from 11.90% (Lee et al., 1996) to 49.98% 
(How & Howe, 2001). 
Table 5.1: Mispricing of Australian IPOs 
Study Period N Mean (%) Median (%) 
Finn & Higham (1988) 1966 – 1978 93 29.20 - 
How et al. (1995) 1980 – 1990   340 19.74 10.00 
Lee et al. (1996) 1976 – 1989 266 11.90 - 
How & Howe (2001) 1979 – 1990 396 49.98 12.69 
Dimovski & Brooks (2004) 1994 – 1999 358 25.60 - 
Bayley, Lee & Walter (2006) 1995 – 2000 182 26.72 8.24 
Dimovski & Brooks (2008) 1994 – 2004 834 22.40 7.60 
Gygax & Ong (2011) 2001 – 2005 468 21.69 - 
Dimovski, Philavanh & Brooks (2011) 1994 – 2004 380 29.60 - 
Bird & Ajmal (2016) 1995 – 2013 1,095 25.51 8.62 
1. The table summarises evidence of IPO mispricing in Australia. 
 
Similar to the general observation about studies that examine mispricing (see Table 
1.1), Australian studies also overlook the skewness that is present in the mispricing 
distributions. This is apparent from the differences between the mean and the 
median levels of mispricing reported in Table 5.1. For example, How et al. (1995) 
examine a sample of 340 IPOs issued from 1980 to 1990 that are mispriced by an 
average of 19.74% and have a median of 10%. How and Howe (2001) report mean 
and median mispricings of 49.98% and 12.69% respectively in a sample of 396 





Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the key driver of mispricing is information 
asymmetry and uncertainty surrounding an IPO and these are also found to impact 
the mispricing of Australian IPOs. Various firm-level factors have been identified 
that impact the level of mispricing. These factors are both endogenous and 
exogenous to the firm conducting the IPO. The factors that are found to increase 
the level of mispricing are: retained ownership (Lee et al., 1996), risk factors 
reported in prospectus (Gygax & Ong, 2011) and recent market performance 
(Dimovski & Brooks, 2004; Dimovski et al., 2011). On the other hand, the factors 
that are found to reduce the mispricing of the Australian IPOs are: retained 
ownership (Dimovski & Brooks, 2004), offer size (Dimovski & Brooks, 2004), 
offer price (Gygax & Ong, 2011) and VC certification (Gygax & Ong, 2011). 
Evidence of the impact of underwriter certification on mispricing in Australia, like 
the evidence in the US, is mixed. How et al. (1995) find that the involvement of a 
financial institution as an underwriter reduces mispricing, whereas recent studies 
by Dimovski and Brooks (2004) and Gygax and Ong (2011) find that IPOs being 
underwritten increases mispricing. 
 Method 
Following the discussion in Section 3.4 and the base model given in Equation (3.3), 
the empirical model for examining the Australian IPOs is stated in Equation (5.1). 
We use 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗
, the firm-level explanatory variables (discussed in Section 3.2.2) and 
year dummies, 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑚, to control for time effects. In addition, changes are made to two 
of the independent variables to capture Australian institutional practices. First, since 
it is not mandatory for Australian issuers to provide earnings per share forecast in 
the IPO prospectus, we use a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the earnings 
forecast is provided in the IPO prospectus and 0 otherwise, and is expected to 
reduce mispricing. Second, the Australian issuers may choose not to involve a 
financial institution as an underwriter; therefore we use a dummy variable with a 
value of 1 if a financial institution is involved as an underwriter and 0 otherwise. 
The definitions of the independent variables and the expected signs of their 
relationships with the first day IPO returns are summarised in Table 5.2. The 







log RRi, t = α + β1logAssetsi+ β2logAgei+ β3EP S i + β4RetOwni  
            + β5logOSi  + β6IMi + β7InvOPi + β8VCi  + β9UWi   
       +  β10logRF i   + β11MP30 i  + β11RelVol i + ΣYeari + εi         (5.1) 
 
Table 5.2: Definitions of independent variables 
Variable Definitions Expected 
Sign 
logAssetsi Logarithm of one plus pre-IPO total assets  - 
logAgei Logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated from the 




A dummy variable with the value of 1 if earnings forecast 
is provided in the prospectus and 0 otherwise.  
- 
RetOwni Calculated as one minus the number of shares issued / total 
number of shares outstanding. 
- 
logOSi Logarithm of offer size measured from the final offer price 
multiplied by the number of shares offered.  
- 
IMi A dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed 
price offer and 0 for book building offers. 
+ 
InvOPi One divided by final offer price per share. - 
UWi  
 
A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a financial institution 
is involved as an underwriter and 0 otherwise.  
+/- 
VCi A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture 
capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 
otherwise. 
- 
logRFi Logarithm of the number of risk factors reported in the IPO 
prospectus 
+ 
MP30i Pre-IPO 30-day performance of ASX All Ordinaries Index. + 
RelVol Pre-IPO 30-day realised volatility of the market index 
where the stock is listed calculated as the square root of 
(252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). 
+ 
1. The table summarises the expected signs of the relationship between the independent variables and the 
first day IPO returns.  
 
 Sample characteristics 
 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the main variables for the whole sample are reported in 
Table 5.3. The average mispricing is 25.51% with a median of 10%. The 
distribution of the first day returns is heavily skewed to the right with 37.30% of 
the sample IPOs being overpriced, and only 16% of the sample yielding returns 
above the average returns. The IPO shares are offered at an average price of AUD 
0.52. The average size of assets of the firms before they go public is AUD 175.40 
million. Although on average Australian firms undertaking an IPO are five years 
old (one-third of the average age of the firms going public in the US), over 40% of 




forecast are provided by 35.40% of the firms in our sample. The issuing companies 
retain 57% of the ownership on average, with those companies with the highest 
levels of retained ownership being in the hotel industry, and those with the lowest 
levels being in the financial sector. Only 37.20% of the IPOs in our sample had a 
financial institution in the role of an underwriter which is lower than the 64.74% 
reported by Gygax and Ong (2011). The reason for this difference is the period 
examined. Gygax and Ong examine IPOs that were issued from 1996 to 2006 
whereas our sample consists of IPOs that were issued from 1995 to 2013, and the 
Australian market has experienced a significant decline in the proportion of the 
IPOs being underwritten. In 1995 the figure was 83.30% and it fell as low as 19.70% 
in 2010. 
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of the Australian sample 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Median Skewness 
First day returns (%) 25.51% 83.87% 10.00% 4.78 
Offer Price ($) 0.51 0.78 0.20 9.47 
Assets ($M.) 175.40 3,101.30 1.06 27.81 
Age (years) 5.00 11.11 1.42 5.73 
EPS Dummy 0.35 0.47 0.00 0.61 
Retained Ownership (%) 57.60% 19.80% 58.00% -0.45 
Offer Size ($M.) 36.63 206.54 6.00 13.57 
Issue Method 98.30 12.27 1.00 -7.61 
Inverse offer price 3.63 172.60 5.00 -0.75 
Underwriter Dummy 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.53 
Venture Capitalist 0.02 0.14 0.00 6.54 
No. of Risk Factors 13.32 7.28 13.00 0.86 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) 7.29% 64.90% 16.00% -0.84 
Realised Volatility t-30 (%) 12.84% 5.80% 11.06% 1.84 
No. of IPOs 1,095    
1. The data for the study are obtained from multiple sources. The 1361 Australian IPOs issued during the 
period of 1995–2013 (and their listing dates) were identified using the Morningstar Global Database. The 
offer prices of the IPOs and the independent variables were obtained from the IPOs’ prospectuses which are 
available on the Thomson One Banker website and the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) website. The 
daily adjusted trading prices of the stocks included in our sample and the ASX All Ordinaries Index, which 
is used as a benchmark for market performance and calculation for realised volatility, were collected from 
DataStream. The construction of the final sample for the analysis involved certain adjustments. We 
excluded: firms for which prospectuses or historical prices were not available, unit trusts, stapled securities, 
issues without public offer components and CHESS Depository Interests (CDIs). This left a final sample 
size of 1095 IPOs. 
2. The table summarises descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables used in the study.  
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Offer price is the 
price at which IPO shares are offered for subscription to investors. Assets are pre-IPO total assets. Age is 
the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPS Dummy equals 1 if an 
earnings forecast is provided in the prospectus and 0 otherwise. Retained Ownership is one minus the 
number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is measured as the final offer 
price multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if 
the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. Inverse offer price is one divided by the final 
offer price per share. Venture Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture 
capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. Underwriter Dummy equals 1 if a 
financial institution is involved in the role of an underwriter and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors measures 
the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the 
ASX All Ordinaries Index. Realised Volatility t-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of the market index 





5.4.2 Levels of mispricing 
The mean mispricing is 25.51% and the median is 10% with a skewness measure 
of 4.78. The distribution of the mispricing is presented in Figure 5.1, which shows 
a right-skewed distribution. The presence of skewness is confirmed by the Shapiro-
Wilk test which rejects the null hypothesis that the mispricing distribution is 
normally distributed. The departure from normality highlights the need to examine 
the latent characteristics of the mispricing distribution. For this, we divide our IPOs 
in accordance with the extent and sign of their mispricing in order to better analyse 
the factors that drive different levels of mispricing. There are 408 overpriced IPOs 
which are divided into two equal sub-categories: highly overpriced and overpriced 
IPOs. There are 630 IPOs with positive returns which are divided into three equal 
subcategories: underpriced IPOs, highly underpriced IPOs and extremely 
underpriced IPOs. Finally, there are 57 IPOs with close to zero returns which we 
refer to as fairly priced IPOs.22  The average mispricing of these sub-ranges is 
reported in Table 5.4. It is worth noting that the difference between the mean and 
median levels of mispricing is largely driven by the extremely underpriced IPOs 
(approx. 19% of the sample) which are on average mispriced by 133.20%.  
Figure 5.1: Distribution plot showing Australian IPO mispricing 
  
 
                                                 


















(0 - 0.186) (0.186 - 0.377) (0.377 - 0.423) (0.423 – 0.616) (0.616 – 0.808) (0.808 – 1) 
First day returns (%) -38.60% -9.60% 0.00% 11.10% 48.30% 133.20% 
Assets ($M.) 80.56 96.16 4.06 61.77 202.36 489.23 
Age (years) 5.48 4.79 2.65 5.17 5.32 4.87 
EPS Dummy 0.29 0.36 0.32 0.37 0.49 0.26 
Retained Ownership (%) 56.80% 54.50% 53.20% 58.10% 60.50% 59.10% 
Offer Size ($M.) 33.10 76.86 19.45 29.17 21.55 26.92 
Issue Method 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Inverse Offer Price 3.92 3.59 4.29 3.64 3.24 3.61 
Underwriter Dummy 0.34 0.44 0.29 0.34 0.40 0.36 
Venture Capitalist 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 
No. of Risk Factors 12.73 14.01 14.09 13.47 12.54 13.56 
Market Performance t-30 (%) -7.27% -1.48% -0.69% 10.93% 20.56% 17.47% 
Realised Volatility t-30 (%) 13.99% 12.76% 14.38% 12.93% 12.62% 11.49% 
No. of IPOs 204 204 57 210 210 210 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 5.3.  
2. The table breaks down the means of the variables for various sub-ranges based on the magnitude of the mispricing of the IPOs as follows: the highly overpriced IPOs (i.e. the top 18.6% of 
the sample when the IPOs are ranked from the most overpriced to the most underpriced), the overpriced IPOs (ranked from 18.6% to 37.7%), the fairly priced IPOs (ranked 37.7% to 42%), the 
underpriced IPOs (ranked from 42.3% to 61.6%), the highly underpriced (ranked 61.6% to 80.8%) and the extremely underpriced (ranked 80.8% to 100%).  
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date 
of incorporation. EPS Dummy equals 1 if an earnings forecast is provided in the prospectus and 0 otherwise. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of shares issued over total number of 
shares outstanding. Offer Size is measured as the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price 
offer and 0 for book building offers. Inverse offer price is one divided by final offer price per share. Venture Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists 
as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. Underwriter Dummy equals 1 if a financial institution is involved in the role of an underwriter and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors 
measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of ASX All Ordinaries Index. Realised Volatility t-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility 




As can be seen from Table 5.4, there is a wide variation in the magnitude of the first 
day returns across our six sub-ranges as well as in the characteristics of the IPOs 
associated with those levels of mispricing. The highly overpriced IPOs are older 
companies with larger offer sizes that are less likely to provide earnings forecasts 
in the prospectus and go public during periods of negative market performance and 
higher volatility. The highly underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs tend to 
be larger firms that are likely to provide earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. 
These firms have relatively smaller offer sizes, higher offer prices, tend to involve 
a financial institution in the role of an underwriter, have involvement of a venture 
capitalist and go public during a period of good market performance and less 
volatility. 
Lastly, the fairly priced IPOs tend to be young and smaller companies that have 
smaller offer sizes and offer prices, have no venture capitalist involvement and are 
less likely to involve a financial institution in the role of an underwriter. These IPOs 
go public during periods of highly negative market performance and highly volatile 
markets. The characteristics of the firms that do not vary significantly across the 
levels of mispricing are retained ownership, issue method and number of risk 
factors reported in the prospectus. 
 Results and discussion 
 
5.5.1 OLS and median regression estimates 
The first column of Table 5.5 reports the OLS estimates of Equation (5.1). The 
significant variables are age (-), the provision of earnings estimates (-), the number 
of risk factors provided (+), and the recent performance of the market (+). 
Consistent with Beatty and Ritter (1986), these findings suggest that ex-ante 
uncertainty between sellers and investors is a key driver of mispricing. 
Comparing the OLS estimates with the median QR estimates reported in the second 
column of Table 5.5, two variables which are significant under the OLS regression 
remain the same: age (-) and market performance (+). Distinct from OLS, the 
median QR shows the significance of three variables: offer size (-), offer price (-) 
and whether the IPO is underwritten (-). Consistent with literature, the estimates 




reduce mispricing. This could be because, as suggested by Beatty and Welch 
(1996), setting a lower offer price exposes an IPO to more outside scrutiny and 
reduces the need for mispricing. Also, consistent with the signaling model and the 
certification hypothesis, the involvement of a financial institution as an underwriter 
providing certification to investors regarding the quality of the issue results in 
lower mispricing. These results are consistent with explanations that higher 
information asymmetry increases mispricing, and that certification of an IPO by a 
financial institution reduces mispricing (Campbell & Kracaw, 1980; Booth & 
Smith, 1986). The analysis suggests that the factors that increase the mispricing of 
IPOs include: younger age at the time of IPO (Lee et al., 1996), no involvement of 
an underwriter (How et al., 1995), smaller offer size (Dimovski & Brooks, 2008), 
and higher offer price (Brennan & Hughes, 1991). These are characteristics of IPOs 
where investors might feel that they are at an information disadvantage and 
therefore require higher mispricing. Further, signs of previous positive market 
performance suggest that euphoric markets cause higher levels of mispricing 
(Dimovski et al., 2011). 
We see differences between estimates of the OLS and median QR in terms of sign, 
magnitude and significance. These differences have significant implications. First, 
the median QR regression identifies more factors that impact the mispricing which 
is a finding that is consistent with prior studies. Second, the differences in the results 
are consistent with Table 5.4 but are not captured by the OLS. For example, Table 
5.4 shows that IPOs with smaller offer sizes and larger offer prices tend to be more 
mispriced, a relationship that is captured by the median QR but is not captured by 
the OLS. Similarly, the OLS finds no significant relationship between the 
involvement of an underwriter and mispricing whereas the median QR suggests that 
no involvement of financial institutions as underwriters increases mispricing. 
Further, the comparison of the OLS coefficients with the QR coefficients (columns 
3–8 of Table 5.5, to be discussed in the next section) shows that the OLS estimates 
match closely with the estimates of the right tail of the distribution (the extremely 
underpriced IPOs). This suggests that the OLS regression coefficients are driven by 
the strong impact of the extremely underpriced IPOs on the least squares fit and the 
asymmetric density of the sample distribution. It should be noted that both the OLS 
and median QR approaches focus on the central tendency of the sample distribution 




Table 5.5: OLS and QR estimates 
 
Variables  Full Sample Median  Highly  
overpriced 




OLS 0.5 0.093 0.281 0.4 0.518 0.712 0.904 
(Intercept) 0.2504 0.3967***  -0.5094 0.2006* 0.2893*** 0.4222*** 0.4005 1.6318** 
logAssetsi 0.0141 0.0010  0.0216*** 0.0029 0.0049 0.0019 0.00412 -0.0057 
logAgei -0.0391* -0.0173***  -0.0579*** -0.0198*** -0.0162** -0.0134* -0.0138 -0.0047 
EPSi -0.1089*** -0.0046  0.0457** 0.0138 0.0086 -0.0058 -0.0809*** -0.2690*** 
RetOwni 0.1129 0.0549  0.0131 0.0117 0.0280 0.0381 0.0529 0.1558 
logOSi -0.0258 -0.0406***  0.0101 -0.0352*** -0.0463*** -0.0448*** -0.0403 -0.0607 
IMi 0.0098 -0.0039  -0.0621 -0.0042 -0.0069 0.0061 0.0833 0.0998 
InvOPi 0.0005 -0.0166***  0.0260 -0.0126*** -0.0157*** -0.0182*** -0.0225** -0.0151 
UWi -0.0488 -0.0188**  0.0224 -0.0028 -0.0156* -0.0219** -0.0701** -0.1003** 
VCi 0.0229 0.0353  -0.0315 0.0052 0.0258 0.0281 -0.0161 -0.1201 
logRFi 0.1752*** 0.0072  -0.0020 0.0102 0.0032 0.0071 0.0439 0.3667*** 
MP30i 0.0053** 0.0034***  0.0009 0.0034*** 0.0034*** 0.0035*** 0.0051** 0.0123** 
RelVoli -0.3822 -0.0008  0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0738 -0.0614 -0.2229 
YearDummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 / R1 0.081 0.031  0.050 0.026 0.030 0.030 0.078 0.219 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 5.3.  
2. Estimated results are from Equation 5.1. The dependent variable is the log of (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. LogAssets is the logarithm of one plus pre-IPO total assets. LogAge 
is the logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPS is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if an earnings forecast is provided in the prospectus 
and 0 otherwise. RetOwn is calculated as one minus the number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. LogOS is the logarithm of offer size measured from the final offer price 
multiplied by the number of shares offered.  IM is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. InvOP is one divided by final offer price per 
share. VC is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. UW is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a financial 
institution is involved in the role of an underwriter and 0 otherwise. LogRF is the logarithm of the number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus. MP30 is pre-IPO 30-day performance of 
the ASX All Ordinaries Index. RelVol is the realised volatility of the market index over the 30 days prior to the IPO. 
3. The first column provides the OLS estimates from Equation 5.1. 
4. Column 2 provides median quantile estimates. Columns 3–8 provide QR estimates for the quantile points selected as mid-points of the sub-ranges defined in Table 5.4. 
5. Coefficients significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are marked by ***, ** and * respectively.  




the various levels of mispricing. We address this issue by examining the impact of 
the independent variables on different levels of mispricing that are set in Table 5.4. 
5.5.2 QR estimates 
The information presented in Table 5.4 suggests that the impacts that the 
explanatory variables have on different levels of the first day returns might vary. In 
order to investigate the effects, we focus on six categories of IPO returns, ranging 
over the different levels of mispricing as described previously in this chapter. We 
use the QR to estimate the impacts of the variables on each level of mispricing by 
setting the reference point as the midpoint of the corresponding range. The mid-
points for the range of highly overpriced and overpriced IPOs are 0.093 and 0.281 
respectively. The mid-point of the range for underpriced IPOs is 0.518. For highly 
underpriced IPOs it is 0.712 and for extremely underpriced IPOs it is 0.904. Lastly, 
the mid-point for fairly priced IPOs is 0.4. The QR estimates corresponding to each 
level of mispricing are reported in columns 3 to 8 of Table 5.5. What is immediately 
evident is that there are considerable variations in the size, sign and significance of 
estimates as we move from the highly overpriced IPOs to extremely underpriced 
IPOs. When looking at the whole sample (using OLS), we find no relationship 
between issuer size and IPO mispricing; however, this is not true for the overpriced 
IPOs where smaller firm size is found to increase mispricing. Across the fairly 
priced and underpriced IPOs, there is no significant relationship between issuer size 
and mispricing. 
The age of the company undertaking the IPO is significantly and positively 
correlated to overpricing, but is negatively correlated to underpricing. The age of 
the company has no significant impact on the IPOs that are highly underpriced and 
extremely underpriced. 
Unlike How (1996), who does not find a significant relationship between IPO 
mispricing and earnings forecasts, the availability of performance forecasts is found 
to impact the IPOs at the very extremes of mispricing – that is, for the highly 
overpriced and the highly and extremely underpriced IPOs. For these IPOs, the 
relationship changes from being significantly positive (for highly overpriced IPOs) 
to being significantly negative (for highly underpriced and extremely underpriced 




instances of IPO mispricing, but reduces the level of mispricing for those at both 
extremes. 
Using median QR, we previously found that the level of mispricing is lower for 
IPOs which raise large amounts of funds. However, examining different levels of 
the distribution we find that this only applies to IPOs that are only slightly mispriced 
(overpriced to underpriced IPOs). The magnitude of the coefficient increases with 
the level of mispricing, suggesting that as the offer size decreases, the magnitude 
of the mispricing changes from being positive to negative. The amount of funds 
raised has no discernible impact on the mispricing of IPOs across highly overpriced, 
highly underpriced and extremely underpriced ranges. 
We previously found, when examining the whole sample, that a low issue prices 
reduce mispricing. This is a finding that applies to all but the highly overpriced and 
the extremely underpriced IPOs. It is another example of a finding that applies most 
to the less extreme groups of mispriced IPOs. 
It was anticipated that the underwritten issues would be less mispriced, but again 
we find little evidence for that when examining the IPOs as a whole. Taking a closer 
look, we find that having an underwriting does result in a lower level of mispricing 
for underpriced issues. However, being underwritten has no impact on the extent of 
mispricing for overpriced issues. 
Next, we consider the number of risk factors that are disclosed in the prospectus 
which are considered likely to be positively correlated with the extent of any 
underpricing. We find this is strongly the case when we apply the OLS regression. 
But no such relationship is found when we apply the median QR. When we extend 
the QR analysis to the six ranges of mispricing, we find that greater risk disclosure 
results in greater underpricing in the case of the extremely underpriced IPOs. 
Finally, market euphoria is associated with greater underpricing. Indeed, we find 
this to be the case for all except for the most highly overpriced issues. The sign on 
this variable is positive for the other five groups, which means that the IPOs issued 
during periods when the overall market is performing particularly well will be more 
underpriced/less overpriced. The coefficient of market performance is consistent 




underpriced and the extremely underpriced IPOs, suggesting that the better the 
market performance, the higher the mispricing. 
We now summarise the results of the independent variables at various levels of 
mispricing. We find two interesting observations from Table 5.5. First, the sets of 
variables that significantly impact on mispricing tend to vary across the levels of 
mispricing. Second, the independent variables have more significant relationships 
with the milder levels of mispricing (overpriced, fairly priced and underpriced 
IPOs) compared to those on the tails (highly overpriced, highly underpriced and 
extremely underpriced IPOs). 
The results show that larger and older firms that provide earnings forecasts are 
significantly more likely to have highly overpriced IPOs. For the IPOs that are 
slightly mispriced (or fairly priced), we find that the factors that significantly impact 
mispricing are firm age, offer size, offer price, underwriter involvement and recent 
market performance. 
Now turning to the highly underpriced IPOs, we find that non-provision of earnings 
forecast, higher offer price (reflected by the increase in the magnitude of InvOPi), 
lack of underwriter involvement and positive market performance increase 
mispricing. Lastly, extremely underpriced IPOs are significantly impacted by lack 
of earnings forecast, no involvement of an underwriter, highly euphoric market and 
higher number of risk factors reported in the prospectus. This suggests that 
investors who buy underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs are compensated 
for the risk they take in investing in those IPOs (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Ljungqvist, 
2007). On the other hand, company characteristics, offer characteristics, issue 
certification and market sentiment is positively related with IPOs at milder levels 
of mispricing (Dimovski & Brooks 2004; 2008; Gygax & Ong, 2011).  
Overall, our results show that independent variables impact differently across 
different levels of mispricing. Table 5.6 presents the F-statistics of the equality of 
slope parameters across the levels of mispricing that we examined. The test reveals 
the differences between the slope estimates of the various levels of the mispricing 
distribution. These differences are significant at the 1% level. These tests reveal 
differences between the IPOs in two extreme regions, the highly overpriced and the 




have on various levels of mispricing are significantly different across the mispricing 
distribution, and supports our use of the QR to explore those differences. 
Table 5.6: Tests of the equality of slope estimates across quantiles 
Levels of mispricing Quantiles Estimate p-value 
Highly overpriced vs extremely 
underpriced 
0.093 vs 0.904 28.42 0.000*** 
Overpriced vs highly underpriced 0.281 vs 0.712 6.41 0.000*** 
Fairly priced vs underpriced 0.40 vs 0.518 1.41 0.073* 
All levels of mispricing 0.093 vs 0.281 vs 
0.40 vs 0.518 vs 
0.712 vs 0.904 
21.25 0.000*** 
1. The table shows the F-statistics of the equality of slope estimates across the selected quantiles 
representing the levels of the first day returns. 
2. Coefficients significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are marked by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the mispricing of IPOs in the Australian 
market. Using a sample of Australian IPOs issued during the period from 1995 to 
2013, we find an average mispricing of 25.51%, consistent with previous studies 
on Australian IPOs. However, we find that the distributions of these first day returns 
are heavily skewed to the right. This fact is substantially ignored in previous studies.  
Considering the asymmetry of the distribution, we argue that the mean overstates 
the mispricing of IPOs. We argue that the median of first day returns provides a 
better measure of the extent of mispricing. In the case of Australia this reduces the 
estimate of the extent of mispricing from 25.51% (mean) to 10.00% (median). We 
find the mispricing distribution is skewed to the right with 37.70% of the IPOs 
being overpriced. To capture the characteristics of the IPOs across the varying 
magnitudes of mispricing, we divided the first day returns into various levels of 
mispricing: highly overpriced, overpriced, fairly priced, underpriced, highly 
underpriced and extremely underpriced. 
Our OLS analysis reveals that firm age and the release of earnings forecasts tend to 
decrease the extent of mispricing, whereas higher number of risk factors and 
positive market performance increase mispricing. On the other hand, using the 
median QR we find that younger business entities undertaking an IPO, smaller offer 
size, higher offer price and no the involvement of an underwriter, increase 
mispricing. In addition, positive market performance is also found to be positively 




The comparison of OLS with median QR shows that using the median as a measure 
of central tendency provides a more accurate and detailed understanding of the 
impact that the independent variables have on the mispricing. The results show that 
the IPOs are more mispriced when investors find themselves at an information 
disadvantage. The examination of the six levels of mispricing using the QR 
approach shows that the impacts of the independent variables vary across the levels 
of mispricing. The QR estimates show that the highly overpriced IPOs are 
significantly impacted by firm size, firm age and provision of earnings forecast. 
Further, we find that firm age, offer size, offer price and involving a financial 
institution as an underwriter reduce the mispricing of the three levels of the 
underpriced IPOs. However, the highly underpriced and extremely underpriced 
IPOs are associated with risky firms that do not provide earnings forecasts, involve 
an underwriter and report a higher number of risk factors. Lastly, we find that most 
of the firms issue their IPOs during periods of higher market performance. We do 







6 Chapter 6: Mispricing in China 
 
 Introduction 
In this chapter we examine the mispricing of 2199 Chinese IPOs that are listed on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
from 1995 to 2013. 
The SSE and the SZSE are the fourth- and eighth-largest stock markets in the 
world23 respectively and are categorised as emerging markets.24 The Chinese stock 
exchanges are still not completely open to foreign investors and are tightly 
regulated and administered by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). The Chinese market has been subject to regulatory restrictions specifically 
in regards to the supply and pricing of IPOs which, over time, have evolved to be 
more market oriented. Initially, the government had two ways of intervening in the 
IPO market. The first way was restricting the number of IPOs, which was a common 
practice from 1990 to 2000. As a result the IPO market was dominated by state-
owned firms going public. These firms struggled to compete with the private firms 
in the market. In response to the competition faced by the state-owned firms, the 
Chinese government imposed IPO quotas for provinces and municipalities to 
control the number of firms going public. The restricted supply of IPOs in a capital 
market lacking sufficient investment opportunities gave rise to huge excess demand 
and resulted in high first day returns (Gao, 2010). In the early 2000s, the 
government removed IPO quotas by moving to the standard process of registration 
of the IPOs, allowing companies to make their own decisions to go public.  
The second way in which the government intervened was to regulate the IPO 
pricing mechanism. The pricing mechanism has two broad regimes: fixed pricing 
and book building. The reforms in the pricing mechanism that took place over time 
are sub-categories of the fixed price and book building pricing systems. From 1990 
to 1995, most IPOs were sold by way of a fixed price, with the CSRC determining 
the number of shares issued, the offer price and the PE ratio. From 1996 to mid-
1999, a relatively fixed price-to-earnings (PE) ratio mechanism was introduced in 
                                                 
23 World Federation of Exchanges Ranking. 




which after-tax earnings per share and relative earnings were used to determine the 
IPO price. The PE was determined by the CSRC which usually fixed it at between 
12 and 15. From July 1999 to mid-2002, the CSRC switched to an auction system 
where the offer price was determined by investors using an online bidding process. 
The auction mechanism was adopted to let the market completely set the price. 
However, the change in the system did not reduce the magnitude of IPO mispricing. 
Instead mispricing was as high as 1365%, with average returns for the period 
between mid-1999 to mid-2000 being 153.36%. The change in pricing mechanism 
led to huge losses in stock prices in later trading. Therefore, for July 2000 to 2004, 
the pricing mechanism reverted to a fixed PE mechanism with the offer price PE 
ratio being less than 20. In December 2004, the regulations changed again, and the 
book-building system of price setting was adopted on 1 January 2005. This change 
in the pricing regime was a major shift, with market forces, rather than the 
government, now being the major force in determining the issue price. Our results 
show that the adoption of the book-building pricing mechanism has significantly 
reduced the average mispricing to 61.2% from 2005 to 2013, compared to 169.7% 
for the period from 1995 to 2004.  
 Studies on China 
Data on the mispricing of Chinese IPOs is summarised in Table 6.1. What is 
immediately evident is the exceptionally high levels of mispricing, that are higher 
than those in other emerging markets (see Table 1.1). Mok and Hui (1998) examine 
101 IPOs listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1990 to 1993. These IPOs 
were mispriced by 434.90%. Later studies continue to report high levels of 
mispricing in Chinese IPOs, with a decline in the magnitude of mispricing over the 
years, ranging from 948.59% (Su & Fleisher, 1999) to 50.17% (Cao et al. (2013). 
The traditional mispricing theories that are known to explain the mispricing of the 
IPOs more generally do not adequately explain the mispricing of Chinese IPOs, 
except for ex-ante uncertainty being the key driver of the mispricing. Yu and Tse 
(2006) examine the mispricing of 343 Chinese IPOs using the winners curse model, 
the ex-ante uncertainty theory and the signalling model. They find strong support 
for ex-ante uncertainty being the main reason for the high levels of mispricing. The 





Further studies examining the mispricing of Chinese IPOs identify various firm-
level attributes and institutional factors that explain the high levels of mispricing. 
The firm-level attributes that are found to increase the level of mispricing are firm 
size (Chen et al., 2004), firm age (Tian, 2011), retained ownership (Su & Fleisher, 
1999), provision of higher earnings forecast (Chen et al., 2004), smaller offer size 
(Mok & Hui, 1998; Yu & Tse, 2006), offer price (Chan et al., 2004; Chang et al., 
2008) and recent market performance (Cheung et al., 2009; Chiou et al., 2010). The 
factors that are found to reduce mispricing are earnings forecast (Kao, Wu & Yang, 
2009), offer price (Guo & Brooks, 2008) and involvement of a VC (Cao et al., 
2013). When going public, Chinese IPOs often experience huge time lapses 
between the time an IPO is offered and when it is listed on the stock exchange. This 
delay in listing is also found to increase ex-ante uncertainty and the resulting 
mispricing (Tian, 2011). 
Table 6.1: Mispricing of Chinese IPOs 
Study Period N Mean (%) Median (%) 
Mok & Hui (1998) 1990 – 1993 101 434.90 -  
Su & Fleisher (1999) 1987 – 1995 308 948.59 231.25 
Chen et al. (2004) 1992 – 1997 701 298.00 145.00 
Chan, Wang & Wei (2004) 1993 – 1998  570 177.70 - 
Wang (2005) 1994 – 1999 747 271.90 123.90 
Yu & Tse (2006) 1995 – 1998  343 123.59 111.23 
Guo & Brooks (2008) 1984 – 2005 1393 378.41 119.37 
Cheung et al. (2009) 1992 – 2006  1191 133.61 107.12 
Gao (2010) 2006 – 2008 217 157.00  - 
Chiou, Li, Cheng & Chang (2010) 1995 – 2007  1080 118.70 103.50 
Lee et al. (2010) 1993 – 2005  1249 144.42 108.16 
Tian (2011) 1992 – 2004 1377 247.00 122.00 
Cao et al. (2013) 2009 – 2010  153 50.17 - 
Tian & Zhang (2014) 1993 – 2010 1970 181.60 98.11 
1. The table summarises the mispricing evidence from Chinese IPO studies.  
 
It is a common finding in IPOs studies that having underwriters impacts the level 
of mispricing (Dimovski & Brooks, 2004; Dolvin & Jordan, 2008). However, 
studies examining mispricing in China show little support in favour of this impact. 
Tian and Zhang (2014) study the relationship between IPO mispricing and 
underwriter reputation and argue that, given the Chinese market characteristics 
where the government has an active role in IPOs pricing, underwriter reputation 





Cheung et al. (2009) study the impact of a changing pricing mechanism on the 
initial returns of 1191 IPOs that were mispriced by 133.61%. They find that high 
mispricing in Chinese IPOs is caused by the fixed price mechanism and the firms 
going public during periods when the market is enjoying positive performance. 
However, they observe that as the pricing mechanism changed to the book building 
method, the magnitude of the initial returns started decreasing. Similarly, Chiou et 
al. (2010) and Lee et al. (2010) also find a decline in the level of mispricing when 
the book building method was adopted. 
A common finding in the other markets is the skewness of the mispricing 
distribution. The same is true for Chinese IPOs. Su and Fleisher (1999) report 
948.59% (231.25%) mean (median) mispricing in a sample of 308 IPOs issued 
between 1987 and 1995. Guo and Brooks (2008) report a sample of 1393 IPOs 
issued between 1984 and 2005 has mean (median) mispricing of 378.41% 
(119.37%). Tian and Zhang (2014) report mean and median mispricing of 181.60% 
and 98.77% respectively in a sample of 1970 IPOs issued from 1993 to 2010. Some 
recent studies on Chinese IPOs have attempted to address this issue. Lee et al. 
(2010) divide the distribution of the first day returns into three equal categories, 
referred to as low initial returns (quantile 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3), medium initial returns 
(quantile 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6) and high initial returns (quantile 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9). Using 
a QR approach, they show that the offer price is negatively correlated with the level 
of mispricing.  That is, the lower the offer price, the higher the underpricing. Higher 
levels of mispricing are associated with IPOs that have longer delays between the 
IPO date and the listing date. They also find that firms that go public during periods 
of positive market performance are more mispriced. Tian (2011) studies 1377 IPOs 
issued between 1992 and 2004 with mean (median) mispricing of 247% (122%). 
Tian reports that 34% of the sample IPOs were overpriced, with mean returns of       
-38%. Using the bootstrap empirical analysis method to overcome the issue of non-
normality in the sample, Tian shows that the factors that cause mispricing in 
Chinese IPOs are: smaller size of issuer, longer trading history, restrictions on 
pricing mechanism and longer delays in IPO listing. 
In short, the evidence to date from studies examining the first day returns of the 
Chinese IPOs suggests that the Chinese IPOs typically have higher returns than 




uncertainty, regulatory interventions in the pricing mechanism, and market 
momentum, which are driven by the institutional characteristics of the Chinese 
IPOs market.  
 
 Method 
The base model for the study is presented in Equation (3.3). The empirical model 
to examine the mispricing of the Chinese IPOs is presented in Equation (6.1). Since 
the focus of this chapter is on examining the mispricing of Chinese IPOs, we use, 
𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗
, which denotes the firm-level explanatory variables (discussed in Section 3.2.2) 
and year dummies, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑚, to control for time effects.  
log RRi, t = α +β1logAssetsi +β2logAgei +β3EPSi +β4RetOwni +β5logOSi 
+β6IMi +β7InvOPi +β8VCi +β9UMSi +β10RFi +β11MP30i + 
β12Exchangei +β13logLagDaysi +β14RelVoli +ΣYeari+εi,t  
(6.1) 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus first day returns (RRi,t). The 
first day returns are measured through a standard returns calculation procedure 
using Equation (3.1). In addition to the independent variables used in the previous 
chapters, we use two more variables. One is Exchangei which is a dummy variable 
with a value of 0 if the IPO is listed on the SSE and 1 if the IPO is listed on the 
SZSE. The other is logLagDaysi which we use to capture the number of days 
between the issue and the listing of the IPO. The definitions of the independent 
variables used in this chapter and the expected signs of their relationships with the 
first day IPO returns are summarised in Table 6.2. The expected signs are based on 
the relationships reported in the previous studies. 
We also examine the impact of the change in pricing regime that took place in 
January 2005. To do this, we multiply all the variables in Equation (6.1) with a 
dummy variable Regime, which takes the value of 0 if the IPO is issued before 2005 
and 1 otherwise. The functional form of this method is given in Equation (6.2). The 
coefficient of variable Xi, (pre) is the coefficient of the explanatory variables before 
the regime shift. The coefficient Xi, (diff) reflects the difference between the 
coefficients of the independent variables before and after the regime shift. In order 
to obtain the coefficient of the independent variables after the regime shift (Xi, (post)) 
we add the coefficients of Xi, (pre) and Xi, (diff). The significance of Xi, (post) is 




    𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒. 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖        (6.2) 
 
Table 6.2: Definitions of independent variables 
Variable Definitions Expected 
Sign 
logAssetsi Logarithm of one plus pre-IPO total assets.  - 
logAgei Logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated from the 
difference of the foundation year and the time of the IPO. 
+ 
EPSi Earnings forecast provided in the IPO prospectus. - 
RetOwni Calculated as one minus the number of shares issued / total 
number of shares outstanding. 
- 
logOSi Logarithm of offer size measured from the final offer price 
multiplied by the number of shares offered.  
- 
IMi A dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is fixed 
price offer and 0 for book building offer. 
+ 
InvOPi One divided by final offer price per share. - 
UMSi  
 
Underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital 
raised by the underwriter in a year, divided by capital raised 
by all the IPOs in that year. 
- 
VCi A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture 
capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 
otherwise. 
- 
RFi The number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus + 
MP30i pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the 
stock is listed. 
+ 
logLagDaysi Logarithm of one plus no. of days between IPO date and 
listing date. 
+ 
Exchangei A dummy variable with value of 0 for the SSE and 1 for the 
SZSE. 
+/- 
RelVoli Realised volatility of 30-day pre-IPO is calculated as the 
square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N)  
+ 
1. The table summarises the expected signs of the relationships between the independent variables and the first 
day IPO returns.  
 
 Sample characteristics 
 
6.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables for the whole sample are reported in Table 
6.3. The average mispricing of the sample IPOs is 112.10% and the median is 
71.40%. The skewness of the mispricing distribution is 8.85. This suggests that the 
distribution of the first day returns is heavily skewed to the right with 6.27% (138 
IPOs) of the sample IPOs being overpriced and only 31.83% (700 IPOs) having 
above average returns. The average age of the Chinese sample IPOs is 
approximately 6.10 years which is a year higher than the Australian sample and 
also higher than the 3.06 years previously reported for China (e.g. Yu & Tse, 2006) 




van Essen (2010). The total money raised by the IPOs over our sample period was 
CNY 2,288.248 billion with an average offer size of CNY 1,040.586 million. 
Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics of the whole sample 
 Variables Mean St. Dev Median Skewness 
First day returns (%) 112.10% 212.70% 71.40% 8.85 
Offer price (CNY) 15.15 14.59 9.60 3.53 
Assets (CNY M.) 11,234.24 194,028.30 263.78 22.87 
Age (years) 6.10 9.77 3.82 7.05 
EPS (CNY) 0.65 0.85 0.34 2.49 
Retained Ownership (%) 72.90% 7.60% 74.80% -0.67 
Offer Size (CNY M.) 1,040.58 3,861.91 420 11.9 
Issue Method 0.45 0.49 0.00 0.19 
Inverse offer price 0.13 0.12 0.10 4.01 
Underwriter Market Share 0.04 0.05 0.02 3.29 
Venture Capitalist 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.70 
No. of Risk Factors 28.3 8.71 28.00 0.20 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) 1.80% 11.90% 0.39% 0.85 
Exchange 0.64 0.48 1.00 -0.59 
Lag Days (Days) 54.36 241.88 14.00 7.68 
Realised Volatility t-30 (%) 27.50% 12.8% 23.70% 1.20 
No. of IPOs 2,199    
1. The names and the listing dates of 2235 Chinese A-Shares IPOs, listed at the SSE and the SZSE, issued 
during the period from 1995 to 2013 were identified using the Morningstar Global Database. The offer prices 
of the IPOs and all the independent variables except for market performance were obtained from the IPO 
prospectuses available on Thomson One Banker, the SSE and the SZSE websites. The daily adjusted trading 
prices of the stocks included in our sample and the composite indices of the market where the stock is listed, 
which are used as a benchmark for market performance, were collected from DataStream. The final sample 
excluded firms with unavailable prospectuses, unavailable historical prices, close-end funds, and issues 
without a public offer component, leaving the final sample size of 2199 IPOs. 
2. The table summarises the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in the study.  
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-IPO 
total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPS 
Earnings forecasts are provided in the IPO prospectuses. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of 
shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is measured as the final offer price multiplied 
by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed 
price offer and 0 for book building offers. Inverse offer price is one divided by final offer price per share. 
UMS is the underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by the underwriter in a year 
divided by capital raised by all the IPOs in that year. Venture Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 
1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk 
Factors measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is the pre-IPO 30-day 
performance of the market index where the stock is listed. Exchange is a dummy variable with value of 0 if 
the IPO is listed in the SSE and 1 for the SZSE. Lag Days are the no. of days between offering date and listing 
date. Realised Volatility t-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of market index calculated as the square root of 
(252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). 
 
The issuing companies retained 72.90% of the ownership on average, with those 
companies with the highest proportion of retained ownership being in the financial 
sector. The companies with the lowest proportion of retained ownership are from 
the consumer goods sector. A little less than half of our sample IPOs (45.20%) were 
priced using the book building method. The sample IPOs are listed on either of the 
two exchanges of mainland China – 35.80% on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 




6.4.2 Mispricing in the SSE and the SZSE 
Table 6.4 reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables of the IPOs listed in 
the SSE and the SZSE. There are some observable differences between the IPO 
characteristics of the two stock exchanges. The IPOs listed on the SSE have a mean 
(median) mispricing of 125.20% (95.10%) whereas the mean (median) mispricing 
of the IPOs listed in the SZSE is 104.80% (56.13%). In contrast to previous studies 
(e.g. Chang, Chen, Chi & Young, 2008; Chi & Padgett, 2005) we find the mean 
mispricings of the IPOs of the two exchanges to be significantly different. 
Furthermore, the IPOs listed in the SSE have larger pre-IPO assets and offer sizes, 
are younger, provide less earnings forecasts and are sold at lower prices than the 
IPOs listed in the SZSE. The characteristics of the firms listed on the SSE reflect 
higher risk characteristics and are more mispriced. The differences in the means are 
significant except for the number of risk factors, pre-IPO market performance and 
lag days. 
6.4.3 Levels of mispricing 
The differences between the means and medians and the skewness of the first day 
returns reported in Table 6.3 show a significantly skewed distribution. This is 
further confirmed by the Shapiro-Wilk test which rejects the null hypothesis that 
the first day returns are normally distributed. The right-skewed distribution is 
clearly observable from the distribution plot in Figure 6.1. The difference between 
the mean and median levels of mispricing is driven by approximately 31% of the 
IPOs being on the right tail of the mispricing distribution. Those IPOs are on 
average mispriced by 263.50% and maximum returns go as high as 3875%. In order 
to further investigate the variability of the mispricing across the sample, the 
distribution of Chinese IPOs’ returns is divided into three categories: IPOs with 
negative returns, IPOs with close to zero returns and IPOs with positive returns. 
There are 138 IPOs with negative returns which are called overpriced IPOs. There 
are 2010 IPOs with positive returns which are divided into three equal 
subcategories: underpriced IPOs, highly underpriced IPOs and extremely 
underpriced IPOs. Finally, there are 51 IPOs with close to zero returns (i.e. ranging 
from 0.0001% to +0.0001%), which we refer to as fairly priced IPOs. The average 
mispricing of these sub-ranges and the corresponding means of the independent 




Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics by stock exchange 
Variables Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE)  Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE)  SSE – SZSE  
Mean SD Median Skewness  Mean SD Median Skewness  Mean diff. t-stats 
First day returns (%) 125.20% 158.90% 95.10% 5.47  104.80% 237.20% 56.10% 9.09  20.40% 2.40** 
Assets (CNY M.) 30,480.57 323,344.70 320.89 13.64  484.16 1,479.23 246.87 17.13  29,996.4 2.60*** 
Age (years) 4.11 7.75 2.15 8.99  7.21 10.57 5.78 6.55  -3.10 -7.86*** 
EPS (CNY) 0.60 0.85 0.28 1.84  0.69 0.85 0.41 2.87  -0.09 -2.34** 
Retained Ownership (%) 71.10% 9.60% 70.90% -0.18  73.80% 6.10% 75.00% -0.96  -2.70% -7.15*** 
Offer Size (CNY M.) 1,848.57 6,334.08 369.32 7.18  589.35 536.00 451.20 3.21  665.24 5.56*** 
Issue Method 0.76 0.42 1.00 -1.26  0.27 0.45 0.00 0.99  0.49 25.46*** 
Inverse offer price 0.17 0.12 0.15 3.71  0.10 0.12 0.06 4.95  0.07 13.43*** 
Underwriter Market Share 0.05 0.06 0.03 2.94  0.03 0.03 0.02 1.87  0.02 9.53*** 
Venture Capitalist 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.97  0.19 0.39 0.00 1.57  -0.04 -2.52** 
No. of Risk Factors 28.20 8.81 28.00 0.18  28.32 8.65 28.00 0.21  -0.12 -0.33 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) 1.40% 9.00% 0.01% 0.87  2.10% 13.00% 0.6% 0.79  -0.07% -1.41 
Lag Days (Days) 65.26 276.58 17.00 7.74  48.27 220.01 13.00 7.31  16.99 1.48 
Realised Volatility 24.10% 12.89% 19.61% 1.29  29.30% 12.44% 25.47% 1.30  -5.20% -87.80*** 
No. of IPOs 788     1,411       
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 6.3.  
2. The table summarises the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables of the IPOs in the relevant exchange.  
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of 
incorporation. EPS is the earnings forecasts provided in the IPO prospectus. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is 
measured as the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. Inverse 
offer price is one divided by the final offer price per share. UMS is the underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by the underwriter in a year divided by capital raised by all the 
IPOs in that year. Venture Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors measures the 
risks reported in the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the stock is listed. Exchange is a dummy variable with a value of 0 if the IPO 
is listed in the SSE and 1 for the SZSE. Lag Days are the no. of days between the IPO date and the listing date. Realised Volatility t-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of the market index calculated as 
the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). 






Table 6.5: Variable means by the extent of mispricing 
Variables Overpriced Fairly Priced Underpriced Highly underpriced Extremely underpriced 
(0 – 0.063) (0.063 – 0.086) (0.086 – 0.391) (0.391 – 0.695) (0.695 – 1) 
First day returns (%) -9.10% 0.00% 25.62% 81.06% 263.50% 
Assets ($M.) 930.05 105,186.14 22,534.23 4,626.27 1,500.83 
Age (years) 9.17 7.41 7.58 5.57 4.42 
EPS (CNY) 0.52 0.45 0.56 0.66 0.78 
Retained Ownership (%) 76.30% 76.00% 74.58% 72.30% 70.74% 
Offer Size ($M.) 1,274.58 2,640.80 1,497.70 992.81 460.02 
Issue Method 0.05 0.12 0.22 0.52 0.72 
Inverse Offer Price 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.19 
Underwriter Market Share 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Venture Capitalist  0.26 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.13 
No. of Risk Factors 28.52 27.76 28.08 28.41 28.32 
Market Performance t-30 (%) -6.80% -4.60% -0.80% 2.40% 6.00% 
Exchange 0.77 0.86 0.75 0.58 0.54 
Lag Days (Days) 53.04 14.21 15.42 24.17 126.93 
Realised Volatility t-30 (%) 21.70% 24.50% 24.80% 28.10% 30.80% 
No. of IPOs 138 51 670 670 670 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 6.3. 
2. The table breaks down the levels of the first day returns based on the magnitude of mispricing, where 0 to 0.063 refer to overpriced IPOs, 0.063 to 0.086 refer to fairly priced IPOs and 0.086 to 0.391, 
0.391 to 0.695 and 0.695 to 1 refer to underpriced, highly underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs respectively. 
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of 
incorporation. EPS Earnings forecasts are provided in the IPO prospectuses. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is 
measured as the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. Inverse 
offer price is one divided by final offer price per share. UMS is the underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by the underwriter in a year divided by capital raised by all the IPOs 
in that year. Venture Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors measures the risks 
reported in the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the stock is listed. Lag Days are the no. of days between IPO date and listing date. 
Exchange is a dummy variable with a value of 0 if the IPO is listed in the SSE and 1 for the SZSE. Lag Days are the number of days between IPO date and listing date. Realised Volatilityt-30 is the 30-




Figure 6.1: Distribution plot showing Chinese IPO mispricing 
 
 
Table 6.5 shows an observable non-uniformity in the mispricing across the levels 
of mispricing. Examination of the characteristics of the dependent and the 
independent variables shows that the IPOs within each level of mispricing have 
varying characteristics. The overpriced IPOs are small companies that are older, 
provide lower earnings forecasts and retain larger proportions of shares. Additional 
characteristics include they involve larger offer sizes, are mostly book built, are 
listed mostly in the SZSE and go public in periods of lower market performance 
and volatility. On the other hand, extreme cases of underpricing are observed in 
IPOs that are younger and smaller companies with smaller offer sizes and offer 
prices that provide larger earnings forecasts and are mostly fixed price IPOs. These 
companies are mostly listed on the SSE and go public during periods of high market 
performance and volatility, with large delays between their IPO dates and listing 
dates. The fairly priced IPOs are firms that are old, have the largest firm size and 
offer size, with the smallest delays between the IPO and the listing date. Lastly, it 
is important to mention that the factors that do not vary across the levels of 
mispricing are: underwriter’s market share, which according to Tian and Zhang 
(2014) does not have a significant role to play in pricing of the IPOs, and the number 






Figure 6.2: Distribution plot for IPO mispricing for two periods 
 
 
6.4.4 Change in pricing mechanism 
A key development peculiar to the Chinese market is the continuous change in the 
IPO pricing mechanism over time. In the beginning IPOs were priced using variants 
of the fixed price method, with high involvement of the government in setting the 
final offer price. This price setting mechanism is considered to be a major factor in 
the higher underpricing of Chinese IPOs (Tian & Zhang, 2014). The pricing 
mechanism gradually changed to the market-oriented method of book building 
which was formally adopted in January 2005. Table 6.6 reports the descriptive 
statistics of the key variables before (IPOs from 1995 to 2004) and after (IPOs from 
2005 to 2013) the shift in pricing mechanism. One observation that is immediately 
evident is a significant shift in the size of mispricing from 167.7% to 61.2% and 
also a decline in the skewness of the returns distribution. These features are clearly 
observable by comparing the distribution plots in Figure 6.2. Further, there is also 
a change in the characteristics of the firms going public when the book building 
method of pricing was adopted. The companies that went public pre-2005 had an 
average size of CNY 951.61 million, were 3.65 years old and had an average offer 
size of CNY 431.84 million. In contrast, firms going public after 2005 were larger 
(CNY 20350.81 million), older (8.27 years) and had larger offer sizes (CNY 
1578.92 million). After the post-regime shift, companies provided lower earnings 
forecasts (0.51), sold IPOs at higher price, had more involvement of venture 




Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics: pre and post change in pricing regime 
Variables (Pre-2005 IPOs)  (Post-2005  IPOs)  post – pre regime period 
Mean SD Median Skewness  Mean SD  Median Skewness  Mean diff. t-stats 
First day returns (%) 169.70% 288.40% 112.80% 6.96  61.20% 79.00% 37.00% 2.57  -108.50% -11.71*** 
Assets (CNY M.) 951.61 6,552.16 244.59 17.90  20,350.81 266,154.76 283.95 16.64  19,399.00 2.48** 
Age (years) 3.65 11.81 1.03 7.35  8.27 6.83 7.66 7.22  4.61 11.01*** 
EPS (CNY) 0.82 1.03 0.29 1.14  0.51 0.62 0.40 6.31  -0.31 -8.36*** 
Retained Ownership (%) 69.90% 8.50% 70.20% 0.06  75.00% 6.00% 75.00% -1.55  0.05 17.72*** 
Offer Size (CNY M.) 431.84 829.12 280.50 9.68  1,578.92 5,185.45 600.00 8.97  1,147.1 7.45*** 
Issue Method 0.95 0.20 1.00 -4.47  0.01 0.08 0.00 11.97  -0.94 -139.56*** 
Inverse offer price 0.19 0.14 0.16 4.102  0.07 0.06 0.05 2.88  -0.119 -25.024*** 
Underwriter Market Share 0.05 0.04 0.03 3.03  0.04 0.05 0.02 3.60  -0.01 -5.26*** 
Venture Capitalist 0.11 0.31 0.00 2.55  0.24 0.43 0.00 1.23  0.13 8.35*** 
No. of Risk Factors 27.98 8.91 28.00 0.31  28.54 8.51 28.00 0.10  0.56 1.51 
MarketPerformancet-30(%) 1.65% 14.00% -0.03% 0.82  0.82% 8.00% 0.00% 9.00%  -0.83% -4.03*** 
Exchange 0.38 0.48 0.00 0.49  0.87 0.33 1.00 -2.23  0.49 27.29*** 
Lag Days (days) 102.20 346.92 21.00 5.14  12.05 7.24 11.00 19.98  -90.15 -8.34*** 
RealisedVolatilityt-30(%) 28.60% 15.90% 22.40% 0.92  26.40% 9.00% 23.90% 1.25  -2.20% -3.91*** 
No. of IPOs 1,032     1,167       
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 6.3. 
2. The table summarises descriptive statistics of the sample IPOs for the pre-regime change period i.e. 1995–2004 and post-regime period i.e. 2005–2013. 
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. 
EPS Earnings forecasts are provided in the IPO prospectuses. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is measured as the final offer 
price multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offered. Inverse offer price is one divided by final 
offer price per share. Underwriter Market Share is the underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by the underwriter in a year divided by capital raised by all the IPOs in that year. Venture 
Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. 
MarketPerformancet-30 is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the stock is listed. Lag Days are the no. of days between IPO date and listing date. Exchange is a dummy variable with a 
value of 0 if the IPO is listed in the SSE and 1 for the SZSE. Lag Days are the no. of days between IPO date and listing date. Realised Volatilityt-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of the market index calculated 
as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N).  





tests for the mean differences of the independent variables reveal significant 
differences between the IPO characteristics before and after the regime shift, with 
the exception of the number of risk factors. 
 Results and findings 
6.5.1 OLS and median regression estimates 
Table 6.7 reports the regression coefficients of Equation (6.1). The first column 
reports OLS regression coefficients. The significant variables are age (+), EPS 
forecast in the prospectus (+), offer size (-), offer price (+), risk factors reported in 
the prospectus (+), market performance (+), stock exchange (-), delay in IPO date 
and the listing date (+) and realised volatility (+). Column 2 reports median QR 
results which show a change in the magnitude of the coefficients of the independent 
variables compared to the OLS. Eight out of nine variables under the OLS 
regression remain significant when we use median regression: age (+), earnings per 
share forecast (+), offer size (-), offer price (-), market performance (+), exchange 
(-), lag days (+) and realised volatility (+). The variable that has a significant impact 
under the OLS model but is not found to be significant under the median QR is the 
number of risk factors reported in the prospectus. 
The results are consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis (Beatty & 
Ritter, 1986; Yu & Tse, 2006) and previous studies. The mispricing is significantly 
impacted by older business entities undertaking an IPO (Chang et al., 2008), 
providing higher earnings forecasts (Chen et al., 2004), setting lower offer price 
(Cheung et al., 2009), having a smaller offer size (Yu & Tse, 2006), reporting a 
higher number of risk factors and undergoing longer delays in listing (Guo & 
Brooks, 2008). In developed markets, older business entities are found to reduce 
ex-ante uncertainty and mispricing (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). However, we find 
the age of the business entity is directly correlated with the amount of mispricing. 
Ceteris paribus, Lin et al. (1998) argue that in a transition economy like China, 
older firms are associated with historical burdens while younger firms are likely to 
perform better. In such cases, older firms are associated with higher ex-ante 




Table 6.7: OLS and QR estimates 




OLS 0.5 0.031 0.075 0.238 0.543 0.848 
(Intercept) 1.2198*** 1.2960***  0.1170 1.2819 1.2579*** 1.3167*** 1.5506*** 
logAssetsi -0.0006 0.0015  -0.0012 -0.0031* -0.0005 0.0014 -0.0004 
logAgei 0.0228*** 0.0241***  0.0169*** 0.0107* 0.0248*** 0.0236*** 0.0101 
EPSi 0.0087** 0.0087***  0.0084** 0.0051** 0.0107*** 0.0077*** -0.0002 
RetOwni 0.0427 0.0387  -0.1181*** -0.0383 -0.0449 0.0444 0.0411 
logOSi -0.1642*** -0.1694***  -0.1793*** -0.1632*** -0.1695*** -0.1702*** -0.1699*** 
IMi 0.0221 0.0191  0.0204 0.0098 0.0319 0.0168 -0.0045 
InvOPi 0.7888*** 0.6731***  0.6203*** 0.6043*** 0.5752*** 0.6753*** 0.7557*** 
UMSi -0.0209 -0.0079  -0.0256 -0.0415 0.0392 -0.0281 0.0575 
VCi -0.0067 -0.0088  -0.0040 -0.0044 -0.0060 -0.0111* -0.0124 
RFi 0.0005* 0.0001  0.0008*** 0.0004* 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
MP30i 0.3732*** 0.4109***  0.2967*** 0.3242*** 0.3850*** 0.4106*** 0.3936*** 
Exchangei -0.0262*** -0.0382***  -0.0373*** -0.0301*** -0.0397*** -0.0347*** -0.0234** 
logLagDays 0.0087* 0.0172***  -0.0165* -0.0018 0.0235*** 0.0166*** 0.0371*** 
RelVoli 0.0908*** 0.0787***  0.0712*** 0.0863*** 0.1256*** 0.0645** 0.1099*** 
YearDummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 / R1 0.6968 0.4702  0.3767 0.3850 0.4300 0.4714 0.4929 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 6.3.  
2. Estimated results are from equation 6.1. The dependent variable is the log of (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. LogAssets is the logarithm of one plus pre-IPO total assets. LogAge is the logarithm 
of the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPS is earnings forecasts provided in the IPO prospectus. RetOwn is calculated as one minus the number of shares issued over 
total number of shares outstanding. IM is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. LogOS is the logarithm of offer size measured from the final offer 
price multiplied by the number of shares offered. InvOP is one divided by final offer price per share. VC is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the 
issue and 0 otherwise. UMS is the underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by the underwriter in a year divided by capital raised by all the IPOs in that year. RF is the number of risk factors 
reported in the IPO prospectus. logLagDays is logarithm of no. of days between IPO date and listing date. MP30 is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the stock is listed. Exchange is a 
dummy variable with value of 0 if the IPO is listed on the SSE and 1 for the SZSE. logLagDays is the logarithm of one plus the no. of days between IPO date and listing date. Realised Volatility t-30 is the 30-day 
pre-IPO volatility of the market index calculated as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N).  
3. The first column provides the OLS estimates from Equation 6.1.  
4. Column 2 provides median quantile estimates. Columns 2–7 provide QR estimates for the quantile points selected as mid-points of the sub-ranges defined in Table 6.5.  
5. Coefficients significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are marked by ***, ** and * respectively.   




Further, we find the expected positive relationships between the mispricing and the 
recent performance and volatility of the equity market (Kao et al., 2009). The 
positive sign on recent market performance suggests that issuers tend to issue their 
IPOs at times of high market performance. The positive sign on volatility suggests 
that the issuers price their shares lower than the equilibrium price during periods 
of high volatility. The significant and negative coefficient of the stock exchange 
dummy suggests that listing on SSE increases mispricing compared to SZSE. 
Lastly, consistent with the previous studies, we do not find any significant 
relationship between the role of the underwriter in the IPO and first day returns (Su 
& Brookfield, 2013). However, we observe a change in sign between the OLS and 
QR estimates. 
It is important to note that both OLS and median QR examine central regions of 
the mispricing distribution – that is, the mean and the median. They do not examine 
the relationships between mispricing and independent variables at the more 
extreme regions of the distribution. In the next subsection, we use the QR method 
to examine the relationships between mispricing and explanatory variables at 
various levels of first day returns. 
6.5.2 QR estimates 
The QR results for the ranges that represent the various levels of mispricing in 
China are reported in columns 3 to 7 in Table 6.7. The QR results show that the 
impacts of the independent variables vary across the six levels of mispricing in 
terms of their sign, size and significance. These variations allow us to differentiate 
between the determinants of the IPOs across the various ranges. 
The size of the firm (logAssetsi), age (logAgei), earnings forecast (EPSi), proportion 
of the shares retained (RetOwni), no. of risk factors reported in the prospectus (RFi) 
and delay in the listing (logLagDaysi) exhibit varying relationships with different 
levels of mispricing. For example, retained ownership that has no impact on the 
overall level of mispricing (both the mean and the median levels), is found to 
positively contribute to mispricing of the overpriced IPOs. This suggests that, as 
argued by Clarkson et al. (1992), providing lower earnings forecasts and retaining 




triggers a less enthusiastic response from the investors in the aftermarket and may 
lead to overpricing.  
Both size and earnings forecasts have a significant positive impact on mispricing 
across all ranges, with the exception of the extremely underpriced IPOs. The 
magnitude of the coefficients increase as we go from the overpriced to the highly 
underpriced IPOs, suggesting that the level of mispricing increases with increase in 
the earnings forecast and decreases in offer size. The coefficient of delay in listing 
is significant and negative for the overpriced IPOs and significant and positive for 
the underpriced IPOs, suggesting that longer delays in listing are associated with 
higher mispricing. This suggests that investors are compensated for holding the 
shares for a longer time period before the IPO lists on the exchange. An example 
of this is Shandong Jintai, with a delay of listing of 9.20 years. Shandong Jintai had 
1278.84% returns. This is consistent with other studies on the Chinese market (e.g. 
Mok & Hui, 1998; Tian, 2011).  
The variables of offer size (logOSi), offer price (InvOPi), market performance 
(MP30i), exchange of listing (Exchangei) and market volatility (RelVoli) have similar 
effects regardless of the level of mispricing. Offer size has a significantly negative 
relationship across all levels of mispricing, suggesting that as the size of the offer 
decreases the initial returns increase. This implies that the smaller IPOs have higher 
ex-ante uncertainty and are more mispriced (Yu & Tse, 2006). The coefficients of 
recent market performance and market volatility are significant and positive. This 
is a common finding in IPO studies (e.g. Paudyal et al., 1998; Su & Brookfield, 
2013). We extend the previous finding and argue that market performance and 
volatility have an increasing impact on initial returns. The coefficient of market 
performance (MP30i), 11, reflects the rate of change in stock performance as 
market performance changes. In other words, 11 = RRi / MP30i, implies that for 
an increasing impact of market performance (or market volatility) on the stock 
performance, the numerator (RRi) should have a higher rate of change compared 
to the denominator (MP30i). This suggests that the IPOs in the Chinese market 
yield higher initial returns than those in the market index.25 This is also the case 
                                                 
25 The standard deviation of the first day returns is 2.127 compared to the standard deviations of Market 
Performancet-30 and Realised Volatilityt-30 which are 0.1196 and 0.1284, respectively. Similarly, the standard 




with the coefficient of market volatility. Lastly, reduction in the size of the 
coefficient of Exchangei suggests that the IPOs that are listed on the SSE are likely 
to have higher positive returns (underpricing). 
6.5.3 Impact of change in pricing mechanism on mispricing 
The Chinese IPO market has experienced various changes in IPO pricing 
mechanism over time. Variants of fixed pricing were used to price the IPOs but 
gradually transformed into the more market-oriented pricing mechanism of book 
building, which was formally adopted in January 2005. Previous studies comparing 
the fixed price method with book building indicate the latter is more efficient in 
reducing mispricing (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989; Engelen & van Essen, 2010). 
To examine the impact of changes in the pricing regime in China we include in the 
regression specification a dummy term for each variable in Equation (6.1) which 
takes a value of zero for the period before 2005 and one otherwise, as shown in 
Equation (6.2). The impacts of independent variables on first day returns before and 
after the regime shift are reported in Table 6.8. The Xi,(pre) reflects the coefficient 
of the independent variables before the regime shift. Xi,(diff) is the difference 
between the coefficient value of the independent variables before and after the 
regime shift and Xi,(post) is the coefficient of the independent variable after the 
regime shift. The analysis is conducted using Equation (6.2). 
The OLS estimates are reported in column 1 of Table 6.8. The variables that are 
found to increase mispricing before 2005 are: age (+), offer price (+), market 
performance (+) and volatility (+). The factors that reduce mispricing for the same 
period are: offer size (-) and exchange (-). For the period from 2005 onwards, the 
factors that are found to increase the mispricing are: age (+), retained ownership 
(+), offer price (+), market performance (+) and volatility (-). The factors that 
reduce mispricing from 2005 onwards are: offer size (-) and exchange (-). A 
comparison of the estimates of the two periods shows that the factors impacted 
mispricing in the same way both before and after the change in the pricing 
mechanism. The ownership retained by the issuer has no impact on the mispricing 
pre-2005 but is found to have a significantly positive impact for 2005 onwards. The  
                                                 
MarketPerformancet-30 and RealisedVolatilityt-30 for these two levels of mispricing are 0.140 (0.07) and 0.158 




Table 6.8: China OLS and QR estimates with regime dummy as interactive term with each variable 




OLS 0.5 0.031 0.075 0.238 0.543 0.848 
(Intercept) 1.7463*** 2.0244***  0.7045*** 2.1590 2.1910*** 2.0610*** 2.1987*** 
logAssets (pre) -0.0005 0.0016  -0.0065*** -0.0032* -0.0007 0.0019* 0.0036 
logAssets (diff) -0.0002 -0.0037  0.0092*** 0.0093** 0.0003 -0.0028 -0.0052 
logAssets (post) -0.0007 -0.0022  0.0026 0.0062 -0.0003 -0.0008  -0.0016 
logAge (pre) 0.0210* 0.0265**  0.0440*** 0.0147 0.0370*** 0.0294*** 0.0035 
logAge (diff) -0.0036 -0.0112  -0.0663*** -0.0113 -0.0260*** -0.0143* 0.0153 
logAge (post) 0.0175* 0.0153**  -0.0223 0.0034 0.0110*** 0.0151**  0.0188 
EPS (pre) 0.0051 0.0073*  0.0046 0.0095** 0.0016 0.0049 0.0037 
EPS (diff) 0.0046 0.0016  0.0026 -0.0047 0.0035 0.0021 -0.0075 
EPS (post) 0.0097 0.0090*  0.0072 0.0047 0.0051 0.0070 -0.0038 
RetOwn (pre) -0.0584 -0.0290  -0.1501** -0.0368 -0.1107** -0.0007 -0.2491*** 
RetOwn (diff) 0.2180** 0.1082  0.0679 -0.0206 0.2038*** 0.1208 0.5216*** 
RetOwn (post) 0.1595** 0.0792  -0.0823 -0.0574 0.0931 0.1201 0.2725*** 
logOS (pre) -0.2130*** -0.2403***  -0.0656*** -0.2685*** -0.2691*** -0.2448*** -0.2181*** 
logOS (diff) 0.0598*** 0.0879***  0.0235** 0.1625*** 0.1329*** 0.0842*** 0.0492** 
logOS (post) -0.1533*** -0.1524***  -0.0421*** -0.1061*** -0.1362*** -0.1606*** -0.1690*** 
IM (pre) 0.0078 -0.0105  0.0159 0.0460 0.0043 -0.0146 0.0021 
IM (diff) 0.0234 0.0764  0.0183 -0.0432 0.0461 0.0515 0.0152 
IM (post) 0.0312 0.0659  -0.0342 0.0028 0.0504 0.0369 0.0173 
InvOP (pre) 0.8299*** 0.6430***  0.8136*** 0.7392*** 0.5363*** 0.6953*** 0.6032*** 
InvOP (diff) -0.3532*** -0.1027  -0.4626*** -0.4395*** -0.2045** -0.2393* 0.1395 
InvOP (post) 0.4766*** 0.5404***  0.3511*** 0.2997*** 0.3317*** 0.4561*** 0.7427*** 
UMS (pre) -0.1422 -0.1270  -0.3461*** -0.1721* 0.0272 -0.2066** 0.0832 
UMS (diff) 0.2361* 0.1763  0.3331*** 0.3016*** 0.1012 0.2771*** -0.0061 
UMS (post) 0.0939 0.0494  -0.0131* 0.1295 0.1284 0.0705* 0.0771 
VC (pre) -0.0108 0.0000  -0.0573*** -0.0246 -0.0154 -0.0022 0.0034 




Table 6.8 (continued)        




 OLS 0.5  0.031 0.075 0.238 0.543 0.848 
VC (post) -0.0041 -0.0098  0.0026 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0109 -0.0096 
RF (pre) 0.0068 0.0038  0.0011 -0.0048 -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0133 
RF (diff) 0.0004 0.0030  -0.0010 0.0055 -0.0040 0.0065 -0.0096 
RF (post) 0.0072 0.0069  0.0021 0.0007 -0.0058 0.0061 0.0037 
MP30 (pre) 0.3796*** 0.4006***  0.1504*** 0.3353*** 0.3548*** 0.4068*** 0.4119*** 
MP30 (diff) -0.0266 0.0052  0.2837*** -0.0070 0.0522 -0.0193 0.0476 
MP30 (post) 0.3530*** 0.4058***  0.4340*** 0.3283*** 0.4070*** 0.3875*** 0.4595*** 
Exchange (pre) -0.0145* -0.0232**  -0.0244* -0.0211** -0.0229** -0.0193** -0.0015 
Exchange (diff) -0.0294 -0.0232  0.0085 0.0080 -0.0125 -0.0450** -0.0338* 
Exchange (Post) -0.0438*** -0.0464***  0.0329 -0.0131 -0.0354** -0.0643*** -0.0352 
logLagDays (pre) -0.0049 0.0055  -0.0086 -0.0265*** 0.0157** 0.0039 0.0401*** 
logLagDays (diff) 0.0186 0.0145  0.0048 0.0167 -0.0087 0.0219 -0.0134 
logLagDays (post) 0.0137 0.0199  -0.0038* -0.0099** 0.0070* 0.0258 0.0267*** 
RelVol (pre) 0.0953*** 0.0746**  0.0273 0.0376 0.1183*** 0.0652* 0.0958* 
RelVol (diff) -0.0593 -0.0774  0.4905*** 0.1441** 0.0053 -0.1198 -0.0397 
RelVol (post) 0.0360** -0.0027  0.5174* 0.1817 0.1236*** -0.0546 0.0561 
YearDummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 / R1 0.7028 0.4836  0.4114 0.4195 0.4539 0.4847 0.5073 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 6.3.  
2. Estimated results are from Equation 6.2. Xi, (pre) is the coefficient of explanatory variables before the regime shift. The coefficient Xi, (diff) reflects the difference between the coefficients of the independent variables 
before and after the regime shift. In order to get the coefficient of the independent variables after the regime shift (Xi, (post)) we add Xi, (pre) and Xi, (diff). The significance of Xi, (post) is determined by using the Wald 
test. The dependent variable is the log of (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. LogAssets is the logarithm of one plus pre-IPO total assets. LogAge is the logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated 
at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPS is earnings forecasts provided in the IPO prospectus. RetOwn is calculated as one minus the number of shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. 
IM is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. LogOS is the logarithm of offer size measured from the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares 
offered. InvOP is one divided by final offer price per share. VC is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. UMS is the 
underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by the underwriter in a year divided by capital raised by all the IPOs in that year. RF is the number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus.  
Exchange is a dummy variable with value of 0 if the IPO is listed in the SSE and 1 for the SZSE. logLagDays is the logarithm of no. of days between IPO date and listing date. MP30 is the pre-IPO 30-day 
performance of the market index where the stock is listed. 
3. The first column provides the OLS estimates from Equation 6.2. 
4. Column 2 provides median quantile estimates. Columns 3–7 provide QR estimates for the quantile points selected as mid-points of the sub-ranges defined in Table 6.3. 
5. Coefficients significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are marked by ***, ** and * respectively.  




coefficients of listing exchange suggest that IPOs listed in SSE are more mispriced 
during both periods. However, the magnitude of the impact of the variables 
decreased from the pre-2005 period to the period from 2005 onwards, reflecting the 
reduction in the level of mispricing of the two periods. This suggests that the 
introduction of a market-oriented method of pricing significantly contributed to the 
reduction in mispricing. 
The application of QR across the levels of mispricing provides further insights into 
the changing impacts of the independent variables across the levels of mispricing. 
The estimates are reported in column 3 to 7 of Table 6.8. The results show that the 
impacts that the independent variables have on mispricing vary across the levels of 
mispricing as well as across the two periods. 
While looking at the central region of the distribution we do not see any impact of 
firm size on mispricing. But the QR estimates that, before 2005, firm size has a 
significantly negative relationship with the mispricing of overpriced and fairly 
priced IPOs but has a significantly positive impact on the mispricing of highly 
underpriced IPOs. This suggests that as firm size increases, the magnitude of the 
mispricing increases. This relationship only holds for the pre-2005 period as firm 
size has no significant impact on mispricing from 2005 onwards. This change in 
impact is significant for overpriced and the fairly priced IPOs. 
Age of the firm has a significantly positive impact on the overpriced, underpriced 
and highly underpriced IPOs pre-2005. For the period 2005 onwards, the age of the 
firm is only found to increase the mispricing of underpriced and highly underpriced 
IPOs. The change in the impact of firm age on mispricing during the two periods is 
significant. 
Pre-2005, retained ownership has a significantly negative relationship with the 
mispricing of overpriced, underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs. Retained 
ownership has no impact on mispricing for 2005 onwards, except in the case of 
extremely underpriced IPOs. 
Offer size has a significantly negative impact across all levels of mispricing for both 
the time periods. The magnitude of the estimates suggests that as offer size 




extremely underpriced. However, there is a decrease in the magnitude of logOS(pre) 
and logOS(post) suggesting a shift in impact due to the change in the pricing 
mechanism. 
The offer price is found to have a significantly negative impact across all levels of 
mispricing both before and after the change in the pricing regime. The magnitude 
of the coefficients shows that as the offer price decreases, the IPOs are more 
mispriced. However, there is a decrease in the magnitude of the mispricing with the 
change in the pricing regime. 
Underwriter reputation is found to decrease the mispricing of overpriced, fairly 
priced and the highly underpriced IPOs before 2005. However, for the period from 
2005 onwards, the coefficient of underwriter reputation is significantly negative for 
overpriced IPOs and significantly positive for highly underpriced IPOs. This 
highlights the role of the underwriters after the introduction of the book building 
process. The relationship between mispricing and UMSi changes from significantly 
negative for the overpriced IPOs to being significantly positive for the extremely 
underpriced IPOs. This finding supports the proposition by Aggarwal, Prabhala and 
Puri (2002) that in a book building pricing regime, underwriters underprice IPOs to 
please their investor clientele. 
The difference between the offer date and the listing date (logLagDays), which is 
previously found to increase the mispricing, has a significantly positive impact on 
mispricing of underpriced IPOs for both the periods. But the magnitude of the 
impact decreases after the shifting to the book building method. 
Consistent with Kao et al. (2009), recent market performance is found to increase 
mispricing in both the periods examined. Whereas, before 2005, market volatility 
has a significantly positive relationship with the three levels of the underpriced 
IPOs. However, market volatility does not have a systematic relationship with the 
mispricing in the 2005 onwards period, except that is has a significantly positive 
impact on overpriced and underpriced IPOs. 
Now we move on to discuss the impact of the independent variables on each level 
of mispricing. The size of the firm, retained ownership, venture capitalist and listing 




overpriced IPOs during the pre-regime period but have no significant relationships 
after the change in regime. On the other hand, age has a significantly positive 
impact on the extent of mispricing for overpriced IPOs before 2005 but has no 
significant relationship for 2005 onwards. Offer size, offer price and underwriter 
reputation have a significantly negative relationship with the extent of mispricing 
for overpriced IPOs both before and after the change in the pricing mechanism. 
While market performance has a significantly positive correlation with mispricing, 
indicating that issuers who overprice seem to take high market performance and 
volatility as an opportunity to maximise their IPO proceeds. A closer examination 
of these IPOs highlights three interesting facts: (a) all of the overpriced IPOs are 
fixed price; (b) issuers increase their potential wealth by overpricing26; and (c) these 
IPOs are the oldest companies and retain the highest proportion of ownership. 
These patterns suggest that the issuers gain more wealth than they would have 
generated if they had followed the book building method. However, after the shift 
in pricing regime, the market seems to reject the IPOs that have fixed prices, are 
older, retain a higher proportion of ownership and sell at higher offer prices. 
Underpriced and highly underpriced IPOs show similar results in which mispricing 
is significantly impacted by age (+), retained ownership (+), offer price (+), offer 
size (-), underwriter reputation (-), recent market performance (+), listing on the 
SSE   (-), lag between IPO date and listing date (+) and volatility (-). We see that 
most of the coefficients have decreased after the change in price regime. This 
suggests that the involvement of the market in the pricing of IPOs mitigates 
mispricing. However, the similarity between these two levels of mispricing is not 
without exceptions. For example, underwriter reputation has no impact on 
underpriced IPOs but we see a change in sign of the coefficient when the figure 
changes from -0.2066 to 0.0705. The change in sign suggests that underwriter 
reputation decreases underpricing in the pre-regime shift period whereas under the 
market-oriented pricing mechanism reputable underwriters tend to leave some 
money on the table to keep investors engaged. This explanation can be inferred 
from the positive insignificant coefficient of UMS(post) suggesting that for fairly 
priced IPOs, underwriter reputation has no impact. These results suggest that the 
                                                 
26 This is based on the mispricing gain (loss) to the issuer’s wealth, calculated following da Silva 
Rosa, Velayuthen and Walter (2003) where standard mispricing is adjusted for the proportion of the 




book building method gives underwriters some influence on the pricing of the IPOs, 
and by using that influence they tend to leave money on the table and establish their 
clientele by benefiting investors. This behaviour of benefiting investors and 
establishing clientele base has relevance in the context of the Chinese market 
because during the period when the market was controlled by strict government 
regulations (prior to 2004) and underwriters were state-controlled, underwriters had 
no incentive to misprice (Su & Brookfield, 2013). This finding is further 
strengthened by a reduction in the magnitude of the coefficient of UMSi from -
0.3461 (UMS (pre)) to   -0.0131 (UMS (post)) for the overpriced IPOs and a change in 
the same coefficient from -0.2066 (UMS (pre)) to +0.0705. (UMS (post)), suggesting 
that larger underwriters have started to leave money on the table after the pricing 
method changed to book building. Similarly, highly underpriced IPOs are not 
impacted by the delay in listing and market volatility. 
Lastly, the mispricing of the extremely underpriced IPOs is caused by higher 
retained ownership, smaller offer size and offer price, euphoric market and delay in 
listing. These results show that extreme levels of mispricing are caused by risk 
characteristics of the IPOs which put the investors at an information disadvantage. 
Therefore, issuers misprice these IPOs to compensate investors for the risk they 
take. It is worth noting that the issuers of extremely underpriced IPOs lose over half 
(53.80%) of their potential proceeds to underpricing. Surprisingly, we do not see 
that Exchange(Post) and RelVol(Post) have significant impacts on the extremely 
underpriced IPOs. 
In summary, the adoption of the book building mechanism of IPO pricing 
significantly reduced the level of mispricing in Chinese IPOs, with a decrease of 
more than 100%.  The current levels of mispricing are higher than those in other 
countries. The results are consistent with the expected signs and previous studies. 
The results also suggest a behavioural shift in investors’ investment patterns, as is 
suggested by the differences in the Xi,(post) coefficients of overpriced and extremely 
underpriced IPOs. Our results partially support the findings of Gao (2010) that the 
Chinese IPO returns can be explained by behavioural factors such as market 
sentiment. Further, consistent with Cao et al. (2013) we do not find any significant 
relationship between the involvement of venture capitalists and mispricing. 




The use of the QR method, using Equations 6.1 and 6.2, allowed us to explore the 
latent relationship between the levels of mispricing and the independent variables 
in Chinese IPOs. The coefficients obtained for Equations 6.1 and 6.2 show a 
varying relationship between the independent variables and the levels of 
mispricing. Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.9 report the estimates of the equality of 
slope parameters of Equations 6.1 and 6.2 across the five levels of mispricing. The 
comparison of the estimates shows that the differences in the impacts of the 
independent variables are significant at the 1% level across all the levels of 
mispricing. These tests show differences between the IPOs in two extreme regions, 
the highly overpriced and the extremely underpriced IPOs. This confirms that the 
impact that independent variables have on various levels of mispricing are 
significantly different across the mispricing distribution, and supports our use of 
the QR to explore those differences. 
Table 6.9: Tests of the equality of slope estimates across quantiles 
Panel A    
Level of mispricing Quantiles Estimate p-value 
Overpriced vs. extremely 
underpriced 
0.031 vs. 0.848 8.93 0.000*** 
Fairly priced vs. highly 
underpriced 
0.075 vs. 0.543 7.63 0.000*** 
Overpriced vs. underpriced 0.031 vs. 0.238 36.32 0.000*** 
All levels of mispricing 0.031 vs. 0.075 vs. 0.238 
vs. 0.543 vs. 0.848 
18.26 0.000*** 
Panel - B    
Overpriced vs. extremely 
underpriced 
0.031 vs. 0.848 11.91 0.000*** 
Fairly priced vs. highly 
underpriced 
0.075 vs. 0.543 6.98 0.000*** 
Overpriced vs. underpriced 0.031 vs. 0.238 6.11 0.000*** 
All levels of mispricing 0.031 vs. 0.075 vs. 0.238 
vs. 0.543 vs. 0.848 
8.02 0.000*** 
1. Panel A shows the F-statistics of the equality of slope estimates of Equation 6.1 across the selected 
quantiles representing the levels of the first day returns. 
2. Panel B shows the F-statistics of the equality of slope estimates of Equation 6.2 across the selected 
quantiles representing the levels of the first day returns. 
3. Coefficients significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are marked by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has three main focuses. First, we identify the extent and distribution 
of the mispricing of Chinese IPOs. Second, we find the factors that contribute to 
the mispricing using OLS and QR approaches. Third, we study the impact of the 




Using a sample of 2199 IPOs listed on the SSE and the SZSE, we show that average 
mispricing is 112.10% with a median of 71.40% for the IPOs listed between 1995 
and 2013. The mispricing distribution is skewed to the right, with 6.27% of IPOs 
being overpriced, and almost one-third of the sample IPOs have above-average 
returns. In contrast to Chen et al. (2004), we find that the IPOs listed on the SSE 
are significantly more mispriced than those listed on the SZSE. 
We divided the IPOs into five groups based on direction of mispricing from lowest 
to highest as follows: overpriced IPOs, fairly priced IPOs, underpriced IPOs, highly 
underpriced IPOs, and extremely underpriced IPOs. Using a combination of OLS 
and QR methods, we find a variation in the relationship of the independent variables 
across the levels of the mispricing. The factors that explain the overpriced and fairly 
priced IPOs are different to those that explain the extremely underpriced IPOs. 
These differences are more pronounced between the tails of the distribution. Our 
analysis shows that overpriced IPOs are impacted by age, firm size, earnings 
forecast and offer size. However, the extremely underpriced IPOs are driven by 
high risk characteristics of the issuers who compensate investors for taking that risk, 
firm size, offer size, offer price and delay in listing. Although such companies are 
considered risky, they are able to list on the stock exchange and do not have the 
historical burden that older firms usually carry. The younger and smaller ventures 
attract investor interest and yield higher returns (Lin et al., 1998; Tian, 2011). In 
addition, we find that as market performance and market volatility increase, 
mispricing increases. We also find that mispricing is more prevalent in the SSE than 
the SZSE. 
The adoption of the book building method of pricing has reduced mispricing from 
169.70% to 61.20% and it has also reduced the skewness of the returns. We find 
that the change in the pricing mechanism has also changed the risk characteristics 
if firms going public. The factors that largely drive the pre-2005 mispricing do not 
have any significant impact in the period from 2005 onwards. This is observable in 
the coefficients of logAssets(post), logAge(post), EPS(post), and RetOwn(post) for 
overpriced and fairly priced IPOs. For the right side of the distribution (i.e. the IPOs 
with positive returns) we find that the change to the book building method reduced 
the magnitude of the coefficient of the independent variables for the three levels of 




logLagDays(post). The results also highlight that reputable underwriters are also 
found to increase the underpricing of IPOs, which was previously not the case for 
the Chinese underwriters. Consistent with Cao et al. (2013), we find there is no 





7 Chapter 7: Mispricing in Malaysia 
 
 Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine the mispricing of Malaysian IPOs. Previous studies 
show a huge decline in the magnitude of the mispricing of Malaysian IPOs from 
166.7% (Dawson, 1987) to 6.94% (Badru & Ahmad-Zaluki, 2018). We find an 
average mispricing of 1.80% in a sample of 419 Malaysian IPOs that were issued 
from 1995 to 2013. The extent of the mispricing ranges from -94.77% to 1566.67%, 
where 59.42% of the sample IPOs are overpriced and only 18.85% of the sample 
IPOs have above average returns. The distribution of these returns is skewed to the 
right, with a median mispricing of -17.53%. In order to gain greater insights into 
the factors contributing to mispricing, we divide the sample into four levels based 
on the direction and magnitude of the mispricing: highly overpriced IPOs, 
overpriced IPOs, fairly priced IPOs and underpriced IPOs. The IPOs show varying 
characteristics across the four levels. Firms with larger assets, greater ages, larger 
offer sizes, and reputable underwriters tend to be the more underpriced, while firms 
that provide the highest earnings forecasts are highly overpriced. Firms with small 
sizes, average ages, higher earnings forecasts and high offer prices are overpriced.  
The Malaysian market is of interest as it is categorised as an emerging market by 
MSCI, but with some of characteristics that make it different from other emerging 
markets. Firms that go public have a choice to list on either the Main Market or the 
ACE Market of the stock exchange. Listing on the Main Market has stricter criteria 
than the ACE Market. The key requirements for listing on the two markets are 
summarised in Table 7.1. 
The companies seeking to be listed on the Main Market are required to obtain 
approval from the SC to have their prospectuses registered. They are also required 
to show a track record of profitability for the last three to five years. In contrast, 
firms seeking to be listed on the ACE Market are only required to have their 
prospectuses reviewed by the SC before they are registered. Thereafter, ACE 
Market companies undergo a tutoring period with a financial institution, which acts 




financial institutions who can be involved as sponsors27  is provided by Bursa 
Malaysia. The IPO prospectuses require wide disclosure, including: financial 
performance and profits, forecast profits (such as forecast earnings per share) and 
the potential risk factors affecting the issue. The earnings forecasts need to be 
verified by the reporting accountant and the issuer is also required to provide 
commentary on the steps taken to mitigate the potential risk factors affecting the 
issue. These features suggest that companies listed on the ACE Market are likely to 
be risky and more mispriced.  
 
Table 7.1: Listing requirements for listing on Main Market and Ace Market 
Criteria Main Market ACE Market 
Profit test Continuous profit after tax for 
three to five financial years with 
cumulative sum of not less than 
RM 20 million, where the most 
recent year’s profit after tax must 
be at least RM 6 million.   
No minimum profit requirement. 
Public spread At least 25% of the share capital 
with a minimum of 1000 public 
shareholders having no less than 
100 shares each. 
At least 25% of the share capital 
with a minimum of 200 public 
shareholders having no less than 




50% of public shares to be 
allocated to Bumiputera investors. 
No allocation requirement at the 
time of listing. However, 12.5% of 
the paid up capital is required to be 
allocated to Bumiputera investors 
within a period of one to five years 
from the date of listing depending 
on the profitability of the 
company. 
Sponsorship  Not applicable. Sponsor to be engaged to ascertain 
listing suitability and is required 




Sufficient working cash flow for 
at least 12 months with positive 
cash flow from operating 
activities and no accumulated 
losses in the latest audited balance 
sheet. 
Sufficient working cash flow for at 
least 12 month. 
Lockup 
period 
Six months from the date of 
listing 
Six months from the date of listing 
for all the shares held. Later, at 
least 45% of the shares must be 
held for another six months and 
thereafter the shares can be sold 
over a period of three years. 
1. The table compares listing requirements of Main Market and ACE Market. 
 
                                                 
27 A sponsor is a financial institution that is a go-to entity for the firm seeking to list in the ACE Market. The 
sponsor determines the suitability of a business to be listed and continues to advise and guide the listed company 




 Studies in Malaysia 
A summary of IPO mispricing in Malaysia is provided in Table 7.2 where the early 
evidence of IPO studies goes back to Dawson (1987) who studies a sample of 21 
Malaysian IPOs and finds an average mispricing of 166.6%. Studies that followed 
continued to report Malaysian IPOs being mispriced. It is observed that the 
magnitude of mispricing has decreased over time from 99.25% (Jelic et al., 2001) 
to 6.94% (Badru & Ahmad-Zaluki, 2018). 
Table 7.2: Mispricing of Malaysian IPOs 
Study Period N Mean (%) Median (%) 
Dawson (1987) 1978 – 1983 21 166.6 - 
Mohamad et al. (1994) 1975 – 1990 65 135 - 
Paudyal et al. (1998) 1984 – 1995 95 61.80 40.50 
Jelic et al. (2001) 1980 – 1995 182 99.25 79.04 
Corhay et al. (2002) 1992 – 1996 258 41.7 32.21 
Prasad, Vozikis & Ariff (2006) 1968 – 1975 38 57 - 
Prasad et al. (2006) 1976 – 1992 75 118 - 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) 1990 – 2000 454 95.2 76.5 
Murugesu & Santhapparaj (2010) 1999 – 2004 210 1.82 1.63 
Low & Yong (2011) 2000 – 2007  368 30.83 19.74 
Rahim, Embi & Yong (2012) 1999 – 2008 384 30.21 18.13 
Younesi et al. (2012) 2007 – 2010 66 7.34 - 
Badru & Ahmad-Zaluki (2018) 2005 – 2015 220 6.94 4.55 
1. The table summarises evidence of IPO mispricing in Malaysia. 
 
Like other markets, there is an observable difference between the mean and the 
median levels of mispricing of Malaysian IPOs. Paudyal et al. (1998) examine 95 
Malaysian IPOs issued from 1984 to 1995 and find mean and median returns to be 
61.80% and 40.50% respectively. Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) report that a sample 
of 454 IPOs issued between 1990 and 2000 have a mean (median) mispricing of 
95.2% (76.5%). Low and Yong (2011) show that 368 IPOs issued between 2000 
and 2007 have a mean mispricing of 30.83% and a median of 17.94%. A more 
recent study by Badru and Ahmad-Zaluki (2018) shows mean and median 
mispricing of 6.94% and 4.55% respectively in a sample of 220 IPOs issued 
between 2005 and 2015. 
The above discussion and the statistics reported in Table 7.2 highlight two features 
of the mispricing of Malaysian IPOs: (a) There is a difference between the mean 
and the median levels of mispricing (wherever reported), (b) the magnitude of 




Studies that examine mispricing in Malaysia show that the factors that are found to 
contribute to the mispricing are: larger size (Badru & Ahmad-Zaluki, 2018), lower 
age (Jelic et al., 2001), higher retained ownership (Paudyal et al., 1998), small offer 
size (Corhay et al., 2002), large offer price (Rashid, Abdul-Rahim & Yong, 2016), 
higher underwriter reputation (Paudyal et al., 1998; Murugesu & Santhapparaj, 
2010), high market performance (Jelic et al., 2001), and market volatility (Paudyal 
et al., 1998). On the other hand, the factors that are found to reduce the level of 
mispricing are: large offer size and concentrated ownership structure (Rahim et al., 
2012). 
Table 7.3: Definitions of independent variables 
Variable Definition Expected 
Sign 
logAssetsi Logarithm of one plus pre-IPO total assets  - 
logAgei Logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated from 
the difference of the foundation year and the time of 
the IPO. 
- 
EPSi The forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. - 
RetOwni Calculated as one minus the number of shares issued / 
total number of shares outstanding. 
- 
logOSi Logarithm of offer size measured from the final offer 
price multiplied by the number of shares offered.  
+ 
IMi A dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a 
fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. 
+ 
InvOPi One divided by final offer price per share. - 
UMSi Underwriter Market Share is calculated as the sum of 
total capital raised in IPOs by the underwriter in a year 
‘t’, divided by the total capital raised by all the IPOs in 
the year ‘t’. 
- 
VCi A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had 
venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the 
issue and 0 otherwise. 
- 
RFi No. of Risk Factors measures the risks reported in the 
IPO prospectus. 
- 
MP30i The pre-IPO 30-day performance of the FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia Index. 
+ 
Boardi A dummy variable with a value of 1 for IPOs listed in 
the Main Market and 0 for the ACE Market. 
- 
RelVoli Realised volatility of 30 days pre-IPO is calculated as 
the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N)  
+ 
1. The table summarises the expected signs of the relationships between the independent variables and the 
first day IPO returns.  
 
 Method 
The empirical model for examination of mispricing of the sample of Malaysian 
IPOs is presented in Equation (7.1). We use, 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗
, the firm-level explanatory 
variables (discussed in Section 3.2.2) and year dummies, 𝑋𝑖𝑡




effects, as shown in Equation (3.3). To capture the setting of the Malaysian IPO 
market we add a dummy variable Boardi to our model. Boardi takes a value of 1 if 
the IPO is listed on the Main Market and 0 for the ACE Market. The definitions of 
the independent variables and the expected signs of their relationships with the first 
day IPO returns are summarised in Table 7.3. 
log RRi,t = α  + β1logAssetsi+β2logAgei +β3EP Si+β4RetOwni  
+ β5logOSi   +  β6IMi  +  β7InvOPi +  β8UMSi   +  β9VCi                          
+  β10RFi + β11MP30 i  + β12Board +  β13RelVol i           
+ ΣYeari + εi,t                                                                          (7.1) 
 
Table 7.4: Descriptive statistics of the Malaysian sample 
Variables Mean St. Dev Median Skewness 
First day returns (%) 1.80% 138.30% -17.53% 7.35 
Offer price (MYR) 1.27 0.96 1.00 1.55 
Assets (MYR M.) 158.26 658.63 12.40 7.75 
Age (years) 6.01 10.57 2.44 5.84 
EPS (MYR) 12.42 14.88 7.78 1.43 
Retained Ownership (%) 72.30% 14.60% 75.00% -2.25 
Offer Size (MYR M.) 130.23 700.84 20.63 12.35 
Issue Method 0.96 0.19 1.00 -4.84 
Inverse offer price 1.42 1.23 1.00 1.87 
Underwriter Market Share 0.10 0.14 0.04 2.71 
Venture Capitalist 0.02 0.16 0.00 5.94 
No. of Risk Factors 18.58 7.31 19.00 0.19 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) 0.60% 6.20% 1.00% 0.82 
Board 0.52 0.50 1.00 -0.09 
Realised Volatilityt-30 (%) 12.9% 83.8% 10.80% 3.53 
No. of IPOs 419    
1. The names and listing dates of 459 Malaysian IPOs issued during our sample period were obtained from 
Bursa Malaysia. The offer prices of the IPOs and all the independent variables except for market 
performance were obtained from the IPO prospectuses available on the Thomson One Banker and Bursa 
Malaysia websites. The daily adjusted trading prices of the stocks included in our sample and the FTSE 
Bursa Malaysia Index, which is used as a benchmark for market performance, were collected from 
DataStream. The construction of the final sample for the analysis involved certain adjustments. The firms 
with unavailable prospectuses, unavailable historical prices, unit trusts, stapled securities and issues without 
a public offer component were excluded, leaving a final sample size of 419 IPOs. 
2. The table summarises descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in the study.  
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-
IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. 
EPS is the forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. Retained Ownership is one minus the number 
of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is measured as the final offer price 
multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the 
IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. Inverse offer price is one divided by final offer 
price per share. Underwriter Market Share is calculated as the sum of total capital raised in IPOs by the 
underwriter in a year t, divided by the total capital raised by all the IPOs in the year t. Venture Capitalist is 
a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the 
issue and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. 
MarketPerformancet-30 is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index. Board is a 
dummy variable with value of 1 for IPOs listed in the main market and 0 for the ACE Market. Realised 
Volatilityt-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of market index calculated as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-




 Sample characteristics 
7.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the main variables are reported in Table 7.4.  The 
average return of the sample IPOs is 1.80% which is consistent with recent studies 
(Murugesu & Santhapparaj, 2010; Younesi et al., 2012; Badru & Ahmad-Zaluki, 
2018) and lower than that of the older firms (Corhay et al., 2002). The median level 
of mispricing is -17.53% where 59.42% of the sample IPOs are overpriced and only 
18.85% have above average returns.  The average age of the companies in our 
sample is approximately six years which is much less than the 19.57 years reported 
in Jelic et al. (2001), but close to the 5.53 years reported by Ammer and Ahmad-
Zaluki (2016). The total money raised by the IPOs over our sample period is MYR 
54.57 billion with an average offer size of MYR 130.23 million. 
The issuing companies retained 72.30% of the ownership on average, which is close 
to the 74.18% reported by Paudyal et al. (1998). Further, the proportion of the 
ownership retained by Malaysian issuers is close to what is retained by Chinese 
issuers (72.90%) but much higher than the proportion retained by US issuers 
(11.50%). Since the commonly used method of pricing is the fixed price method, 
96.20% of IPOs in our sample are priced using the fixed price method. Unlike the 
US only 2.60% of the sample IPOs have VC backing. Lastly, 52.20% of the IPOs 
are listed on the Main Market and the rest (47.80%) are listed on the ACE Market. 
7.4.2 Levels of mispricing 
The differences between the mean and median, and the skewness of the first day 
returns reported in Table 7.4, suggest that the distribution of the first day IPOs 
returns in Malaysia is not normal. The right-skewed distribution of the first day 
IPOs returns is clearly observable from the distribution plot in Figure 7.1.28 As 
mentioned above, examining the mean of the distribution would provide an inflated 
picture of the first day IPOs returns and information at the tails of the distribution 
would not be captured. To gain further insights into the characterises of the IPOs 
across the mispricing distribution, we divide our sample into three sub-categories: 
IPOs with negative returns called overpriced IPOs (these are at the left-hand side 
                                                 
28 The findings from applying the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality support the conclusion that the 




of the distribution), IPOs with zero returns called fairly priced IPOs (these are in 
the middle of the distribution) and IPOs with positive returns called underpriced 
IPOs (these are at the right-hand side of the distribution). 
Figure 7.1: Distribution plot showing Malaysian IPO mispricing 
 
Due to the larger number of IPOs with negative returns we further sub-divide the 
IPOs with negative returns into two (almost) equal sub-categories: highly 
overpriced and overpriced. This gives us four sub-ranges dividing the distribution 
of the mispricing, from left to right, into highly overpriced, overpriced, fairly priced 
and underpriced IPOs. The descriptive statistics of these sub-ranges are reported in 
Table 7.5.  We find that it is the larger and older firms with larger offer sizes that 
tend to be the more underpriced while the firms that provide the highest earnings 
forecasts are highly overpriced. Further, we see that the firms which use high-
reputation underwriters (underwriters with higher market share) are underpriced. 
Last, firms that go public during periods of high market performance are likely to 
be more underpriced. Further, the market seems to react negatively to market 
volatility, as we see a ‘u-shaped’ relationship between mispricing and realised 
volatility where higher levels of volatility are associated with higher mispricing. 
Table 7.5 shows that the IPOs within each level of mispricing have varying 
characteristics. We examine the impact that these varying characteristics have on 




Table 7.5: Variable means by the extent of mispricing 
Variables Highly Overpriced Overpriced Fairly Priced Underpriced 
0 – 0.295 0.295 - 0.594 0.594 - 0.775 0.775 - 1 
First day returns (%) -64.90% -23.40% 0.00% 125.00% 
Assets (MYR M.) 63.13 106.19 122.17 382.16 
Age (years) 5.86 5.99 4.61 7.37 
EPS 15.52 12.78 4.98 13.86 
Retained Ownership (%) 72.20% 72.00% 72.90% 72.50% 
Offer Size (MYR M.) 34.12 174.23 114.66 211.07 
Issue Method 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.91 
Inverse offer price 1.21 1.30 1.89 1.47 
Underwriter Market Share 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Venture Capitalist 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.14 
No. of Risk Factors 17.35 18.96 21.74 17.15 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) 0.10% 0.50% 0.80% 1.40% 
Board 0.46 0.47 0.63 0.57 
RealisedVolatilityt-30 (%) 15.00% 12.80% 10.70% 11.90% 
No. of IPOs  124 125 76 94 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 7.4.  
2. The table breaks down the means of the variables for various sub-ranges of our data based on the magnitude of the mispricing of the IPOs as follows: the highly overpriced IPOs (i.e. the top 29.5% 
of the sample when the IPOs are ranked from the most overpriced to the most underpriced), the overpriced IPOs (ranked from 29.5% to 59.4%), the fairly priced IPOs (ranked 59.4% to 77.5%) and the 
underpriced IPOs (ranked from 77.5% to 100%).  
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of 
incorporation. EPS is the forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is 
measured as the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. Inverse 
offer price is one divided by final offer price per share. Underwriter Market Share is calculated as the sum of total capital raised in IPOs by the underwriter in a year t, divided by the total capital raised 
by all the IPOs in the year t. Venture Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors 
measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index. Board is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IPOs 





Table 7.6: Descriptive statistics with respect to Main and ACE markets 
Variables 
 
Main market  ACE market  Main – ACE market  
Mean SD Median Skewness  Mean SD Median Skewness  Mean diff. t-stats 
First day returns (%)  -1.06% 86.50% -4.43% 3.38  5.01% 178.78% -25.00% 6.73  -6.07 -0.43 
Assets (MYR M.) 275.03 894.52 51.56 5.56  30.40 56.46 5.59 4.15  244.62 4.03*** 
Age (years) 7.72 12.29 2.78 4.72  4.15 7.91 2.04 9.02  3.57 3.56*** 
EPS 12.72 14.15 9.74 0.92  12.10 15.68 5.47 1.85  0.62 0.42 
Retained Ownership (%) 71.36% 14.09% 74.25% -1.88  73.37% 15.20% 75.00% -2.65  -0.02 -1.39 
Offer Size (MYR M.) 231.34 959.11 37.07 8.96  19.52 21.04 14.29 5.41  211.82 3.26*** 
Issue Method 0.93 0.25 1.00 -3.44  1.00 0.07 1.00 -14.14  -0.06 -3.56*** 
Inverse offer price 1.48 1.03 1.25 1.60  1.05 0.84 0.75 1.38  0.42 4.64*** 
Underwriter Market Share 0.12 0.17 0.05 2.27  0.07 0.09 0.04 2.45  0.05 3.75*** 
Venture Capitalist 0.04 0.19 0.00 4.98  0.02 0.12 0.00 8.04  0.02 1.44 
No. of Risk Factors 19.08 7.88 19.00 0.38  18.04 6.61 19.00 -0.27  1.04 1.46 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) 0.39% 5.45% 1.35% -0.54  0.90% 6.89% 0.39% 1.50  0.38 -0.83 
Realised volatility t-30 (%) 12.36% 7.39% 10.72% 3.28  13.49% 9.33% 10.81% 3.55  -1.13 -1.36 
No. of IPOs 219     200       
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 7.4. 
2. The table summarises descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables of the IPOs listed in the Main and ACE markets 
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of 
incorporation. EPS is the forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is 
measured as the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. Inverse 
offer price is one divided by final offer price per share. Underwriter Market Share is calculated as the sum of total capital raised in IPOs by the underwriter in a year t, divided by the total capital raised 
by all the IPOs in the year t. Venture Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. No. of Risk Factors 
measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index. Realised Volatilityt-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility 
of market index calculated as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). 





7.4.3 Mispricing in the Main and the ACE markets 
Table 7.6 reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables of the IPOs listed on 
the Main and the ACE markets. The IPOs listed on the Main market are on average 
mispriced by -1.06% and average mispricing of the IPOs listed on the ACE market 
is 5.01%. There are some observable difference in the characteristics of the IPOs 
listed on the two markets. The firms that list on the ACE market are smaller in size 
and are younger. These firms have smaller offer size and use less reputable 
underwriters. The characteristics of the firms listed on the ACE market reflect 
higher risk profile and are more mispriced. 
 Results and discussion 
7.5.1 OLS and median regression estimates 
The first column of Table 7.7 reports the OLS coefficients of Equation (7.1). 
Applying the traditional OLS regression, the variables for which coefficients are 
significant are: earnings forecast (-), offer price (+), the underwriter’s market share 
(+), market performance (+) and realised volatility (-). Consistent with previous 
studies, we find that the issuers providing lower earnings forecasts are associated 
with higher mispricing (Jelic et al., 2001), and that having a more reputable  
underwriter increases underpricing (Paudyal et al., 1998). The positive significant 
coefficient of InvOPi is consistent with Malaysian studies that examine IPO 
mispricing (e.g. Rashid, Abdul-Rahim & Yong, 2014; Badru & Ahmad-Zaluki, 
2018). This suggests that risky firms have an incentive to price their IPOs lower to 
attract investors to gain adequate subscriptions (Brennan & Hughes, 1991; 
Chowdhry & Sherman, 1996; Bradley & Jordan, 2002). 
Last, the negatively significant coefficient of RelVoli suggests that the periods of 
high market volatility reduce mispricing. A plausible explanation for this is a 
buildup of negative sentiment in the market during the periods of high volatility 
which leads to a reduction in returns. This explanation is supported by the negative 
correlation between market sentiment (MP30i) and realised volatility (RelVoli) 





Table 7.7: OLS and QR estimates 
Variables  Full Sample Median  Highly  
overpriced 
Overpriced Fairly priced Underpriced 
OLS 0.5 0.148 0.446 0.686 0.889 
(Intercept) 0.0658 -0.0995  0.0736 -0.2285 0.1032 1.7269 
logAssetsi -0.0084 -0.0069*  -0.0145** -0.0094* -0.0021 -0.0040 
logAgei -0.0047 -0.0106  0.0706** -0.0145 -0.0152 -0.0122 
EPSi -0.00345** -0.0024***  -0.0036 -0.0023 -0.0020* -0.0035*** 
RetOwni 0.0537 0.0842  0.1146 0.1595 0.0516 -0.0203 
logOSi 0.0433 0.0361  0.0254 0.0547* 0.0181 0.0379 
IMi -0.0666 -0.0252  -0.0644 -0.0214 -0.0189 -0.4655*** 
InvOPi 0.0544*** 0.0438***  0.0560** 0.0479*** 0.0379*** 0.0533*** 
UMSi 0.3668*** 0.2698**  0.4831** 0.3133** 0.1914** 0.1023 
VCi -0.0823 -0.1189  -0.3287 -0.0647 0.0298 0.1562 
RFi -0.0010 -0.0871  -0.1984 -0.1522 -0.0811 -0.0628 
MP30i 0.50742* 0.4956**  0.2080 0.5631** 0.4262* 0.6873** 
Boardi -0.0095 0.0399  -0.1109** 0.0231 0.0677*** 0.0362 
RelVoli -0.5561* -0.8365**  -0.3923* -0.9164** -0.0677 -0.4405** 
YearDummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 / R1 0.1953 0.0976  0.1922 0.0997 0.0700 0.2454 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 7.4.  
2. Estimated results are from Equation 7.1. The dependent variable is the log of (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. LogAssets is the logarithm of one plus pre-IPO total assets. LogAgei is the 
logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPSi is forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. RetOwni is calculated as one minus the number of 
shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. logOSi is the logarithm of offer size measured from the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered. IMi is a dummy variable with 
the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. InvOPi is one divided by final offer price per share. UMSi is calculated as the sum of total capital raised in IPOs by the underwriter 
in a year t, divided by the total capital raised by all the IPOs in the year t. VCi is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. 
RFi is the number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus. MP30i is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index. Boardi is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IPOs listed on 
the main market and 0 for the ACE Market. Realised Volatilityt-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of the market index calculated as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N) . 
3. The first column provides the OLS estimates from Equation 7.1 
4. Column 2 provides median quantile estimates. Columns 3–6 provide QR estimates for the quantile points selected as mid-points of the sub-ranges defined in Table 7.5. 
5. Coefficients significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are marked by ***, ** and * respectively. 




Comparing the results of OLS regression with the QR regression on median QR 
(column 2 of Table 7.7), the five variables that are significant under the OLS 
regression remain significant under the median regression. In addition, we also find 
that larger companies tend to be less mispriced. This is consistent with Beatty and 
Welch (1996), suggesting that larger firm size reduces uncertainty and the resulting 
mispricing. 
A significant difference between the OLS and median QR results is the decrease in 
the size of coefficients for the QR, except for RelVoli which increases in size. As 
we know that the median returns are less than the mean ones, the increase in the 
coefficient of realised volatility for the median QR confirms our previous finding 
that a higher level of volatility creates negative market sentiment and results in a 
decrease in the magnitude of the mispricing of Malaysian IPOs.29 
A comparison between OLS and the median QR reveals differences between the 
coefficients of the two models in terms of their magnitude and significance. The 
difference between the estimates of OLS and the median QR is partially driven by 
the asymmetric relationship between the mispricing and the factors that explain the 
mispricing, and the strong impact that highly underpriced IPOs (IPOs on the right 
tail of distribution) have on the mean of the distribution. 
Both OLS and the median QR examine the mispricing at the central regions of the 
distribution. As a result the relationship between the mispricing and the independent 
variables at the tails of the distribution risks remaining unexamined, and the 
information that these tails provide, could be ignored. In the next subsection, we 
use the QR method to examine the relationships between mispricing and the 
explanatory variables for various levels of the former. 
7.5.2 QR estimates 
The results reported in columns 3 to 6 of Table 7.6 are the QR estimates across 
various levels of mispricing. The reference point is set at the midpoint of each 
mispricing range. As can be seen, there are considerable variations in the size, sign 
and significance of the coefficients of the independent variables across the levels 
                                                 
29 The value of realised volatility corresponding to the median returns of -17.53% is 24.59% whereas 




of mispricing. For example, the size of the firm is significantly negative for the 
highly overpriced and the overpriced IPOs. The age of the firm, which had no 
significant impact on the central regions of the mispricing, is found to increase the 
mispricing of the overpriced IPOs. Earnings per share forecast has a significantly 
negative impact on the mispricing of the fairly priced and the underpriced IPOs. 
The variable that has a significantly positive impact across all the levels of the 
mispricing is offer price. This suggests that as the offer price increases, the 
magnitude of mispricing increases. This pattern supports our earlier inference that 
risky firms tend to price their IPOs lower to attract investors and gain subscriptions.  
Other variables that explain three out of the four levels of mispricing are: 
underwriter reputation, recent market performance and volatility, and listing board. 
The positive and significant relationships of underwriter reputation with the highly 
overpriced IPOs, overpriced IPOs and fairly priced IPOs suggest that as underwriter 
reputation increases, the magnitude of overpricing increases. In contrast to the other 
markets such as the US, where reputable underwriters are found to increase 
underpricing (Dolvin & Jordan, 2008), Malaysian underwriters tend to favour the 
issuers by overpricing the IPOs. Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Dunbar (2000) 
suggest that, in an environment where IPOs are fixed priced, underwriters have to 
maintain better relationships with the issuers to protect their clientele and do not 
have to favour investors as they usually do in the book building process (Benveniste 
& Spindt, 1989). 
The significantly positive impacts of recent market performance on overpriced, 
fairly priced and underpriced IPOs suggest that euphoric markets increase the 
mispricing of underpriced IPOs, but have no impact on overpriced IPOs. Similarly, 
market volatility is found to reduce mispricing, suggesting that high volatility 
triggers negative reactions in the market and results in a price drop for IPOs. 
From column 3 to column 6, the impact of the independent variables across the 
levels of mispricing show that the factors that explain mispricing do not have a 
uniform relationship across the mispricing distribution. The factors that increase 
the mispricing of the highly overpriced IPOs are age, higher offer price, smaller 
size and reputable underwriter, whereas the factor that goes against the mispricing 




the ACE Market, IPOs tend to be highly overpriced. Similarly, for the overpriced 
IPOs, the factors that increase the mispricing are smaller firm size, larger offer size, 
higher offer price, and reputable underwriters. On the other hand, realised volatility 
tends to work against overpricing. These results are consistent with previous 
studies. 
Lastly, the underpriced IPOs are those which go public during periods of high 
market performance and lower market volatility. In these periods, an overreaction 
is created in the market which leads to higher first day returns. The other variables 
that have significant relationships with the underpriced IPOs are earnings forecast 
(-), issue method (-) and offer price (+), suggesting that book-built IPOs selling at 
lower offer prices and providing fewer earnings forecasts yield positive returns. The 
positive coefficient of UMSi suggests that in a book building process underwriters 
leave some money on the table to maintain their relationships with the investors 
(Aggarwal et al., 2002); however, the insignificance of the coefficient suggests that 
underwriter reputation itself does not have any impact on the underpricing of the 
IPOs. 
The QR coefficients of Equation 7.1 show a varying relationship between the 
independent variables and levels of mispricing. Table 7.7 reports the estimates of 
the equality of slope parameters of Equations 7.1, across the four levels of 
mispricing. A comparison of the estimates shows that the differences in the impacts 
of the independent variables are significant at the 1% level across all the levels of 
mispricing. This confirms that the impact the independent variables have on various 
levels of mispricing are significantly different across the mispricing distribution 
and supports our use of the QR to explore those differences. 
Table 7.8: Tests of the equality of slope estimates across quantiles 
Level of mispricing Quantiles F-Statistic p-value 
Highly overpriced vs underpriced 0.148 vs 0.889 10.59 0.000*** 
Overpriced vs fairly priced 0.446 vs 0.686 2.30 0.008*** 
Highly overpriced vs overpriced vs 
fairly priced vs underpriced 
0.148 vs 0.446 vs 
0.686 vs 0.889 
10.49 0.000*** 
1. The table shows the F-statistics of the equality of slope estimates across the selected quantiles representing 
the levels of the first day returns. 







This chapter examines the determinants of mispricing of IPOs issued in Malaysia 
from 1995 to 2013. We find an overall lower level of mispricing, compared to the 
older studies in Malaysia but consistent with the recent studies (Younesi et al. 2012; 
Badru & Ahmad-Zaluki, 2018). The reduction in the magnitude of the mispricing 
indicates a movement towards pricing behaviour where issuers tend to maximise 
the amount of money raised from the IPOs. Further, as is the case in the last three 
empirical chapters, the distribution of the mispricing of Malaysian IPOs is skewed 
to the right, with 59.42% of the IPOs being overpriced and only 18.85% of the 
sample IPOs having above-average returns. 
The findings provide new understandings about the mispricing of Malaysia IPOs. 
We find that there are various levels of mispricing for IPO returns i.e., highly 
overpriced, overpriced, fairly priced and underpriced IPOs. IPOs have different 
characteristics across the four levels of mispricing. We examine the relationships 
between the levels of mispricing and the independent variables using the OLS and 
QR approaches. 
Overall, ex-ante uncertainty and the underwriter role are key determinants of 
mispricing in Malaysian IPOs. This finding is consistent with prior studies. The QR 
approach provides further details about the relationships between the independent 
variables across different levels of mispricing. With the exception of offer size, we 
find variations in the factors that explain the highly overpriced IPOs, compared to 
those that explain the underpriced IPOs. We also find that firms listed on the ACE 
market signal higher risk characteristics are more mispriced compared to the firms 
listed on the Main market. The theoretical implications that are developed based on 
the IPO process in the developed markets do not apply to Malaysia where the IPO 








The previous four chapters examine the impacts of firm-level factors on IPO 
mispricing in four sample markets – the US, Australia, China and Malaysia. Our 
findings suggest that IPO mispricing is an outcome of various firm-level 
characteristics as well as the institutional characteristics of the country where the 
firm goes public. The firm-level characteristics include the profile of the company, 
the characteristics of the offer, the profile of the intermediaries and entities such as 
underwriters and venture capitalists associated with the offer, the quality of 
disclosure made in the IPO prospectus, and the state of the market when the issue 
is made. The institutional characteristics of the country include the dominant 
method of pricing IPOs, regulatory restrictions and legal obligations a firm needs 
to abide by when going public, the extent of government intervention in secondary 
markets, and choice of listing exchange. 
The mispricing of US IPOs is caused by large firm size, higher earnings per share 
forecast, higher retained ownership, VC backing, high market performance and 
volatility, and listing on NASDAQ. Whereas in Australia, mispricing is caused by 
younger age, smaller offer size, lower offer price, absence of an underwriter and 
high market performance. The Chinese IPOs have a different set of factors 
impacting their mispricing that include older age, high earnings forecast, smaller 
offer size, higher price, high market performance and volatility, time lapse between 
the offer and the listing date, and listing on SSE. Lastly, in Malaysia, the factors 
that significantly impact mispricing are smaller firm size, lower earnings forecast, 
higher offer price, higher reputable underwriters, higher market performance and 
low market volatility. 
A recent body of literature suggests that, in addition to firm-level factors, the 
institutional framework of a country has a significant impact on IPO mispricing 
(Engelen & van Essen, 2010; Autore et al., 2014).  La Porta et al. (1997) suggest 
that the country-level institutional quality affects a firm’s ability to raise capital, as 




have fewer companies going public. Another aspect of institutional quality, which 
is law enforcement, varies across countries. Countries with poor investor protection 
and law enforcement suffer in terms of financial development (King & Levine, 
1993; La Porta et al., 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Hence, difficulty in raising 
capital and poor law enforcement add to the level of ex-ante uncertainty about an 
IPO.  
In an environment where uncertainty is high, investors will require higher 
mispricing to compensate for the risk that they take when subscribing to an IPO. 
For example, firms operating in an environment with poor regulation of intellectual 
property are likely to underinvest in intangible assets, leading to lower value of the 
firm (Claessens & Laeven, 2003). A firm operating in a country that has poor rule 
of law and poor legal protection will face uncertainty about its post-issue operations 
and strategic decisions (such as investing in intellectual property), which negatively 
affects the value of the firm and increases uncertainty. Investors who subscribe to 
risky IPOs will therefore require higher mispricing. The uncertainty that is caused 
by a country’s institutional quality is in addition to the level of uncertainty that is 
caused by firm-level factors. For example, firms with lower-quality underwriters 
are more mispriced due to higher firm-level ex-ante uncertainty about the value of 
the firm. However, a firm that has a lower quality underwriter and goes public in 
an environment with poor regulation quality and rule of law would be more 
mispriced than a firm with the same quality underwriter that goes public in an 
environment with better regulation quality and rule of law. This additional 
mispricing is a result of the ex-ante uncertainty caused by country-level factors. 
In this chapter, we extend the examination of mispricing from a single-country level 
to a cross-country study to analyse the impacts of institutional quality and economic 
strength of a country on the mispricing of IPOs. We use control of corruption, 
government effectiveness, political stability, regulation quality, voice and 
accountability, and rule of law by Kaufmann et al. (2015) as measures of 
institutional quality. For economic strength, we use GDP per capita and GDP 
growth rate. 
First, we find that the relationship that is established between the firm-level 




international setting. Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Boulton et al., 2010; 
Engelen & van Essen, 2010; Autore et al., 2014), our results support the view that 
ex-ante uncertainty contributes to mispricing. We show that IPOs in countries with 
lower levels of institutional quality are more mispriced. The reason is that lower 
levels of institutional quality increase ex-ante uncertainty about the value of the 
firm and thus the investors require less mispricing. Further, large economic size is 
found to reduce mispricing whereas higher economic growth increases mispricing. 
 A snapshot of mispricing across four countries 
Table 8.1 provides a snapshot of the impacts each firm-level factor has across the 
four countries. Firm-level factors tend to impact mispricing differently in each of 
the sample countries. For example, size of the firm is found to increase mispricing 
in the US and decrease mispricing in Malaysia. Firm age reduces mispricing in 
Australia whereas it increases mispricing in China. This difference requires an 
explanation. Findings from developed markets suggest that the older a firm is, the 
greater the amount of historical information on pre-listing performance that is 
available to help investors arrive at a more accurate valuation of the equity and thus 
reduce ex-ante uncertainty and mispricing (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). However, in 
emerging economies, investors find older firms to be risky, which increases ex-ante 
uncertainty and requires higher mispricing (Lin et al., 1998). Consistent with Beatty 
and Welch (1996), we find that higher levels of retained ownership increase 
mispricing in the US but we do not find this to be a significant determinant of 
mispricing in the other three markets. 
Offer price, which Allen and Faulhaber (1989) argues to be a signal by the issuer, 
impacts differently across the four markets. We find that a lower offer price reduces 
mispricing in Australia (Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Gygax and Ong, 2011) but 
increases mispricing in China and Malaysia (Chang et al., 2008). Beatty and Welch 
(1996) provide an explanation to this relationship, arguing that although lower offer 
price is a signal that the issue is of good quality (and should reduce mispricing), if 
a lower offer price disproportionately benefits riskier firms, investors might revise 
their perceptions of the firm's intrinsic riskiness, resulting in an opposite implication 
– that is, IPOs priced lower will be more mispriced. For China, this impact was 





Table 8.1: Summary of the four countries firm-level variables 
Variables US Australia China Malaysia 
(Intercept) -*** +*** +*** - 
logAssetsi +** + + -* 
logAgei - -*** +*** - 
EPSi +*** - +*** -*** 
RetOwni +* + + + 
logOSi + -*** -*** + 
IMi + - + - 
InvOPi - -*** +*** +*** 
UMSi + -** - +** 
VCi +*** + - - 
RFi + + + - 
MP30i +*** +*** +*** +** 
Exchangei +***  -***  
RelVoli +*** - +*** -** 
logLagDaysi   +***  
Boardi    + 
1. This table summarises the signs and significance of the firm-level variables across the four countries. 
 
The variations in the impacts that firm-level variables have on mispricing across 
the four markets are not only limited to company and offer characteristics. Entities 
other than the issuer that provide issue certification (i.e. underwriters and VCs) also 
have varying impacts on mispricing in the four countries. We find the involvement 
of an underwriter reduces mispricing in Australia whereas the involvement of 
reputable underwriters increases mispricing in Malaysia (Paudyal et al., 1998). The 
involvement of a VC in the IPO process is found to increase mispricing in the US 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2004), where 39% of the IPOs are backed by VCs. 
A finding that is common across four markets is the positive impact of market 
euphoria on the mispricing (Ritter 1984; Autore et al., 2014).  Whereas volatility 
increases mispricing in the US and China, it decreases mispricing in Malaysia. This 
suggests that investors in the US and China require higher mispricing when IPOs 
are issued during period of volatility, whereas Malaysian investors tend to pay less 
for IPOs issued during the periods of high market volatility. The exchange at which 
the IPO is issued is also found to be a significant factor in explaining the direction 
of mispricing. In the US, firms listed in the NASDAQ are more mispriced, as these 
firms are mostly new technology ventures and are associated with higher 






In summary, we provide insights into the impacts that firm-level factors have on 
mispricing. Overall, ex-ante uncertainty is the key driver that impacts mispricing. 
But, the magnitude and direction of the impact is determined by the country-level 
institutional framework. 
 Institutional framework and mispricing 
A major finding of studies that examine the impacts of institutional quality on 
capital market performance is that better institutional quality reduces ex-ante 
uncertainty at the time of the IPO and leads to less mispricing. Engelen and van 
Essen (2010) argue that strong institutions reduce ex-ante uncertainty, since 
investors have more confidence that they are protected by laws against any 
expropriation by the controlling shareholder, and thus require less mispricing. 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) find that firms that operate in countries with poor 
corporate governance practices will not commit to better governance. In this regard, 
a better governance level limits the expropriation of private benefits by controlling 
shareholders. For example, controlling shareholders have access to day-to-day 
information about a company’s operations, which they can use for their benefit at 
the cost of outside shareholders. Therefore, in a country with weaker investor 
protection, there will be higher ex-ante uncertainty at the time of IPO, and investors 
will require higher mispricing to subscribe to the IPO. 
A country with strong institutional quality has both positive and negative effects on 
IPO mispricing. Strong institutions make it easy for firms to raise capital, while 
they also strengthen the position of the minority investors and reduce the 
entrepreneurs’ control of their firm. Similarly, strong regulation quality and law 
enforcement make corporate disclosure more transparent. At the same time, strong 
regulation quality also exposes firms to the risk of losing value in the event of the 
firm making a loss. Therefore, issuers in countries with strong institutional quality 
who want to retain control over their firms have an incentive to price their IPOs 
lower, as setting a lower price will increase demand for the IPO shares and this will 
result in dispersed ownership and less monitoring by minority shareholders 
(Boulton et al., 2010). 
The number of studies that have examined the effects of country-level factors on 




director rights, creditors’ rights, efficiency of judicial system, anti-self-dealing, 
anti-self-dealing public enforcement, democracy, property rights, public 
enforcement and rule of law to examine the impacts of country-level corporate 
governance on IPO mispricing. Their findings suggest that countries that have 
higher levels of investor protection experience more mispricing. On the other hand, 
they find a negative and significant relationship between public enforcement and 
first day returns, suggesting that IPOs in countries where the regulators who 
monitor the stock exchange have more power experience less mispricing. 
Using quality of financial reporting practices, enforcement of law, outside 
monitoring, level of economic development and public trust as proxies for 
institutional quality, Autore et al. (2014) find that country-level institutional quality 
is positively related to the first day returns of IPOs in developed markets. This 
relationship is absent for IPOs in emerging markets. In addition, they report that 
IPO mispricing is higher in countries whose quality of financial reporting score is 
above the median, but does not have any impact in countries whose financial 
reporting score is below the median. They further find that IPOs in countries where 
insider trading laws are enforced have higher first day returns than those in 
countries that do not enforce insider trading laws. Similarly, IPOs in countries with 
high public trust scores are more mispriced and vice versa. Lastly, countries that 
restrict ownership of non-financial companies by banks experience more 
mispricing. In contrast, Engelen and van Essen (2010) find that if a country has a 
strong legal framework this reduces ex-ante uncertainty and mispricing. They argue 
that a strong legal system reduces an issuer’s cost of going public compared to what 
it would be for a firm in a country with a weaker legal system, and hence less 
mispricing is required. 
The other important factor that impacts a firm’s performance is the state of the 
economy in which a company is operating. Autore et al. (2014) posit that strong 
economies have strict laws which induce issuers to misprice their IPOs to reduce 
outside monitoring. Thus, higher mispricing is the consequence. On the other hand, 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) find that large economies are associated with less 
uncertainty and the IPOs in those countries display less mispricing. Similarly, 
Boulton et al. (2017) find an indirect relationship between size of the economy 




on the impact of country-level accounting conservatism30 on IPO mispricing. They 
show that larger economies have higher levels of conservatism, and that higher 
levels of conservatism lead to less mispricing. On the other hand, IPOs in countries 
with higher levels of public trust scores are more mispriced and vice versa. This is 
because of the positive correlation between public trust and economic growth (La 
Porta et al., 1997) and because higher levels of public trust increase market 
participation as firms find it easy to go to public to raise equity (Guiso, Sapienza & 
Zingales, 2004). 
Table 8.2: Definitions of explanatory variables 
Variable Definitions 
ContofCorri Control of corruption: includes perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as the "capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests (Kaufmann et al., 2015). 
GovtEffi Government effectiveness; includes perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al., 2015). 
 
PoliStabi Political stability: includes perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism 
(Kaufmann et al., 2015). 
RegQuali Regulations quality: includes perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development 
(Kaufmann et al., 2015). 
VoiceAndAccti Voice and accountability: includes perceptions of the extent to which 
a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media (Kaufmann et al., 2015). 
RuleOfLawi Rule of law: includes perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Kaufmann et 
al., 2015). 
log GDP / 
capitai 
Logarithm of gross domestic product per capita. 
GDP growthi Annual percentage change in gross domestic product per capita. 
Ausii Dummy: if country is Australia then 1 otherwise 0 
Chinai Dummy: if country is China then 1 otherwise 0 
Malaysiai Dummy: if country is Malaysia then 1 otherwise 0 
TA.Zi z-score of pre-IPO total assets 
  
                                                 
30 Boulton et al. (2017) define conservatism as accounting practices in which the net book value of 




Table 8.2 (continued) 
Variable Definitions 
logAgei Logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated from the difference of 
the foundation year and the time of the IPO. 
EPS.Zi z-score of earnings per share forecast provided in prospectus 
RetOwni Calculated as one minus the number of shares issued / total number 
of shares outstanding. 
OS.Zi z-score of offer size (offer price x no. of shares offered) 
IMi A dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer 
and 0 for book building offers. 
OP.Zi z-score of offer price 
UMSi Underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by 
the underwriter in a year divided by capital raised by all the IPOs in 
that year. 
VCi A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture 
capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. 
RiskFactorsi The number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus. 
MP30i pre-IPO 30 days performance of the market index where the stock is 
listed. 
RelVoli Realised volatility of 30 days pre-IPO is calculated as the square root 
of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N)  
1. The table provides definitions of the independent variables used in the study. 
 
 Method 
Following the base model given in Equation (3.3), the empirical model for 
examining mispricing across countries is given in Equation (8.1). The model 
combines firm-level and country-level variables along with a set of control 
variables, 















+  𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (8.1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the log of first day returns calculated as in Equation 
(3.1); 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 refers to a set of firm-level explanatory variables; 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑘  refers to a set of 
country-level variables; 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑙  denotes a set of country dummies to control country 
effects and 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑚 denotes a set of year dummies used to control time effects. The 
definitions of the explanatory variables are stated in Table 8.2. It is important to 
mention that the data for each country is collected in its local currency (where 
applicable). Therefore, for consistent comparison, we transform the variables 





 Sample characteristics 
8.5.1 Descriptive statistics by country 
The magnitude of mispricing as well as the characteristics of the firms going public 
vary as shown in Panel A of Table 8.3. Across the four countries, China has the 
highest mispricing followed by the US, Australia and Malaysia. One might expect 
that developed markets such as the US and Australia would exhibit lower 
mispricing; however, it is Malaysia that has the lowest level of the mispricing. 
Chinese IPOs are the largest in size and Malaysian IPOs are the smallest. In each 
country, the companies that go public have different ages. US companies are found 
to be the oldest and the Australian ones are the youngest. We further see that firms 
in China and Malaysia retain higher proportions of ownership than those in the US 
and Australia. 
The dominant method of going public in Australia and Malaysia is the fixed price 
method, whereas the US issuers uses the book building method to price IPOs. The 
Chinese IPO market has used a combination of the two methods. The fixed price 
method was used until December 2004 and the book building method was adopted 
in January 2005. The underwriter reputation measured by underwriters’ market 
share suggests there is a higher level of reputable underwriter involvement in US 
and Malaysian IPOs, whereas reputable underwriters have the least involvement 
with Australia IPOs. Similarly, the practice of involving a VC in an IPO is most 
common in US IPOs and least common in Malaysia and Australia. The highest 
average number of reported risk factors is found in China, whereas the smallest 
number is found in the US and Malaysia. Lastly, an examination of the markets 
where the IPOs are listed suggests that the Chinese market has less euphoria but 
higher volatility at the times when the highest number of firms is going public. The 
Australian markets are exuberant but are the least volatile. The Malaysian market 
shows the least (approximately) movement in the market, in terms of both 









Table 8.3: Variable means for each country 
Panel A: Means of firm-level variables by country 
Variables Australia China Malaysia US 
First Day Returns (%) 25.51% 112.10% 1.80% 34.90% 
Total Assets (USD million) 118.50 1506.60 47.95 841.26 
Age (years) 4.99 6.10 6.01 15.30 
EPS (USD) 1.56 0.08 0.37 0.27 
Offer Size (USD million) 30.96 144.15 80.29 119.24 
Retained Ownership (%) 57.50% 72.90% 72.30% 11.50% 
Inverse of Offer Price 4.58 1.00 5.08 0.08 
Issue Method 0.98 0.45 0.96 0.20 
UMS 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.07 
VC 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.39 
No. of Risk Factors 13.32 28.30 18.58 14.20 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) 7.29% 1.80% 0.60% 2.14% 
Realised Volatilityt-30 (%) 12.84% 27.47% 12.90% 17.49% 
     
Panel B: Means of country-level variables by country 
Variables Australia China Malaysia US 
Control of corruption 1.99 -0.46 0.30 1.53 
Government effectiveness 1.77 0.00 1.06 1.69 
Political stability 0.97 -0.46 0.28 0.63 
Regulation quality 1.66 -0.25 0.55 1.57 
Voice and accountability 1.45 -1.51 -0.35 1.27 
Rule of law 1.75 -0.41 0.51 1.52 
GDP / capita p.a. (USD) 38,782.66 2,857.59 5,809.60 38,521.27 
log GDP / capita 10.49 7.65 8.61 10.54 
GDP growth p.a. (%) 3.30% 9.80% 5.70% 3.10% 
     
Panel C: No. of IPOs across markets and time 
Year Total Australia China Malaysia US 
1995 327 12 18 8 289 
1996 566 11 182 17 356 
1997 447 24 194 13 216 
1998 243 15 95 7 126 
1999 319 33 96 12 178 
2000 387 60 133 28 165 
2001 165 29 75 14 47 
2002 204 38 71 40 55 
2003 210 54 67 45 44 
2004 376 92 100 63 121 
2005 303 96 15 62 130 
2006 327 126 67 9 125 
2007 433 179 125 3 126 
2008 168 54 77 20 17 
2009 174 31 99 8 36 
2010 547 76 347 28 96 
2011 483 96 282 18 87 
2012 310 43 154 10 103 
2013 182 26 1 14 141 
No. of IPOs 6,171 1,095 2,199 419 2,458 
1. The table presents the sample specifications across the four countries. Panel A reports the means of firm-
level independent variables across the four countries. Panel B reports country-level independent variables 
across the four countries. Panel C reports the frequency of firms going public in the four countries over the 






Table 8.3 (continued) 
2. The names and listing dates of the 8069 IPOs in Australia, China, Malaysia and the US were obtained 
from Morning Star, SDC Platinum New Issues Database and Bursa Malaysia. The offer prices of the IPOs 
and the independent variables are primarily obtained from IPO prospectuses sourced from Thomson One 
Banker, the SDC Platinum New Issues Database, the Australian Securities Exchange website, the Bursa 
Malaysia website and Jay Ritter’s IPO data. The daily prices of the stocks included in our sample, the ASX 
All Ordinaries Index, the Shanghai Stock Exchange A-Shares Index, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-
Shares Index, the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index, the NYSE Composite Index and the NASDAQ 
Composite Index are obtained from Datastream. For country-specific variables, Worldwide Governance 
Indicators developed by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay were obtained from the World Bank’s governance 
indicators. The data on GDP per capita and GDP growth rate were sourced from the World Development 
Indicators available from the World Bank’s data catalogue. The time series exchange rates, to convert offer 
price, total assets, offer size and EPS values from home currency to US Dollars, were obtained from 
Datastream. 
3. The first day returns were calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-
IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPS 
is the forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of 
shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size is measured as the final offer price 
multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO 
is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. Inverse offer price is one divided by final offer price 
per share. Underwriter Market Share is calculated as the sum of total capital raised in IPOs by the underwriter 
in a year t, divided by the total capital raised by all the IPOs in the year t. Venture Capitalist is a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 
otherwise. No. of Risk Factors measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is 
the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the IPO is listed. Realised Volatilityt-30 is the 
30-day pre-IPO volatility of market index calculated as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). 
Control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulation quality, voice and 
accountability and rule of law are six measures of institutional quality by Kaufmann et al. (2015). GDP per 
capita is a measure of economic size in USD. GDP growth rate is the percentage change in GDP of a country 
in one year. log GDP / cap is the natural logarithm of one plus GDP per capita.  
4. All figures in monetary values are in USD. 
 
 
Panel B of Table 8.3 reports the means of the country-level variables across the four 
countries. The first six variables are measures of institutional quality at the country 
level by Kaufmann et al. (2015) where a high score indicates stronger institutional 
quality based on the means for the six variables. Australia would appear to have the 
highest institutional quality, followed by the US, Malaysia and China. The lowest 
score for control of corruption for China is consistent with the notion that IPOs in 
countries with high levels of corruption experience high mispricing (Jenkinson & 
Ljungqvist, 2001, p. 39). This observation is further supported by Tian (2011). The 
measures of economic development show variation across each of the sample 
country. For example, GDPs per capita for each country show that Australia has the 
highest GDP per capita while China has the lowest. GDP growth rate is higher for 
the emerging markets and lower for the developed markets. However, the change 
in the growth rate is more stable for the developed markets (i.e. Australia and the 
US), and volatile for the emerging markets (i.e. China and Malaysia). We also find 






Panel C of Table 8.3 shows trends in IPO volumes across markets and time. There 
is considerable variation in the number of firms going public over the years. For 
example, there are two peaks, in terms of the number of firms going public, in our 
sample period.  One takes place during the period from 1996 to 1999 and the other 
occurs during the period from 2010 to 2012. The highest number of public offerings 
was made in the year 1996 and the lowest in 2008. Further, consistent with the 
phenomenon of hot issues markets as explained by Ritter (1984), there is a positive 
correlation between mispricing and IPO volume. 
8.5.2 Levels of mispricing 
The average mispricing across the four countries is 58.51%. This is significantly 
higher than the average of 24.97% reported in Engelen and van Essen (2010). This 
is because of the large mispricing observed in Chinese IPOs. The average 
mispricing of the US and Australian IPOs is 32.01% which is close to the 30.1% 
reported by Autore et al. (2014) for developed markets. The distribution plot of 
mispricing across the whole sample is shown in Figure 8.1. 
 




Consistent with the common observations in the literature and the findings in the 
previous empirical chapters, the mispricing distribution of the whole sample is 
skewed to the right, with a huge difference between the mean (58.51%) and the 




divide the mispricing distribution into three categories with respect to the sign of 
their returns. There are 1684 IPOs with negative returns which we sub-divide into 
two equal groups of highly overpriced (the top 13.6% of the sample where the IPOs 
are ranked from the most overpriced to the most underpriced) and overpriced IPOs 
(ranked observations from 13.6% to 27.3%). We have 332 IPOs with zero returns, 
referred to as fairly priced IPOs (ranked observations from 27.3% to 32.7%). Lastly, 
there are 4155 IPOs with positive returns which we sub-divide into three equal 
groups of underpriced (ranked observations from 32.7% to 55.1%), highly 
underpriced (ranked observations from 55.1% to 77.6%) and extremely underpriced 
IPOs (ranked observations from 77.6% to 100%).31 
The means of the mispricing sub-ranges and the corresponding means of the firm-
level independent variables are reported in Panel A of Table 8.4. The means of the 
mispricing levels are influenced by concentration of the four countries across the 
six groups as shown in Panel B of Table 8.4. The majority of the highly overpriced 
IPOs (71.50%) are the US IPOs which are only 24.50% of the US sample. Whereas 
26.36% of the highly overpriced IPOs are Malaysian IPOs which is approximately 
53% of the Malaysian sample. The cluster of the three sub-categories of the 
underpriced IPOs are dominated by Chinese IPOs (49.18%). However, among the 
extremely underpriced IPOs 73.06% are from China. Malaysia has the least 
concentration in the three-categories of the underpriced IPOs followed by Australia.  
The firms in the six levels of mispricing exhibit varying characteristics.  The highly 
overpriced firms are the smallest, oldest, provide highest earnings forecasts in their 
prospectus, have smaller offer sizes and higher prices. The highly overpriced IPOs 
are also found to be certified by highly reputable underwriters and have high 
involvement of venture capitalists. These firms report fewer risk factors in their IPO 
prospectus and go public in periods of negative market performance. At the other 
end of the distribution, the extremely underpriced firms are the largest. These firms
                                                 
31 The distribution of the whole sample of returns is divided into three categories i.e. IPOs with negative returns, 
IPOs with zero returns and IPOs with positive returns. There are 1684 IPOs with negative returns which are 
further divided into two equal sub-categories: highly overpriced IPOs and overpriced IPOs. There are 4155 
IPOs with positive returns which are further divided into three subcategories; underpriced IPOs, highly 
underpriced IPOs and extremely underpriced IPOs. Finally, there are 332 IPOs with close to zero returns 
referred to as fairly priced IPOs. The mid-points of these sub-categories are selected as the reference points. 
The mid-points for the highly overpriced and overpriced IPOs are 0.068 and 0.2045 respectively. The mid-
point of the range for underpriced IPOs is 0.439, that for highly underpriced IPOs is 0.6635 and that for 




Table 8.4: Whole sample means by the extent of mispricing 
Panel A: Means of firm-level variables by the extent of mispricing 
Variables Highly 
overpriced 




 0-0.136 0.136-0.273 0.273-0.327 0.327-0.551 0.551-0.776 0.776-1 
First Day Returns (%) -57.22% -3.78% 0.00% 6.57% 42.83% 148.46% 
Total Assets (USD mil.) 102.52 222.99 394.36 1360.31 1489.17 2935.99 
Age (years) 13.49 8.94 9.52 11.44 9.26 5.98 
EPS (USD) 1.24 0.94 0.56 0.84 0.32 0.34 
Offer Size (USD mil.) 93.03 182.58 86.25 220.42 182.13 79.71 
Retained Ownership (%) 30.48% 44.40% 32.63% 40.74% 50.28% 59.33% 
Inverse of Offer Price 1.26 2.52 2.61 1.58 0.86 1.53 
Issue Method 0.86 0.75 0.86 0.73 0.53 0.74 
UMS 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
VC 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.20 
No. of Risk Factors 15.52 16.49 15.85 16.44 21.87 24.72 
MarketPerformancet-30 (%) -1.74% -20.97% -10.98% 5.14% 10.84% 17.63% 
Realised volatility t-30 (%) 16.30% 15.60% 9.00% 16.6% 22.10% 26.80% 
Total no. of IPOs 842 842 332 1,385 1,385 1,385 
       
Panel B: Country-wise breakdown of IPOs in each level of mispricing 
 Highly 
overpriced 




 0-0.136 0.136-0.273 0.273-0.327 0.327-0.551 0.551-0.776 0.776-1 
No. of the US IPOs 602 272 186 661 495 242 
No. of Australian IPOs - 406 58 446 86 99 
No. of Chinese IPOs 18 137 - 258 774 1,012 
No. of Malaysia IPOs 222 27 88 20 30 32 




Table 8.4 (continued) 
Panel C: Means of country-level variables by the extent of mispricing 
Variables Highly 
overpriced 




 0-0.136 0.136-0.273 0.273-0.327 0.327-0.551 0.551-0.776 0.776-1 
Control of corruption 1.20 1.36 1.28 1.27 0.39 0.13 
Government effectiveness 1.50 1.43 1.55 1.40 0.75 0.42 
Political stability 0.55 0.54 0.57 0.48 0.03 -0.07 
Regulation quality 1.28 1.28 1.32 1.25 0.54 0.22 
Voice and accountability 0.81 0.83 0.87 0.77 -0.33 -0.74 
Rule of law 1.20 1.29 1.29 1.22 0.44 0.10 
GDP per capita p.a. (USD) 27,507.40 33,782.54 31,160.79 32,704.22 17,907.81 99,34.99 
log GDP / capita 9.923 10.173 10.08 10.10 9.00 8.01 
GDP growth p.a. (%) 0.049 0.041 0.037 0.044 0.069 0.081 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 8.3. 
2. The table breaks down the levels of the first day returns based on the magnitude of mispricing, where figures of 0 to 0.136 refer to highly overpriced IPOs, 0.136 to 0.273 refer to overpriced 
IPOs, 0.273 to 0.327 refer to fairly priced, and 0.327 to 0.551, 0.551 to 0.776 and 0.776 to 1 refer to underpriced, highly underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs respectively. 
3. The first day returns are calculated as (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Assets are pre-IPO total assets. Age is the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date 
of incorporation. EPS Earnings forecasts are provided in the IPO prospectus. Retained Ownership is one minus the number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. Offer Size 
is measured as the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered. Issue Method is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building 
offers. Inverse offer price is one divided by final offer price per share. UMS is the underwriter’s market share calculated through the capital raised by the underwriter in a year divided by 
capital raised by all the IPOs in that year. Venture Capitalist is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. 
No. of Risk Factors measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. MarketPerformancet-30 is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the stock is listed. Realised 
Volatilityt-30 is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of market index calculated as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). Control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, 
regulation quality, voice and accountability and rule of law are six measures of institutional quality by Kaufmann et al. (2015). GDP per capita is a measure of economic size in USD. GDP 
growth rate is the percentage change in GDP of a country in one year. log GDP / cap is the natural logarithm of one plus GDP per capita.  




are the youngest (Loughran and Ritter, 2004), have smaller offer sizes (Michaely 
and Shaw, 1994) and retain higher proportions of the shares at the time of their IPOs 
(Beatty and Welch, 1996; Bradley, Jordan, Yi & Roten, 2001). The IPOs that are 
extremely underpriced provide lower earnings forecasts (Lev and Penman, 1990) 
and report more risk factors in their prospectus (Gygax and Ong, 2011). These firms 
are underwritten by financial institutions that are less reputable than those 
associated with other firms, and they have more involvement from venture 
capitalists (Meigginson and Weiss, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). These firms 
are found to go public during periods of high market performance and market 
volatility (Paudyal et al., 1998; Autore et al., 2014). The characteristics of the 
extremely underpriced firms tend to increase ex-ante uncertainty and would require 
higher mispricing. 
The overall observation is that the means of the key variables vary across the levels 
of IPO mispricing. For example, the pre-IPO assets (measured in millions of US 
dollars) increase as the IPO returns increase. The IPOs of the smallest firms tend to 
be overpriced while those of the larger firms tend to be underpriced. The age of the 
firm at the time of going public is inversely related to the IPO returns, which means 
that younger firms have higher returns. Similarly, the earnings forecast figure has 
an inverse relationship with IPO returns, which means that the firms that provide 
higher earnings forecasts have negative returns. The means of market performance 
and market volatility suggest that issues that go public during periods of high 
market performance are underpriced, whereas issues that go public during periods 
of negative market performance are overpriced. Further, higher market volatility is 
associated with higher mispricing, such that when market volatility is above 
average, IPOs experience mispricing.  Below average market volatility is associated 
with overpriced IPOs. Fairly priced IPOs are associated with the least volatile 
markets. 
Panel C of Table 8.4 reports the means of country-level variables for the different 
groups of mispriced IPOs. The means of the first six variables, that reflect a 
country’s institutional quality, show that the highest scores are related to the fairly 
priced IPOs. However, the second-highest scores are associated with the IPOs with 
negative returns, and the lowest scores are associated with highly underpriced and 




that capture the economic strength of a country. The lowest scores for GDP per 
capita are associated the IPOs that are highly underpriced and extremely 
underpriced, whereas higher levels of economic growth (GDP growth rate) are 
associated with higher levels of first day returns. 
 Results and discussion 
8.6.1 OLS and median regression estimates 
We start our empirical analysis by estimating the effect of country-level 
institutional quality and economic strength on the mispricing of the whole sample 
using the OLS and median regression approaches. The results are reported as Model 
1 to Model 6 in Table 8.5. Model 1 reports the OLS estimates of Kaufmann et al.’s 
(2015) institutional quality measures. This relation is reflected in the significant and 
negative coefficients for four out of the six variables ranging from -0.2678 for 
political stability to -0.4532 for control of corruption.  
The significantly negative coefficient of control of corruption suggests that IPOs in 
countries with less control of corruption are more mispriced. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that higher ex-ante uncertainty leads to higher mispricing. This is 
because persistent corruption increases uncertainty by impeding firm growth, 
reducing productivity and increasing inefficiency (e.g. Ades & Tella, 1997; 
Athanasouli & Goujard, 2015; Dal Bó & Rossi, 2007). Thus, increased corruption 
increases information asymmetry and uncertainty, leading to higher mispricing 
(Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001; Tian, 2011). The negative estimate for political 
stability (-0.2678) suggests that an increase of one standard deviation in a country’s 
political stability score will result in a decrease of 26.78% in first day IPO returns. 
The variable that has a significantly positive relationship with the first day IPOs 
returns is rule of law (1.8222). This suggests that IPOs in countries with a stronger 
rule of law experience higher underpricing. This implies that in countries where 
laws are strong, IPOs tend to be more mispriced. This is consistent with Tinic (1988) 
who finds that issuers misprice to reduce litigation risk. While mispricing and 
litigation are both costs to the issuers and underwriters, there is a trade-off between 
reducing  litigation  risk and  increasing  offer proceeds.  Hughes and  Thakor  




Table 8.5: OLS and median regression estimates  
Variables OLS Median QR OLS Median QR OLS Median QR 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
(Intercept) -0.2012 0.2791 4.9954*** 3.7673*** 2.3593** 3.9602*** 
ContofCorri -0.4532** 0.2128**   -0.4901** -0.1606* 
GovtEffi -0.3582** -0.4501***   0.0151 0.4061*** 
PoliStabi -0.2678** 0.0475   -0.4077*** -0.2874*** 
RegQuali -0.3159* -0.0910   -0.2834 0.2021** 
VoiceAndAccti -0.5747 -0.5825**   -0.3219 0.0935 
RuleOfLawi 1.8222*** 0.6466***   1.7150*** 0.4604*** 
GDPGrowth   5.1550*** 3.6125*** 4.8241*** 3.2967*** 
logGDP/Capita   -0.5275*** -0.3831*** -0.3295*** -0.5288*** 
Ausii 0.9053*** -0.0077 0.5771*** -0.0267 0.8245*** -0.0002 
Chinai 0.4732 -0.2937 -1.1797*** -0.9416*** 0.0793 0.2505 
Malaysiai -0.1848 -0.6232* -1.1828*** -1.0792*** -0.4787 -0.5265* 
TA.Zi 0.0039 0.0040 0.0007 -0.0009 0.0027 0.0008 
logAgei 0.0219* -0.0041 0.0335*** 0.0023 0.0267** 0.0040 
EPS.Zi 0.0201 0.0211*** 0.0244** 0.0237*** 0.0184 0.0164*** 
RetOwni -0.0816 0.0319 -0.0897 0.0211 -0.0913 0.0133 
OS.Zi -0.0641*** -0.0153* -0.0694*** -0.0289*** -0.0676*** -0.0324*** 
IMi 0.0069 0.0614*** -0.1059** 0.0038 -0.0175 0.0114 
OP.Zi -0.1337*** -0.0879*** -0.1169*** -0.0596*** -0.1275*** -0.0602*** 
UMSi 0.0587 0.0832 0.1003 0.1049 0.0569 0.1137* 
VCi 0.0967*** 0.0238** 0.1011*** 0.0195** 0.1008*** 0.0313*** 
RiskFactorsi 0.0042** 0.0014** 0.0032* 0.0013** 0.0039** 0.0009 
MP30i 0.0129*** 0.0094*** 0.0162*** 0.0101*** 0.0138*** 0.0095*** 
RelVoli 0.3975*** 0.0708 0.1628 0.0463 0.3367** 0.0049 
YearDummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 / R1 0.1822 0.1622 0.1855 0.1693 0.1899 0.1721 




Table 8.5 (continued) 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 8.3.  
2. Estimated results are from Equation 8.1. The dependent variable is the log of one plus (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Control of corruption, government effectiveness, political 
stability, regulation quality, voice and accountability and rule of law are six measures of institutional quality used by Kaufmann et al. (2015). GDP growth rate is the percentage change in GDP of a 
country in one year. log GDP / cap is the natural logarithm of one plus GDP per capita. Ausi is a dummy with a value of 1 if the country is Australia and otherwise 0. China is a dummy with a value of 
1 if the country is China and otherwise 0. Malaysia is a dummy with a value of 1 if the country is Malaysia and otherwise 0. TA.Z is the z-score of pre-IPO total assets. LogAgei is the logarithm of the 
firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPS.Zi is the z-score of the forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. RetOwni is calculated as one minus the 
number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. OS.Zi is the z-score of offer size which is measured as the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered.  IMi is a dummy 
variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book building offers. OP.Zi is the z-score of one divided by final offer price per share. UMSi is calculated as the sum of total capital 
raised in IPOs by the underwriter in a year t, divided by the total capital raised by all the IPOs in the year t. VCi is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders 
at the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. RFi is the number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus. MP30i is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the stock is listed. RelVoli 
is the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of market index calculated as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N) 
3. Coefficients significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are marked by ***, ** and * respectively.  




This is because litigation is not only costly in itself but also damages the 
underwriter’s reputation and regular investors’ confidence in the underwriter. This 
finding also supports Boulton et al. (2010) who suggest that in countries with higher 
institutional quality, the issuers tend to underprice more in order to maintain their 
control of the firm. The median regression results of Model 2 show similar results 
to Model 1, with a change in sign from negative to positive for control of corruption. 
However, the combined score of the six institutional factors (results not reported) 
show that overall, good institutional quality reduces mispricing (Doidge et al., 
2007; Engelen & van Essen, 2010). This is the result in both the OLS and the 
median regression estimates. 
Next, we examine the impact of a country’s economic strength on first day IPO 
returns. We take two indicators to measure the strength of the economy: GDP per 
capita (measured in USD) as a measure of economic size, and GDP growth rate as 
a measure of economic growth. The OLS and median regression results for the two 
variables are reported in Model 3 and Model 4 of Table 8.5. The coefficient of GDP 
growth (Model 3) is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that higher 
growth in GDP increases mispricing. The coefficient of logGDP/capita suggests 
that size of the economy is negatively correlated with the level of mispricing. Model 
4 confirms the findings of Model 3, where the coefficients of GDP growth and 
logGDP/capita are positive and negative, respectively. The positive coefficient of 
GDP growth and negative coefficient of GDP per capita suggest that, when these 
variables are combined, mispricing decreases in small growing economies whereas 
it increases in large growing economies. 
To examine the combined effect of all the country-level variables (institutional 
quality and economic strength) on IPO mispricing we regress the eight variables 
together. The OLS and median regression results are reported in Model 5 and Model 
6 of Table 8.5. The combined model confirms the results of our previous findings, 
suggesting that higher institutional quality and larger economic size reduces 
mispricing whereas higher economic growth increases mispricing. However, we 
see slight variations in significance, size and sign between the coefficients of Model 
5 and Model 6. The two variables that show a change in sign and significance are 
government effectiveness and regulation quality (compare Model 6 with Model 5 




answer comes from Boulton et al. (2010) and Autore et al. (2014). In countries with 
high-quality policy development and implementation, and high regulation quality 
that protects shareholders, issuers misprice more at the margin to create enough 
dispersed ownership so that they can retain their control on the firm post-IPO. 
It is important to note that both the OLS and the median QR methods examine 
central regions of the mispricing distribution – that is, the mean and the median. 
They do not examine the relationships between mispricing and independent 
variables in the non-central regions. Since our mispricing distribution comprises 
various levels of IPO returns, in the next subsection, we use the QR method to 
examine the relationships between levels of mispricing and country-level and firm-
level explanatory variables. 
 
8.6.2 QR estimates 
We examine the impacts of country-level institutional quality and economic 
strength across the levels of mispricing by taking the mid-points of the distribution 
sub-ranges described in Table 8.4 (see footnote 30) as reference points for each 
level of mispricing, and we estimate it the impact using the QR method. The QR 
coefficients of each level of mispricing are reported in Table 8.6. 
The overall results match expectations while providing further insights into how a 
combination of the country-level and firm-level factors explains various levels of 
mispricing. The factors that increase the mispricing of the highly overpriced IPOs 
are government effectiveness and rule of law, whereas better regulation quality 
reduces the mispricing of the highly overpriced IPOs. On the other hand, the 
institutional factor that increases the mispricing of the extremely underpriced IPOs 
is rule of law, whereas political stability and voice and accountability reduce the 
mispricing of the extremely underpriced IPOs. For the fairly priced IPOs, control 
of corruption and political stability reduce mispricing, whereas government 
effectiveness, regulation quality and rule of law increase mispricing. 
The observed impact that institutional quality has on levels of mispricing suggests 
that country-level institutional quality explains the mid-region of mispricing 
distribution (fairly priced and underpriced IPOs) but does not adequately explain 




Table 8.6: QR estimates by levels of mispricing  
Variables Highly 
overpriced 




 0.068 0.204 0.30 0.439 0.663 0.888 
(Intercept) 5.5922** 4.0196*** 3.6647*** 3.6894*** 4.0704*** 2.1630** 
ContofCorri -0.6922 -0.4602*** -0.2553** -0.2515** -0.2144* -0.4667 
GovtEffi 1.1965** 0.4466 0.5024*** 0.4318*** 0.3777 -0.0573 
PoliStabi 0.1979 -0.4539*** -0.3412*** -0.3208*** -0.2854*** -0.7598*** 
RegQuali -1.0884** 0.1057 0.2808*** 0.2332** 0.2156* -0.1978 
VoiceAndAccti 0.1163 0.2467 0.0478 0.3209 -0.1005 -1.4832** 
RuleOfLawi 1.0510* 0.8240*** 0.5209*** 0.4321*** 0.7281*** 2.7567*** 
GDPGrowth 2.2369 3.2868*** 3.1784*** 3.3417*** 4.7605*** 7.8842*** 
logGDP/Capita -0.8718*** -0.6043*** -0.5387*** -0.5217*** -0.5365*** -0.2248 
Ausii 1.1477*** 0.2006** 0.0111 -0.0287 0.1339 1.6339*** 
Chinai 0.5621 0.5013 0.3436 0.7215 0.0219 -1.5822 
Malaysiai -0.9761 -0.7075* -0.7179** -0.3315 -0.5865 -1.1283 
TA.Zi 0.0416 0.0246 0.0002 0.0036 0.0112** -0.0075 
logAgei 0.0565*** 0.0255*** 0.0088* 0.0016 0.0034 0.0058 
EPS.Zi 0.0345* 0.0219*** 0.0201*** 0.0245*** 0.0184*** 0.0154 
RetOwni -0.3366*** -0.0902* -0.0561* -0.0011 0.0127 0.0399 
OS.Zi -0.3228*** -0.0947*** -0.0412 -0.0297*** -0.0281*** -0.0253*** 
IMi 0.1282 0.0254 0.0312* 0.0129 0.0074 -0.0806* 
OP.Zi -0.2627*** -0.1213*** -0.0963*** -0.0710*** -0.0577*** -0.0834*** 
UMSi -0.5301** -0.0451 0.0192 0.1065 0.2187*** 0.4033*** 
VCi 0.0635*** 0.0302*** 0.0145 0.0157 0.0542*** 0.0826*** 
RiskFactorsi 0.0007 0.0012** 0.0005 0.0006 0.0011* 0.0049*** 
MP30i 0.0084** 0.0086*** 0.0087*** 0.0096*** 0.0125*** 0.0558*** 
RelVoli 0.3502*** 0.1326* -0.0207 -0.0091 0.0078 0.2801* 
YearDummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 8.6 (continued) 
1. The data sources are consistent with Table 8.3.  
2. Table provides QR estimates for the mid-points of the sub-ranges defined in Table 8.4. 
3. Estimated results are from Equation 8.1. The dependent variable is the log of one plus (First day closing price – Offer price)/Offer price. Control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, political stability, regulation quality, voice and accountability and rule of law are six measures of institutional quality used by Kaufmann et al. (2015). GDP growth 
rate is the percentage change in GDP of a country in one year. log GDP / cap is the natural logarithm of one plus GDP per capita. Ausi is a dummy with value of 1 if the country is 
Australia and otherwise 0. China is a dummy with a value of 1 if country is China and otherwise 0. Malaysia is a dummy with a value of 1 if the country is Malaysia and otherwise 
0. TA.Z is the z-score of pre-IPO total assets. LogAgei is the logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated at the time of IPO from date of incorporation. EPS.Zi is the z-score of the 
forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. RetOwni is calculated as one minus the number of shares issued over total number of shares outstanding. OS.Zi is the z-score of 
offer size which is measured as the final offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered.  IMi is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 
for book building offers. OP.Zi the z-score of one divided by final offer price per share. UMSi is calculated as the sum of total capital raised in IPOs by the underwriter in a year t, 
divided by the total capital raised by all the IPOs in the year t. VCi is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at the time of the issue 
and 0 otherwise. RFi is the number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus. MP30i is the pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the stock is listed. RelVoli is 
the 30-day pre-IPO volatility of market index calculated as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). 
4. Coefficients significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are marked by ***, ** and * respectively. 




IPOs). The same is true for the coefficients of the economic variables which show 
that high GDP growth increases the level of mispricing (except for highly 
overpriced IPOs) while GDP per capita reduces the level of mispricing (except for 
extremely underpriced IPOs). It is the firm-level factors that explain the extreme 
levels of mispricing. This indicates that moderate levels of mispricing are driven by 
the institutional quality of the country in which the firm goes public as well as the 
firm characteristics, while the extreme levels of mispricing are primarily driven by 
firm characteristics. For example, underwriter reputation has a significant negative 
impact on highly overpriced IPOs, whereas it has a significantly positive impact on 
highly underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs. At the same time, involvement 
of VCs increases the mispricing of both highly overpriced and overpriced IPOs, as 
well as highly underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs. This indicates that 
entities involved in the IPO (underwriter and VC) drive extreme levels of 
mispricing more than the environment of the country. IPOs which are underwritten 
by reputable underwriters and have VC involvement tend to be more mispriced 
(How et al., 1995; Dolvin, 2005; Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
Similarly, market volatility has a more pronounced impact on the extreme levels of 
mispricing than it has on the mid-levels of mispricing. On the other hand, the 
variables that have a consistent impact across the levels of mispricing are offer size 
(Michaely & Shaw, 1994; Dimovski & Brooks, 2004), offer price (Beatty and 
Welch, 1996; Guo and Brooks, 2008) and market performance (Autore et al., 2014). 
Another important finding relates to the impact that the pricing mechanism has on 
mispricing. We find that across countries, book built IPOs tend to be more fairly 
priced whereas fixed priced IPOs tend to be underpriced (Engelen & van Essen, 
2010). 
The QR results establish that there is a varying relationship between the country- 
and firm-level independent variables and levels of mispricing. This is apparent 
when one compares the signs, sizes and significance of the coefficients reported in 
Table 8.6. In Table 8.7 we report the F-statistics of the equality of slope parameters 
across the six levels of mispricing. The test results show that the differences 
between the slope estimates associated with each level of mispricing are significant 




Table 8.7: Tests of the equality of slope estimates across quantiles 
Level of mispricing Quantiles Estimate p-value 
Highly overpriced vs extremely 
underpriced 
0.068 vs 0.888 27.294 0.000*** 
Overpriced vs highly underpriced 0.2045 vs 0.6635 11.824 0.000*** 
Fairly priced vs underpriced 0.30 vs 0.439 3.364 0.004*** 
All levels of mispricing 0.068 vs 0.2045 vs 
0.30 vs 0.439 vs 
0.6635 vs 0.888 
13.583 0.000*** 
1. The table shows the F-statistics of the equality of slope estimates across the selected quantiles 
representing the levels of mispricing. 
2. Coefficients significant at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% are marked by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter examines mispricing across the combined sample of the four countries. 
Our results show that the firm-level variables that explain the mispricing of IPOs 
in single country studies continue to significantly explain mispricing across 
countries. This confirms that the impacts that firm-level variables (including age, 
earnings per share forecast, offer size, offer price, underwriter reputation, VC 
involvement, market performance and volatility) have on mispricing are robust. 
However, the primary focus of this chapter is the impacts of countries’ institutional 
quality and economic characteristics on IPO mispricing. 
Our results show that country-level institutional quality adds to the explanations of 
variations in mispricing across countries. Consistent with Engelen and van Essen 
(2010), the countries that have better institutional quality are, overall, less mispriced 
whereas countries with poor institutional quality are more mispriced. This suggests 
that if a country has poor institutional quality, this has economic implications for 
IPOs. In the event of mispricing, money is left on the table and investors are willing 
to pay higher prices for shares when they buy them in the aftermarket. When the 
magnitude of mispricing is large, issuers receive lower proceeds, and this raises the 
cost of raising capital for issuers. This means that because of mispricing, fewer 
firms will choose to raise capital via IPOs, as the firms that make this choice face 
higher costs of capital. Hence, in regard to raising capital, firms operating in 
countries with poor institutional quality are at a disadvantage compared to their 
competitors in countries with better institutional quality because in those countries 
it is easier to raise money through IPOs. However, the QR estimates show that this 
relationship is more pronounced in the mid-region of the distribution, and this 




that country-level institutional quality explains mispricing for a relatively more 
correctly priced IPO, whereas extreme cases of mispricing are explained by firm-
level characteristics. 
In addition to this, our study is one of the first to examine the impacts of economic 
size and growth on IPO mispricing. The results are consistent with expectation and 
with Engelen and van Essen (2010). We find that largest mispricing occurs in 
developing countries experiencing high economic growth and that larger economic 
size (i.e. more development) reduces mispricing. This relationship is more 
pronounced for higher levels of mispricing and it is absent for highly overpriced 
IPOs. On the other hand, firms in larger economies are less mispriced. Boulton et 
al. (2010) suggest that rapidly growing economies offer more venues for firms to 
grow, and so firms in such economies frequently approach equity markets to raise 
capital, resulting in higher mispricing. The cost of capital is already higher in 
smaller economies, and mispricing adds to the existing costs for the firm. Therefore, 
firms going public in slowly growing economies leave less money on the table in 





9 Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
The phenomenon of IPO mispricing has been examined for four decades and has 
attracted increasing attention in recent years, as measured by the rise in the number 
of publications. It has been established that IPOs are mispriced to varying degrees 
around the world, with IPO mispricing being driven by many factors both 
endogenous and exogenous to the issuing firm. These factors include characteristics 
of the firm going public, offer characteristics, the characteristics of the market 
where the firm is going public, risk disclosure, issue certification, market 
performance, and volatility, as well as country-level characteristics such as the 
institutional quality and economic strength of the country. A combination of these 
factors impacts IPO mispricing in different ways, both across firms and across 
markets. 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the IPO literature by providing further 
insights into the mispricing anomaly. Hence, we examine the mispricing of IPOs in 
four sample markets (the US, Australia, China and Malaysia) that are in different 
stages of market development. The US is the most developed of the four markets 
and the one in which the most IPO research has been conducted. The four markets 
exhibit varying levels of mispricing along with variations in the firm characteristics, 
offer characteristics and institutional frameworks. These attributes are discussed in 
detail in the chapters that examine the IPO mispricing in the four markets (Chapters 
4–7). These markets also differ in their levels of institutional quality and economic 
strength. These differences are discussed in Chapter 8. The sample of the four 
markets consists of 6171 firms that went public in the four countries from 1995 to 
2013. 
The findings of this thesis support earlier findings that IPOs are on average 
underpriced and that the extent of the underpricing varies across markets. By 
addressing the research questions posed in Chapter 1, this thesis provides new 
evidence on IPO mispricing which shows that: (a) while IPOs are on average 
underpriced, there is a wide range of mispricing within each of the markets, from 
highly overpriced to extremely underpriced IPOs; (b) purely concentrating on the 
underpricing results in an incomplete analysis of IPO mispricing. For example in 




of IPOs are underpriced; (c) the use of the QR method in addition to the OLS 
method extends our understanding of the variations in the impact of factors across 
the full range of mispricing; (d) the factors that lead to overpricing are different to 
the factors that lead to underpricing; (e) mispricing is driven, not only by firm-level 
factors, but also by the institutional quality and economic strength of a country. A 
summary of these findings is provided in the coming sections. 
 Levels of mispricing 
Research question 1: What is the distribution of mispricing across the four 
markets? 
Overall, our results are consistent with previous studies which conclude that IPOs 
are on average underpriced. However, we find that the means of mispricing 
distributions are significantly different to the medians. In the US, the mean 
mispricing is 34.90% and the median is 2.40%. In Australia, the mean mispricing 
is 25.51% and the median is 10%. In China, the mean mispricing is 112.10% and 
median is 71.4%. In Malaysia, the mean mispricing is 1.80% and the median is           
-17.53%. Further, the mispricing distribution is skewed to the right. 
A closer inspection of the results shows that IPOs are not all underpriced, and that 
a relatively high proportion of the IPOs are overpriced. In the US, 35.50% IPOs of 
IPOs are overpriced. In Australia 37.70% of IPOs are overpriced. In China 6.30% 
of IPOs are overpriced. Whereas, in Malaysia 59.43% of the IPOs are overpriced. 
Further, we show that there is a wide dispersion in mispricing within each of the 
four markets, ranging from highly overpriced to extremely underpriced. 
Our finding suggests that the mean is not a good measure of the extent of mispricing 
in the case of highly skewed distributions. Therefore, in Austtralia, for any given 
IPO an investor has a 50% of chance to make 10% (median) returns, a 37.70% of 
chance of losing money and a 16.60% of chance of making above average returns.  
Research question 2: What are the factors that contribute to mispricing at different 




Our QR results provide us with the insights into the characteristics of IPOs with 
different levels of mispricing. We find that the factors that affect mispricing have a 
varying impact across the range of mispricing. For example, in Australia, older age 
of the firm, smaller offer size and offer price significantly impact overpricing. On 
the other hand, highly underpriced and extremely underpriced IPOs are 
significantly impacted by not providing earnings forecasts, involving an 
underwriter and reporting more risk factors. Most of the firms that timed their IPO 
trading to periods of market euphoria were mispriced to a greater extent. 
The factors that impact overpriced IPOs in China are: age (+), earnings per share 
forecast (+), retained ownership (-), offer size (-), offer price (+), risk factors 
reported in the prospectus (+), recent market performance and volatility (+), delay 
in listing (-) and listing on SSE. The factors that impact extremely underpriced IPOs 
in China are: offer size (-), offer price (+), recent market performance and volatility 
(-), delay in listing (+) and listing on SSE (-). 
The variations in the impacts that the independent variables have across the levels 
of mispricing is not limited to a single market. We found a different relationship 
between mispricing and the variables that explain mispricing in developed markets 
(such as Australia) and under-developed markets (such as China). For example, the 
factors that were found to cause mispricing in Australian IPOs are; younger age, 
smaller offer size, lower offer price, absence of an underwriter and high market 
performance. However, the factors impacting mispricing of the Chinese IPOs 
included: older age, high earnings forecast, smaller offer size, higher price, high 
market performance and volatility, long time lapse between the issue and the listing 
date and listing on SSE. Malaysia had the least amount of mispricing in our sample 
and we found a different set of factors associated with that mispricing. These factors 
included; smaller firm size, lower earnings forecast, higher offer price, higher 
reputable underwriters, higher market performance and low market volatility. A 
significant relationship that we observe in the Australian and Chinese markets is 
the impact of offer price on mispricing. In Australia, a lower issue price reduces 
mispricing, whereas in China firms that have lower offer prices are more mispriced. 
This is consistent with the proposition put forward by Brennan and Hughes (1991), 
that issuers in developed markets are using a low issue price as a signal of quality 




lower offer price is deemed as risk, as suggested by Beatty and Welch (1996), and 
hence firms with lower offer prices experience higher mispricing. Similarly, a 
firm’s age is expected to be inversely correlated to ex-ante uncertainty and the 
resulting mispricing. We find this to be the case with Australian IPOs, but firm age 
has a significantly positive impact on mispricing in China. Lin et al. (1998) argues 
that in emerging economies, investors find older firms to be risky, which increases 
ex-ante uncertainty and results in higher mispricing. 
Our findings on the variability of the magnitude of IPO mispricing confirm that the 
regulatory and institutional frameworks of a country impact the level of mispricing. 
The relationships of mispricing with the regulatory and institutional frameworks of 
a country are discussed in the following sub-section. 
 Mispricing across countries 
Research question 3: How do a country’s characteristics impact IPO mispricing? 
The discussions on the findings in Chapters 4 to 7 show that IPO mispricing varies 
across countries as well as within the countries. To explain the cross-country 
differences in mispricing across markets, we use two country-level characteristics 
as possible differentiating factors across our sample markets. First, we employ a set 
of six variables proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2015) to capture institutional quality 
across countries. Second, we use economic strength (i.e. economic growth and 
economic size) to capture the impacts of economic structure on IPO mispricing. 
Our findings are in line with Beatty and Ritter (1986) who suggest that mispricing 
is caused by uncertainty surrounding the firm going public. We find that the poor 
institutional quality adds to the uncertainty about the value of the firm and leads to 
more mispricing. Firms in countries with higher level of institutional quality are 
less mispriced. 
Our cross-country examination of mispricing is one of the first studies to examine 
the relationship between a country’s economic strength and IPO mispricing. We 
find that countries with high GDP growth experience more mispricing, whereas 




Another key insight that the cross-country study provides relates to the impact of 
the book building method on IPO mispricing. We do not find any significant 
relationship between IPO mispricing and the method of pricing IPOs in single 
country studies. However, when all countries are studied together, we find that the 
book building method tends to reduce mispricing. This finding has policy 
implications, suggesting that a market-oriented mechanism of price setting reduces 
mispricing. A practical demonstration of this finding is observed in the Chinese 
market where the adoption of the book building method resulted in a significant 
reduction in mispricing. 
 OLS and QR approaches 
The OLS method has been a useful tool for examining IPO mispricing and has been 
extensively used in IPO research. Our study highlights certain shortcomings of the 
OLS method: (a) it neglects the issue of skewness that is common in the 
distributions of  mispricing, (b) the estimates obtained from the OLS method 
provide an understanding of the average relationships between the mispricing and 
the factors that explain the mispricing but do not allow researchers to differentiate 
between the effects on IPO across the range of mispricings (c) in the case of right-
skewed distribution, the mean of a distribution would have a strong effect of the 
extreme positive observations and using OLS method in such cases would bias the 
estimates obtained from using the OLS method. 
We adopted the QR approach to examine the impact of the independent variables 
across the levels of mispricing found in the mispricing distribution. The QR 
approach has certain advantages over the OLS method: (a) in cases of skewed 
distribution, the QR approach is a more appropriate technique than the OLS, (b) the 
QR approach is robust for outliers and does not require the condition of normality, 
(c) the QR estimates provide a comprehensive picture of the relationships between 
mispricing and the independent variables across the levels of mispricing, including 
the tail regions that is not possible using the OLS method. 
The results obtained from the OLS estimates show that the independent variables 
that are used to explain the mispricing phenomenon have different impacts at 
different levels of mispricing. This variation is consistent across all the four 




that the impacts of the independent variables vary significantly across all levels of 
mispricing in all four countries. 
 Limitations and future research 
Like any other empirical study, our results should be interpreted with caution. The 
variables used to examine the mispricing may not reflect a fully developed 
empirical model. It is possible that some variables are not included in our model 
which also have an impact on mispricing. For example, we do not have data to 
examine the role that underwriters play by performing price support activities or by 
providing analysts’ recommendations. We also do not have data that identifies 
institutional investors and retail investors. It would be insightful to understand the 
impact that different types of investors have on the levels of mispricing. Such an 
information would allow to examine Rock (1986) winner’s curse model in full 
(refer to Section 2.2.1.1). Future studies could add these and other variables to 
develop a better informed model. 
Future research could expand our analysis in multiple dimensions. One example 
being an in-depth analysis of the overpriced IPOs could be conducted to further our 
understanding of what to date has been a neglected feature of IPO markets around 
the world. Further, the application of the QR approach to Finance in general, and 
IPOs in particular is very recent. Studies like ours, Lee et al. (2010), and Badru and 
Ahmad-Zaluki (2018) provide new perspective about the mispricing phenomenon. 
Future studies can refine the application of QR approach to provide fresh insights. 
We have briefly used the scientometric technique to map the mispricing literature 
and it could be further used to map the literature to identify gaps. Such techniques 
in combination with data mining techniques would be useful to understand the 
impact of the language used in IPO prospectus on mispricing. A recent study by 
Loughran and McDonald (2013) is one such study in this direction. Finally, future 
studies can extend the finance and growth literature by examining the impact of 
stock market behaviour in general and IPOs performance in particular on economic 
development and vice versa, as indeed the money invested in IPOs is a scare 
economic resource and should be allocated efficiently. 
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Appendix A: Process of conducting scientometric 
analysis 
 
We start with gathering relevant scholarly work which primarily includes journal 
articles and books. The sources of this information are the databases which are 
designed to categorise, store, index and distribute the scholarly work. The most 
commonly used sources for locating relevant peer-reviewed articles are Web of 
Science, Scopus, and JSTOR. These sources have established electronic databases 
to store, categorise, index and disseminate the research articles. These databases 
allow users to access and download the metadata of the stored research articles. The 
metadata includes attributes of the articles like title, author(s), year of publication, 
key terms, subject area, journal and in some cases, the abstract. This metadata can 
be used to establish the scope and breadth of the available literature, identify key 
authors and conduct some preliminary trend analysis. 
Extracting the metadata from these journal databases starts with writing a proper 
search query. The search query is a combination of keywords which encompass the 
area of interest – IPO mispricing in our case. The online journal databases then use 
different sets of algorithms to extract the articles that are most relevant to the 
entered keywords as the search query. The online journal databases also allow users 
to apply various filters to the search query to obtain refined search results and the 
most relevant scholarly work. These restrictions include; searching for the key 
words appearing in the title and / or abstract and / or anywhere in the article. The 
online journal databases also allow using multiple keywords in one search query. 
We used a combination of search terms “IPO mispricing”, “IPO underpricing” and 
“IPO overpricing”, in the three main online journal databases (Web of Science, 
Scopus and JSTOR). The three search terms were used together with “OR” as a 
logical operator. This means the results that the databases returned would contain 
at least one of the three abovementioned keywords. The results obtained for the 
search query are reported in Table A.1. The highest number of articles was returned 
by Scopus for all the query types. Scopus holds a database hosting 2349 articles 
with at least one of the three search terms present in them somewhere in the article. 




abstract of the article, Scopus reported 605 articles. Finally, there were 185 articles 
with Scopus whose title contained either “IPO mispricing”, “IPO underpricing” or 
“IPO overpricing”. Web of Science hosted 406 articles with the keyword anywhere 
in the article with 123 articles having the keyword appearing in their title.32 Lastly, 
JSTOR hosted 663 articles with the keyword “IPO mispricing”, “IPO underpricing” 
or “IPO overpricing” appearing somewhere in the article, with 373 and 177 articles 
having the keyword appearing in their abstract and title respectively. 
 
Table A.1: Distribution of articles by query and database 
Query type No. of articles 
 Web of Science Scopus JSTOR 
Anywhere in the article 406 2349 663 
Abstract NA 605 373 
Title 123 185 177 
1. This table breaks down the number of articles sourced from each database. 
 
For creating the word-clouds shown in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 we used the data 
obtained regarding keywords that appear in research papers to classify the concept 
of the paper, and the corpus of abstracts of 2349 articles that were sourced from 
Scopus. The 2349 articles were those which had one of the keywords (IPO 
mispricing, IPO underpricing or IPO overpricing) appearing anywhere in the 
article. The body of text that is obtained from putting all the keywords and abstracts 
together is cleaned by filtering out the stop words.33 The size of the word is directly 
proportional to the frequency it is used – that is, a bigger font means the word was 
frequently used. 
The additional features that these online journal databases offer is that they store 
metadata of the article including year of publication, author(s) name, subject area 
and the source where the article is published. The year of publication can be used 
to rank the articles from the oldest to the newest. Publications can also be ranked 
according to the frequency of publications per year which indicates the evolution 
of the topic over the years. The year of publication information was used to create 
Figure 1.1.  
                                                 
32 Web of Science does not show abstracts of the articles in search results. 
33 Stop words are the most common words that appear in text, such as a, an, the, this, is, are, it etc. 




Appendix B: Definitions of variables and sources 
 
Table B.1: Snap shot of all the variables used in the thesis 
Variable Symbol used Definitions Source 
Firm assets logAssetsi Logarithm of one plus pre-IPO total assets. Used in: all four countries’ studies and the 
four countries combined study 
IPO prospectus, SDC 
platinum 
Firm age logAgei Logarithm of the firm’s age in years calculated from the difference between the 
foundation year and the time of the IPO. Used in: all four countries’ studies and the four 
countries combined study 
IPO prospectus, 
company website, 
Jay Ritter’s IPO 
database 
Earnings per share 
forecast 
EPSi EPS is the forecast earnings per share given in the prospectus. Used in: the US, China and 
Malaysia studies 
IPO prospectus 
EPS dummyi A dummy variable with the value of 1 if earnings forecast is provided in the prospectus 
and 0 otherwise. Used in: Australia study 
Retained ownership RetOwni Calculated as one minus the number of shares issued / total number of shares outstanding. 
Used in: all four country studies and the four countries combined study 
IPO prospectus, SDC 
Platinum 
Offer size logOSi Logarithm of offer size measured from the final offer price multiplied by the number of 
shares offered. Used in: all four countries’ studies and the four countries combined study 
IPO prospectus, SDC 
Platinum 
Issue method IMi A dummy variable with the value of 1 if the IPO is a fixed price offer and 0 for book 
building offered. Used in: all four country studies and the four countries combined study 
IPO prospectus, SDC 
Platinum 
Inverse of offer price InvOPi One divided by final offer price per share. Used in: all four country studies and the four 
countries combined study 
IPO prospectus, SDC 
Platinum 
Underwriter market share UMSi  
 
Calculated as the sum of total capital raised in IPOs by the underwriter in a year ‘t’, 
divided by the total capital raised by all the IPOs in the year ‘t’. Used in: the US, China 
and Malaysia studies. 
IPO prospectus, SDC 
Platinum, Bursa 
Malaysia 
UWi A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a financial institution is involved in the role of an 
underwriter and 0 otherwise. Used in: Australia study 




Table B.1 (continued) 
Variable Symbol used Definitions Source 
Venture capitalist VCi A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue had venture capitalists as shareholders at 
the time of the issue and 0 otherwise. Used in: all four country studies and the four 
countries combined study 
IPO prospectus, SDC 
Platinum 
No. of risk factors RFi No. of Risk Factors measures the risks reported in the IPO prospectus. Used in: China, 
Malaysia and the US studies and the four countries combined study 
IPO prospectus 
logRFi Logarithm of the number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus. Used in: 
Australia study 
MarketPerformancet-30 MP30i Pre-IPO 30-day performance of the market index where the stock is listed. Used in: all 
four countries’ studies and the four countries combined study 
Datastream 
Realised volatility t-30 RelVoli pre-IPO 30-day relaised volatility of the market index where the stock is listed calculated 
as the square root of (252*∑(ln(PXt-i/PXt-i-1))2 / N). Used in: all four countries’ studies 
and the four countries combined study 
Datastream 
Listing exchange Exchangei A dummy variable with value of 0 for the IPOs listed in the NYSE and 1 for those listed 
in the NASDAQ. Used in: the US study 
IPO prospectus, SDC 
Platinum, Stock 
exchange websites 
A dummy variable with value of 0 for SSE and 1 for SZSE. Used in: China study 
Board Boardi A dummy variable with value of 1 for IPOs listed in the Main Market and 0 for ACE 








Control of corruption ContofCorri Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests. Used in: combined study of all four countries 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2015) 
    




Table B.1 (continued) 
Variable Symbol used Definitions Source 
Government 
effectiveness 
GovtEffi Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
Used in: combined study of all four countries 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2015) 
Political stability PoliStabi Capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence 
and terrorism. Used in: combined study of all four countries 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2015) 
Regulation quality RegQuali Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Used in: 
combined study of all four countries 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2015) 
    
Voice and accountability VoiceAndAccti Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
a free media. Used in: combined study of all four countries 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2015) 
Rule of law RuleOfLawi Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Used in: combined 
study of all four countries 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2015) 
GDP per capita logGDP/Capita Logarithm of gross domestic product per capita. Used in: combined study of all four 
countries 
World bank’s data 
catalogue 
GDP growth rate GDP growth (%) Annual percentage change in gross domestic product per capita. Used in: combined study 
of all four countries 
World bank’s data 
catalogue 
1. The table provides a snapshot of the variables used in the thesis, their symbol, description and the data source. 
 
